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Synopsis
This dissertation focuses on multi-agent based negotiation between manufacturer agent
(MA) and material supplier agent (MSA) of supply chain networks when orders of MAs
are out of abilities of MSAs. Four dierent types of negotiations are discussed in this
dissertation: single-attribute single-item (SASI) negotiation, single-attribute multi-item
(SAMI) negotiation, multi-attribute single-item (MASI) negotiation, and multi-attribute
multi-item (MAMI) negotiation.
A coalition formation based negotiation protocol is proposed in this dissertation to solve
above mentioned negotiations. MSA are allowed to nd partners to establish coalitions
when orders of MAs are out of their abilities. A coalition can be established if and only
if all members in coalition reach an agreement. The coalition, which maximizes prot
of the out ability MSA, is determined as nal coalition. A combined coalition formation
protocol, which combines coalition formation for complementary and coalition formation
for substitution, is proposed when multi-item are involved in negotiation. Lead time
changes in multi-attribute negotiation which lead to the change of abilities of MSAs. In
that case, coalitions which are in ability at initial step may become out of ability during
negotiation. A modied coalition formation protocol, in which coalitions of MSAs change
at each negotiation step, is proposed for negotiation when multi-attribute involved. After
coalition is determined, prots are allocated according to contributions of members in
order to keep stability of coalition.
Then, negotiation between MAs and MSAs (coalitions) starts to determine equilibri-
ums. MAs in this dissertation are assumed have initiatives and more negotiation power.
MAs choose strategies rstly and then MSAs observes MAs decisions and make their own
strategies. Thus, iteration of negotiation between MA and MSA (coalition) to determine
equilibrium can be seen as MA-Stackelberg game to nd the Stackelberg equilibrium. In
Stackelberg game, the leader must know ex ante that the follower observes his action.
The follower must have no means of committing to a future non-Stackelberg follower
action and the leader must know this. Indeed, if the "follower" could commit to a Stack-
elberg leader action and the "leader" knew this, the leader's best response would be to
play a Stackelberg follower action. MAs and MSAs (coalitions) in MA-Stackelberg game
xiii
determine their strategies according to their own preferences, and concessions among at-
tributes and (or) items are considered to trade o one attribute and (or) item for another
attribute and (or) item when multi-attribute and (or) multi-item are involved in negoti-
ation. Weights for attributes are provided for MAs and MSAs (coalitions) to determine
their own preferences. Strategy of MA which maximizes MA's prot and accepted by
MSA will be determined as the nal equilibrium.
Finally, MAs negotiate with MSAs (coalitions) to determine nal allocation scheme
which maximizes overall prot of supply chain networks. A two-person like game is intro-
duced to determine nal allocation scheme, where all MAs are combined together as player
1 and all MSAs are considered as player 2. Strategy of player 1 is allocation scheme of as-
signing MAs to MSAs, and strategy of player 2 is allocation scheme of assigning obtained
orders from MAs to coalitions of MSAs. Objective of the game is to decide strategies of
players which can maximize total prot of supply chain networks. Therefore, allocation
scheme can be called as an equilibrium of the game if none of members of the players can
benet by changing its strategy while the other player keep its strategy unchanging. The
proposed method, which decomposes I  J game into J-person cooperative game to nd
coalition if necessary, two-person Stackelberg game to nd equilibrium, and two-person
game to determine nal allocation scheme, is a goody way to solve I  J game and greatly
reduce complexity to solve I  J game.
It's veried that proposed protocols are feasible and eective in solving all four kinds
of negotiations and are reciprocal protocols for both MAs and MSAs. For MAs, they
can reduce costs to divide orders into pieces and allocate to dierent MSAs by selecting
coalitions to keep integrities of orders, and reduce costs to buy materials by selecting
suppliers which have lower price but once have been abandoned due to their limited
abilities. For MSAs, the small-and-medium-sized MSAs have more opportunities to win
orders which were once out of their abilities by establishing coalition. In addition, the
proposed protocols can increase competitiveness of market. Furthermore, the proposed
protocols are very exible, because all MAs and MSAs can dene weights of attributes
and concession rates among dierent attributes and (or) items according to their own
preferences. They not only can tradeo one attribute to another, but also can tradeo
one item to another in order to maximize their total prots of whole order according to
their own preferences rather than maximize each attribute or item.
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Chapter 1 Research Overview
1.1 Introduction
Growing competition and emphasis on eciency and cost reduction, as well as the satis-
faction of consumer demands, have brought new challenges for businesses in supply chain
networks (SCNs). At the same time, supply chains (SCs) have become increasingly global-
ized, and the world environment has become lled with uncertainty. Agent technology and
particularly multi-agent systems was designed to capture many of challenges involved in
supporting changing supply chain practices [Chaib-draa and Muller, 2006]. Negotiation is
a very important problem of SCNs, which ranges from situations where resources must be
allocated to agents to situations involving agent-to-agent bargaining [Shen et al., 2001].
The objective of the negotiation is to achieve Pareto optimality. Game theory has be-
come a primary methodology used in supply chain (SC) related problems, because it's
a powerful tool for analyzing situations in which the decisions of multiple agents aect
each agent's payo [Cachon and Netessine, 2003]. This research tries to solve negotiation
problems under complex negotiation environment including multi-to-multi negotiation,
multi-attribute negotiation and multi-item negotiation.
1.2 Research Backgrounds
1.2.1 Multi-agent based supply chain networks
Supply Chains (SCs) are made up of heterogeneous production subsystems gathered
in vast dynamic and virtual coalitions. Intelligent distributed systems, e.g. multi-agent
systems, enable increased autonomy of each member in SC. Each partner pursues indi-
vidual goals while satisfying both local and external constraints [Maturana et al., 1999].
Therefore, one or several agents can be used to represent each partner in SC. Moreover,
the agent paradigm is a natural metaphor for network organizations, since companies
prefer maximizing their own prots than the prot of SC. The units of SC have the same
characteristics as agents [Chaib-draa and Muller, 2006, Cloutier et al., 2001]:
 Autonomy: A company carries out tasks by itself without external intervention and
1
has some kind of control over its action and internal state;
 Social ability: A company in SC interacts with other companies (e.g. by placing
orders for products or services) ;
 Reactivity: A company perceives its environment, i.e. the market and the other
companies, and responds in a timely fashion to changes that occur in it. In particular,
each rm modies its behavior to adapt to market and competition evolutions;
 Pro-activeness: A company can not only simply act in response to its environment,
but also initiate new activities (e.g. launching new products on the market).
Therefore, a SC can be dened as a system consists of material supplier agents (MSAs),
manufacturer agents (MAs), distributor agents, retailer agents, and consumer agents as
Figure 1.1, where materials ow downstream from MSAs to customer agents and infor-
mation ows in both directions [Ganeshan et al., 1999].
… … … ……
Material Supplier Agent
Manufacturer Agent
Distributor Agent
Retailer Agent
Consumer Agent
Information flow
Material flow
Figure 1.1: Negotiation model of supply chain networks
1.2.2 Multi-agent based negotiation of supply chain networks
Negotiation mechanisms have been studied widely in eld of multi-agent systems. They
possess a variety of features that enable agents be negotiate with each other even in open
environments. However, mainly because of limited computational power, there are several
assumptions that traditionally limit the degree of openness. Negotiation is restricted to
cognitive agents which possess an explicit knowledge of their environment, and interact
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and engage in cooperation with other agent.
A negotiation agent contains seven modules as Figure 1.2 [Wooldridge, 2001]:
 Environment sensing module: senses resource information of negotiation environment;
 Information processing module: calculates inventory level and bids;
 Communication module: negotiation mechanism is embedded in this module;
 Knowledge database: stores transaction information and partner information;
 Task: store and manage task information;
 Intelligent control and decision module: establishment of negotiation mechanism,
delivery arrangement, how to oer a bidder and how to select a partner are done in this
module;
 Execution module: orders are accomplished in this module including produce and
delivery.
Environment
sensing module
Information
processing module
Intelligent control and 
decision model
Execution
module
Tasks
Resource
information Other
MSAs
Knowledge
database
Communication
module
MSA
Figure 1.2: Architecture of negotiation agent
Negotiation is done by exchanging messages among agents (often only two). Since
the process involves several messages, a discussion will take place in which each agent's
attitude will be an important factor. This attitude is governed by an agent's beliefs
and goals and by the global situation. The negotiating process follows tactical rules,
which implement a strategy. Time may be important in limiting the length of negotiation
[Shen et al., 2001]. In general, negotiation process on multi-agent paradigm is divided
into three phases as Figure 1.3 [Jiao et al., 2006]:
 Inviting : manager agent inviting supplier agents when a task comes;
 Bidding : supplier agents bidding for task;
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 Awarding : supplier with maximal utility is selected as a winner, and the winner
supplier is awarded the contractor.
Inviting Bidding Awarding
Manager agent
...
Task
Supplier agent
winner
Figure 1.3: Processes of the negotiation
Recent studies have tended to focus on completely open and highly uncertain environ-
ments that apply agent systems to the real world [Ito et al., 2008]. Negotiation can be
seen as the process of arriving at a state that is mutually agreeable to a set of agents
and it is intimately related to coordination. The negotiation process can be used as a
part of a multi-agent coordination algorithm that implements, for instance, a contracting
mechanism for getting one agent to commit to solving a subproblem for another agent
[Shen et al., 2001]. Negotiation is done by exchanging messages among agents (often only
two) and there are dierent kinds of negotiations among MSAs, MAs, distributor agents,
retailer agents, and consumer agents as shown in Figure 1.1. However, all negotiations can
be concluded as negotiation between seller and buyer as Figure 1.4, where the seller has
diversity products to sell and the buyer has money to buy. This research focuses on the
negotiation between MAs (buyer) and MSAs (seller), and the results can be generalized
into the other negotiations as well.
products money
Seller Buyer 
Figure 1.4: Negotiation model between seller and buyer
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1.2.2.1 Negotiation protocol and negotiation strategy
Negotiation protocols set stage for negotiation process, which contain basic rules for
negotiation process and communication. In addition to using a protocol, each agent will
develop and use a negotiation strategy appropriate to the problem to be solved. Negotia-
tion protocols and negotiation strategies will be quite dierent for dierent categories of
negotiation, where negotiation protocols govern exchange of proposals among agents and
negotiation strategies decide position of a particular agent during negotiation process. As
noted by [Alonso, 1998]:"A strategy is a function from the history of the negotiation to
the current oer that is consistent with the protocol. It species precisely how an agent
will continue (what move it will make) given the protocol, the negotiation up to this point,
and its actual beliefs and intentions." Each agent strategy will depend strongly on the
type of application that each agent is involved in. [Shen et al., 2001] classied negotiation
strategies into following categories:
 Contract based negotiation: Each agent (manager) having some work to subcontract
broadcasts an oer and wait for other agents (contractors) to send bids. After some
delay, the best oers are retained and contracts are allocated to one or more contractors
who process their subtasks. The contract-net protocol provides for coordination in task
allocation, with dynamic allocation and natural load balancing. The approach is quite
simple and can be ecient. However, when the number of nodes is large, the number
of messages on the network increases, which can lead to a situation where agents spend
more time processing messages than doing the actual work. In the worst case that causes
the system stop through being ooded by messages. The choice of a contractor is done
by comparing bids corresponding to a particular oer and using whatever mechanism
relevant to the problem.
 Market based negotiation: In a market-based approach, the goal is to solve a dis-
tributed resource allocation problem. Equilibrium is reached when the prices of goods is
such that all resources are being used up. A particular agent wants to acquire goods but
is limited by budget. Thus, it will make oers based on the current price of goods and
its own preference. It has an internal utility function and its goal is to increase utility,
which corresponds to the hypothesis of rational behavior. However, in the market-based
approach using prices as a primary controlling mechanism, the convergence process may
be slow when involving a large number of oers.
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 Game theory based negotiation: Game theory based negotiation techniques have been
widely used in agent systems. The key concepts in this game theory approach to nego-
tiation are: utility functions, a space of deals, and strategies and negotiation protocols.
Utility values are built into a payo matrix which is typically common knowledge to both
the parties involved in the negotiation. The negotiation process involves an interactive
process of oers and counter-oers in which each agent chooses a deal which maximizes its
expected utility value. There is an implicit assumption that each agent in the negotiation
is an expected utility maximizer. At each step in the negotiation, an agent evaluates the
other's oer in terms of its own negotiation strategy. The negotiation process depends
heavily on the agents' goal of maximizing its utilities.
 Plan based negotiation: Plan based negotiation is based on cooperation strategies
for resolving conicts among plans of a group of agents. Agents need information from
others to be able to plan and function eectively and eciently. With this approach,
agents know in advance exactly what actions they will take and what interactions will
occur. By requiring such a complete specication of behavior, the plan can realistically
only have a short-term horizon due to the unpredictability of events in the environment.
Thus, the negotiation and planning are very tightly intertwined and inevitably suers
from limitations inherent in centralized or distributed multi-agent planning.
 AI based negotiation: It appears that almost every form of human interaction re-
quires some degree of explicit or implicit negotiation. Hence, it is not surprising that
many researchers draw from human negotiation strategies, which often leads to using AI
techniques such as logic, case-based reasoning, and constraint-directed search.
 Other approaches: Negotiation strategies are more dicult to model in situations
where conicts arise between dierent sets of beliefs, and exchanged arguments then have
to be taken into account. Extensive symbolic reasoning can be required at each stage and
may depend closely on the context of the particular application. There are still many other
approaches such as: time-limited, genetic algorithms based, socio-psychological theories
based, argumentation-based and so on.
All methods have their own merits and demerits in solving related problems of SCN.
However, when there are conicts and decisions of agents aect each agent's payo, game
theory has advantages. That's because it is a powerful tool for analyzing interactive
optimization problems. Therefore, this research introduces game theory into negotiation
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to solve conicts between MAs and MSAs. A review on related works in this area will
be discussed in next section. There are two main types of games applied in SC: non-
cooperative game and cooperative game.
1.2.2.2 Game theory based negotiation
(a) Non-cooperative games in SCNs
There are many non-cooperative games in game theory, and Nash game and Stackelberg
game are two main games which had been applied into SCNs. Nash game is a simultaneous
move game where players concurrently make their decisions without any communication.
Nash equilibrium [Nash, 1950] is the most central solution concept for games. It denes
how rational agents should act in settings where an agent's best strategy may depend on
what another agent does, and vice versa. In Stackelberg game, the Stackelberg leader
player chooses a strategy rstly and then the Stackelberg follower player observes this
decision and makes its own strategy choice. Since in many SCN models the upstream rm
possesses certain power over the downstream rm, the Stackelberg equilibrium concept
has found many applications in SCM literatures.
[An et al., 2007] introduced Stackelberg game in SC analyses to solve potential conicts
between manufacturing partners at various process. A CNP-based negotiation protocol
amongst enterprises with marketing science models was proposed in [Kaihara et al., 2006]
and [Kaihara and Fujii, 2008]. N -person game theoretic is included in the horizontally
specialized business model to realize the coordination amongst enterprise in the same busi-
ness segment. The seller and buyer relationship was considered in [Esmaeili et al., 2009]
by using non-cooperative structure, specially, regarded the interaction between buyer and
seller as a Stackelberg game. [Leng and Parlar, 2010] analyzed both simultaneous-move
and leader-follower games to respectively determine the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria
and nd the globally optimal solution that maximizes the system-wide expected prot.
[Hezarkhani and Kubiak, 2010] derived coordinating transshipment prices that always
give rise to a coordinating contract for the chain using the generalized Nash bargaining
solution. [Kurata and Nam, 2010] formulated a Nash game model and a manufacturer-
leader Stackelberg model to explore whether the equilibrium after-sales level that a man-
ufacturer and a retailer decide upon is equivalent to the optimal after-sales service in
terms of customer satisfaction. [Lovejoy, 2010] developed a bargaining-based solution to
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the negotiation between two adjacent multi-rm tiers and show its consistency with famil-
iar solution concepts form the theories of Nash bargaining. [de Albeniz V. and G., 2011]
modeled the situation where a prot-maximizing retailer who seeks to allocate its shelf
space capacity to n products of the same category from competing suppliers as a Stack-
elberg game and then analyzing the Nash equilibrium resulting from the supplier's pric-
ing decisions. [SeyedEsfahani et al., 2011] established Nash game model, Stackelberg-
manufacturer game model and Stackelberg-retailer game model to study the eect of SC
power balance on the optimal decisions of SC members. [Javid and Hoseinpour, 2011] use
Nash model and Stackelberg model to investigate the coordination of cooperative advertis-
ing decisions in a SC with one manufacturer and one retailer. [Hu et al., 2011] introduced
Nash game and Stackelberg game involving a fair internal price to reduce lead-time hedg-
ing and increase the rm's overall prot. [Yin and Nishi, 2011] applied Stackelberg game
model into solve a decision making on purchased quantity of raw materials, price, in-
ventory and production. [Xia, 2011] revealed the equilibrium prices, market segments
and overall prots for the suppliers based on game theory. [Rezapour et al., 2011] ap-
plied Stackelberg game in SCNs design problem anticipating later competition with the
existing rival chain in the markets. [Wu, 2011] investigated the equilibrium behavior of
a two-echelon SC in vertical Nash, manufacturer's Stackelberg and retailer's Stackelberg
strategies. [Lu et al., 2011] applied game theory in manufacturer Stackelberg, retailer
Stackelberg and vertical Nash SC scenarios to obtain the equilibrium solutions for every
entity.
(b) Cooperative games in SCNs
In light of cooperative game theory, a supply network can be modelled as a coalition
of partners pooling their resources and sharing the same utility function. The Pareto
ecient solutions of cooperative game was obtained by optimizing weighted sum of sell-
ers's and buyer's objective functions in [Esmaeili et al., 2009] . [Zhao et al., 2010] took a
cooperative game approach to consider the coordination issue in a manufacturer-retailer
SC using option contracts. [SeyedEsfahani et al., 2011] established one cooperative game
model to study the eect of SC power balance on the optimal decisions of SC members.
[Renna and Argoneto, 2011] proposed a cooperative mechanism based on game theory for
capacity sharing in a network of independent plants.
The key point of using game theory is to nd equilibriums of the games. Methods,
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which are used to nd equilibriums of Nash game and Stackelberg game, are investigated
in follows.
(c) Methods of nding equilibrium
 Nash game: [Mckelvey and McLennan, 1996] reviewed the methods for numerical
computation of Nash equilibria for general nite n-person games and [Stengel, 2002] sur-
veyed the algorithms for computing Nash equilibria of two-person games. [Sjostrom, 1991]
provided a constructive way of checking whether or not a social choice correspondence can
be implemented in Nash equilibria. Nash equilibrium was found by nding the reaction
functions in [Reyniers and Tapiero, 1995] and the Nash equilibrium occurs where reac-
tion curves intersect. [Koller et al., 1996] computed the Nash equilibria of a two-person,
non-zero-sum game by linear complementarity problem. [Jorgensen and Zaccour, 1999]
identied the Markov perfect Nash equilibrium by the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman ap-
proach of dynamic programming. [Govindan and Wilson, 2003] combined the global New-
ton method and the homotopy method to compute Nash equilibria of nite games.
[Govindan and Wilson, 2004] developed a algorithm for computing Nash equilibria of N -
player games by iterated polymatrix approximation. [Sandholm et al., 2005] presented
a mixed integer program formulations for nding Nash equilibria in games (specically,
two-player normal form games). [Littman and Stone, 2005] presented a polynomial-time
algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player games under the
average-payo criterion. [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006] presented a technique for reduc-
ing a normal-form game to a smaller normal-form game for the purpose of computing a
Nash equilibrium. [Porter et al., 2008] presented a pair (2-player and n-player) of algo-
rithms for nding a sample Nash equilibrium. [Leng and Parlar, 2010] found the Nash
equilibrium by using the best response functions. The subgame perfect (Nash) equi-
librium was obtained in [Xiao et al., 2010] by employing backward induction technique.
[Hoda et al., 2010] developed rst-order algorithms to approximate Nash equilibria of two-
person zero-num sequential games by applying Nesterov's smoothing technique to the
saddle-point formulation of the Nash equilibrium problem. [Sinha and Sarmah, 2010] cal-
culated the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium by the intersection of the best response functions.
[Hu et al., 2011] calculated the Nash equilibrium from the rst order derivatives based
on their strictly quasi-concave function. [SeyedEsfahani et al., 2011] calculated the Nash
equilibrium by solving the rst order equation and KKT rst order necessary conditions of
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extreme value theorem. [Wu, 2011] used the rst order condition and backward induction
technique to determine Nash equilibrium.
 Stackelberg game: [Cachon and Netessine, 2003] found an equilibrium of a Stackelberg
game by solving a dynamic two-period problem via backwards induction. [An et al., 2007]
located the Stackelberg equilibrium by the best response function and the backward
induction solutions. [Esmaeili et al., 2009] transformed the nding of the Stackelberg
equilibrium into an unconstrained nonlinear function where the optimal solution can
be found using a grid search. [Leng and Parlar, 2010] found the Stackelberg equilib-
rium by using the best response functions. [Kurata and Nam, 2010] calculated the equi-
librium by solving rst order condition. [Hu et al., 2011] calculated Stackelberg equi-
librium from the rst order derivatives based on their strictly quasi-concave function.
[SeyedEsfahani et al., 2011] calculated the Stackelberg equilibrium by solving the rst or-
der equation and KKT rst order necessary conditions of extreme value theorem. A new
combinatorial Simulated Annealing and Branch & Bound meta-heuristic solving method
was proposed by [Rezapour et al., 2011] to nd the solution of the von-Stackelberg model.
[Wu, 2011] used the rst order condition and backward induction technique to determine
Stackelberg equilibrium.
 Other games: [Owen, 1975] used the duality theory of linear programming to ob-
tain equilibrium price vectors of the n-person game. [Bhat and Leyton-Brown, 2004]
presented algorithms for computing both symmetric and arbitrary equilibria of Action-
graph games using a continuation method. [Ganzfried and Sandholm, 2010] developed
the rst mixed-integer programming formulations for computing a "-equilibrium in large
games of imperfect information by solving an innite approximation of the original game.
[Yin and Nishi, 2011] proposed a solution algorithm based on embedding quantity dis-
count policy into the manufacturing optimization algorithm and solved this problem by
using an Outer Approximation technique. [Lu et al., 2011] calculated the equilibrium by
solving the response function and rst order condition.
1.2.3 Multi-agent based coalition formation of supply chain net-
works
Coalition formation problem considers techniques and criteria that might be used by a
collection of (rational) agents to decide how they might group together to improve individ-
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ual or social utility. It has been and continues to be studied in research eld of multi-agent
systems [Asselin and Draa, 2002]. There are a lot of work focused on coalition formation
among organizations of SCNs. [Shenoy and Lawrence, 1979] emphasized on coalition for-
mation, two models of coalition formation are proposed based on theory of n-person
games. [Ketchpel, 1995] formalized coalition formation problem in decision theoretic and
game theoretic terms and presents a fully distributed algorithm that can eciently de-
termine coalitions that will be approximately stable. [Gamson, 1961] presented a theory
of coalition formation to apply to a full-edged coalition situation. [Aumann et al., 1974]
connected a given solution notion with the same solution notion applied to appropriately
dened games on each of the coalitions. [Sandholm and Lesser, 1995] extended the game
theory to a normative, domain-independent theory of coalitions in combinatorial domains.
[Klusch and Shehory, 1996] presented an approach for cooperation and coalition forma-
tion among information agents for heterogeneous databases. [Nagarajan and Sosic, 2008]
reviewed coalition formation models in a SC from the viewpoint of game theory. Feasibil-
ity and benets of general approach of price and production coordination is investigated in
[Granot and Yin, 2008] via alliance formation in a SC setting and show that alliance for-
mation has a signicant eect on ineciency stemming from decentralization of suppliers
in a push system, system's performance depends on the number of alliances.
Related works of application of coalition formation in SCNs are surveyed as follows:
1.2.3.1 Coalition formation of supply chain
[Hennet and Mahjoub, 2010] represented supply network design problems as problems
of optimal coalition formation. [Lin and Hsieh, 2012] studied selection of chain part-
ners using cooperative coalitional game and formation continues until a stable Cournot-
Nash equilibrium is reached. [Yang and Fong, 2012] discussed on dynamic SC formation.
[Kim and Cho, 2010] presented a concrete method as a solution to SC formation problem
by using agent negotiation based on a Single Machine Earliness/Tardiness model.
1.2.3.2 Coalition formation of buyers
Coalition formation among buyers can be seen as a group-buying game. [Li et al., 2004]
envisioned combinatorial coalition formation problem by forming coalitions buyers to
enlarge quantity in each transaction and take advantage of price discounts. A nego-
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tiation protocol and decision mechanism for buyers to form coalition was provided in
[Sombattheera et al., 2004] when appropriate. [Ito et al., 2002] proposed a new group buy
scheme for agent-mediated electronic markets. [Yamamoto and Sycara, 2001] proposed a
new buyer coalition formation scheme which enables a large number if buyers to form
coalitions. [Hyodo et al., 2003] discussed optimal allocation of buyers in the group buy-
ing using a search algorithm based on GA. An alternative, physics-motivated mechanism
for coalition formation of buyers that treats agents as randomly moving, locally interacting
entities was proposed in [Lerman and Shehory, 2000]. [Tsvetovat et al., 2001] presented a
exible test-bed system to implement and test coalition formation of groups of customers.
[He et al., 2003] surveyed the buyer coalition formation. [Asselin and Draa, 2002] de-
signed a protocol for the formation of coalitions of consumers as buying groups, with
which consumers could to negotiated their preferred values of attributes of products.
1.2.3.3 Coalition formation of sellers
[Sombattheera et al., 2004] provided a negotiation protocol and decision mechanism for
sellers to form coalition when appropriate. [Jin and Wu, 2006] studied the formation of
supplier coalitions in on-line reverse auctions. [Argoneto and Renna, 2010] proposed a
coalition formation algorithm for small and medium suppliers not able to fully respond to
the customer requests based on the Nash equilibrium concept. [Renna, 2010] carried out
the coalition model by a coalition agent, which knows the current processing order and
collects the supplier counter oers.
1.2.3.4 Other coalition formation
[Sombattheera et al., 2004] provided a negotiation protocol and decision mechanism for
logistic provider to form coalition when appropriate. [Bonnevay et al., 2005] analyze the
dynamic of negotiation to deal with the problem of dynamically form coalitions and the
obtain of an equilibrium solution.
1.2.4 Negotiation Model
Automated negotiation provides an important mechanism for distributed decision mak-
ers, both human participants and autonomous agents, to reach agreements. With the
support of an automated negotiation system, human participants can simply input their
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preferences, requirements, etc. into the system and the representative agents can help
negotiate the contents automatically. Such a procedure not only simplies but also ac-
celerates the negotiation processes. Imagine a human coordinator in a large organization
who may need to negotiate with many members in the group on dierent issues on the
same day. A face-to-face, one-to-one negotiation approach would be extremely time con-
suming and thus impact the operational eciency of the organization. Automated ne-
gotiation provides a mechanism for autonomous agents to reach multiple agreements on,
e.g., task allocation, resource sharing, and surplus division more quickly and eciently
[Lai and Sycara, 2009].
1.2.4.1 Single-attribute negotiation and multi-attribute negotiation
Existing research on negotiation problems can largely be divided into two categories:
single-attribute and multi-attribute negotiation. While single-attribute negotiation prob-
lem has been extensively studied, and researches on multi-attribute negotiation is still
at an early stage. In this section, we mainly reviewed related works on multi-attribute
negotiation.
Multi-attribute (multi-issue) negotiation is both necessary and ubiquitous in commerce,
and therefore important. It is a useful mechanism in real life. There are numerous
situations where agents have to negotiate multiple issues at the same time. For example,
in the human environment, a supplier and a buyer may need to negotiate the quantity,
price, and delivery time of a supply contract at the same time. Likewise, an employer
and an applicant may need to negotiate the position, wage, and training opportunities
simultaneously. In the agent world, two (or more) agents in an organization commonly
need to decide how to allocate multiple tasks or share a set of resources. In these situations,
lack of agreement on any one issue can bring the whole process to a halt. Second, besides
being a necessary part of the business environment, multi-attribute negotiations may also
benet agents when they have dierent preferences among the issues. Because they can
trade o one issue for another, the agents may reach an agreement that makes them
mutually better o. For instance, when selling automobiles, dealers can simply sell them
at a single price, but they often introduce nancing, insurance, warranty, and spare parts
packages into the contract. It might be cheaper for the dealers to discount these packages
rather than directly lower the price of the automobile. The buyers are then more willing
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to accept the automobile price, as they may nd that the price of buying those packages
individually is much higher. Thus, by negotiating multiple issues together, they can
achieve a "win-win" outcome that would not be possible by negotiating a single issue
[Lai et al., 2008, Lai and Sycara, 2009].
Multi-attribute negotiation can be much more complicated than single attribute nego-
tiation. The complexity arises from the following factors [Lai and Sycara, 2009]:
 First, in a multi-attribute negotiation, an agent's utility depends on all issues. As a
result, making an appropriate oer becomes more complex, since in each step, an agent
may nd that a number of oers provide her with the same utility level, i.e., are equally
advantageous to her. Which oer to propose at each juncture is usually nontrivial; this
decision impacts the opponent's utility and thus his response. If an agent can select the
oer that maximizes the opponent's utility in each step, the opponent is more likely to
accept the oer. The agent is therefore able to concede less and consequently achieve
more utility.
 Second, negotiations in practice often take place in environments where information
is incomplete. The parties might be meeting for the rst time and thus know nothing
about each other. While it may be possible for the parties to deduce each other's utility
function and strategy in a single-attribute negotiation, it becomes much more dicult
when multiple issues are involved. Moreover, the negotiation context in practice may
also vary over time. The agents might not even have a denitive sense of their own
preferences before a negotiation. The traditional approach to this problem is to apply
preference elicitation before a negotiation. However, preference elicitation is known to be
a dicult and time-consuming procedure, especially when the preferences of the agents
are complex.
 Third, in a multi-attribute negotiation, it is important to achieve a Pareto-optimal
solution. Rational agents should not leave "extra money" on the table. But achieving
a Pareto-optimal settlement between self-interested agents in an incomplete information
environment is dicult.
Therefore, multi-attribute negotiation is a more challenging eld of research than single-
attribute negotiation. A multi-attribute negotiation system must enable agents to nego-
tiate issues eciently and robustly in a domain in which agents might not know each
other's preferences or even have a complete picture of their own preferences.
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Barbuceanu and Lo presented a generic negotiation architecture that uses multi-attribute
utility theory principles to reach agreements that satisfy multiple interdependent objec-
tive [Barbuceanu and Lo, 2000]. Bui et al. proposed a number of heuristics that could
be used to develop trading mechanism based on multi-attribute utility theory, and pre-
sented a number of algorithms that initially focus on the issues that divide the buyer and
sellers [Bui et al., 2001]. Teich et al. described a multi-attribute e-auction mechanism
for auctioning multiple units of good, primarily in B2B transactions [Teich et al., 2006].
Hemaissia et al. proposed a negotiation protocol suited for multiple agents with complex
preferences and taking multiple interdependent issues and recommendations made by
the agents into account at the same time to improve a proposal [Hemaissia et al., 2007].
Ito et.al proposed an auction-based multiple-issue negotiation protocol among nonlin-
ear utility agents [Ito et al., 2008]. Lai and Sycara reviewed the existing research on
multi-attribute negotiation and discussed the gap between the existing work and an ap-
plicable automated multi-attribute negotiation system, and nally presented a generic
framework with two new mechanisms that consider incomplete information, Pareto op-
timality, and tractability [Lai et al., 2008, Lai and Sycara, 2009]. An agent-based multi-
attribute soft-bargaining method for bilateral contracts in a multi-agent market was pre-
sented in [Kebriaei and Majd, 2009] to facilitate negotiation among agents, and a multi-
dimensional fuzzy satisfaction set is proposed for the attributes. Petric and Jezic ad-
dressed a multi-attribute auction model for agent-based content trading in telecom mar-
kets [Petric and Jezic, 2010]. Rao et al. designed a multi-attribute auction mechanism for
addressing the decision making problem of multi-attribute and multi-source procurement
of a kind of homogeneous continuous divisible goods [Rao et al., 2012]. Kersten proposed
typology of concession-making in multi-bilateral negotiation and multi-attribute auctions
[Kersten et al., 2013]. Most of the above work focus on one to one negotiation, and few of
them discuss negotiation between one buyer and multiple sellers. However, to the best of
our knowledge, there is no research address multi-attribute negotiation between multiple
buyers and multiple sellers.
1.2.4.2 Single-item negotiation and multi-item negotiation
In this dissertation, items are indicated for dierent kinds of products. Negotiation
related to items can be divided into: single-item negotiation and multi-item negotiation.
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Most of researches are focused on previous one, because it's the most common situation
to discuss attributes (e.g. price) of one specic item (product). However, it's a common
situation that a MA must buy multiple kinds of items to produce its product (like a bill of
materials to specify raw materials and components that make up a product) and it's also
general that some items can be supplied by the same supplier. For example, a car company
needs to buy screws, valves, lamps, horns, and so on. There are dierent kinds of lamps
such as headlamps, turn signal lamps, fog lights, tail lights, and emergency lights, but can
be supplied by one lamp supplier. Therefore, the car company will negotiate multi-item
(combine all lamps together) at the same time with lamp supplier rather than respectively
negotiates on individual lamp. In that case, MAs and MSAs may reach agreements that
make them mutually better o by trading o among items. Furthermore, it will be a
heavy workload and waste time for MAs to negotiate each item when there are diversity
items to be ordered.
Most works on multi-item auctions suppose two simplifying conditions: quantities
of items to sell are xed as well as quantities requested by buyers. However, these
two hypotheses do not meet requirements of many situations where negotiations are
used. Researchers try to relax these assumptions where available quantities are not
xed [Lengwiler, 1999] as well as quantities requested by buyer [Ben-ameur et al., 2002].
[Ito et al., 2002] focused on multi-item negotiation, where items are substitute and sellers
exchange items when they do not have enough abilities. None of them focused on coali-
tion formation among sellers (suppliers). Shi and Hu using evaluation mechanism and
Nash solution to determine winner of negotiation in which items are combined as a set
[Shi and Hu, 2006]. [Roh and Yang, 2008] proposed an iterative multi-item unit-demand
and unit-supply double-auction mechanism, in which buyers want to buy at most one
item out of the many available and each seller has a single item to sell. A structure of
utility graphs in multi-item negotiation was constructed through collaborative ltering of
aggregate buyer preferences [Robu and Poutre, 2008].
1.3 Research Objectives
Recent studies have tended to focus on completely open and highly uncertain environ-
ments that apply agent systems to the real world. Negotiation is done by exchanging
messages among agents (often only two) and there are dierent kinds of negotiations
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among material supplier agents, manufacturer agents, distributor agents, retailer agents,
and consumer agents. However, all negotiations can be concluded as negotiation between
seller and buyer, where the seller has diversity products to sell and the buyer has money
to buy. This research focuses on negotiation between manufacturer agents (buyer) and
material supplier agents (seller) because it's an essential and important issue of negotia-
tion for supply chain networks. All negotiation models mentioned in section 1.2.4 focus
on simple situations, where attributes and items are considered respectively. However,
in real cases, it's much more complicated some times. Thus, this research considers all
possible combination of situations as shown in Figure 1.5, where four dierent types of
negotiations (single-attribute single-item (SASI) negotiation, single-attribute multi-item
(SAMI) negotiation, multi-attribute single-item (MASI) negotiation, and multi-attribute
multi-item (MAMI) negotiation) between one-MA and multi-MSA and between multi-MA
and multi-MSA are discussed, respectively. It is assumed in this dissertation that only
MSAs are allowed to form coalitions when the order of MA is out of their abilities. No
MA is allowed to form coalitions. That's because this dissertation focuses on the situation
where large-sized MAs and small-and-medium-sized MSAs are involved. Furthermore, it
is assumed that all MAs must be allocated to one MSA or coalition.
Single-attribute
Single-item
One-MA and multi-MSA
Multi-item
Multi-MA and multi-MSA
One-MA and multi-MSA
Multi-MA and multi-MSA
Multi-attribute
Single-item
One-MA and multi-MSA
Multi-item
Multi-MA and multi-MSA
One-MA and multi-MSA
Multi-MA and multi-MSA
Figure 1.5: Negotiation model classication
SASI negotiation is the most common negotiation and has been extensively studied.
However, MAs may need to buy multiple kinds of items to produce its product (like a bill
of materials to specify raw materials and components that make up a product) and it's
also general that some items can be supplied by the same MSA. In that case, MAs and
MSAs may reach agreements that make them mutually better o by trading o among
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items. Thus, SASI negotiation is extended to SAMI negotiation.
Multi-attribute (multi-issue) negotiation is both necessary and ubiquitous in commerce,
and therefore important. It is a useful mechanism in real life. There are numerous
situations where agents have to negotiate multi-attribute at the same time. In the agent
world, two (or more) agents in an organization commonly need to decide how to allocate
multiple tasks or share a set of resources. In these situations, lack of agreement on
any one issue can bring the whole process to a halt. Besides being a necessary part
of the business environment, multi-attribute negotiations may also benet agents when
they have dierent preferences among the attributes. Because they can trade o one
attribute for another, the agents may reach an agreement that makes them mutually
better o. Thus, by negotiating multi-attribute together, they can achieve a "win-win"
outcome that would not be possible by negotiating a single-attribute. Multi-attribute
negotiation can be much more complicated than single-attribute negotiation, and it is a
more challenging eld of research than single-attribute negotiation. Both SASI negotiation
and SAMI negotiation are generalized into MASI negotiation and MAMI negotiation in
this research, respectively.
Furthermore, it is a common situation in manufacturing system that there exist large-
sized MAs as well as small-and-medium-sized MSAs. In that case, the orders of MAs may
be too big for the small-and-medium-sized MSAs to supply independently. MAs either
select the large-sized MSAs or split the orders into pieces and then allocated to multiple
small-and-medium-sized MSAs. MAs need to nd the optimal MSA for each piece of the
order if they want to split the orders into pieces, and also may need to pay for external
fees (e.g. Transportation fee for each piece). It will be a hard work (waste time and with
heavy workload) for MAs to split orders into pieces when there are diversity items with
big quantity to place. MAs may choose the large-sized suppliers even with higher cost
rather than the small-and-medium-sized MSAs with lower cost to reduce workload. In
that case, both MAs and MSAs lose prots. MAs may need to pay more for the large-
sized MSA. On the other hand, the small-and-medium-sized MSAs lose opportunities to
compete for the orders because of their limited abilities. Therefore, it's important to nd
a reciprocal way for MAs to improve their prots and for small-and-medium-sized MSAs
to increase their competitiveness. Thus, this dissertation tries to nd another way to
solve this problem. The proposed coalition formation based negotiation protocols provide
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eective and stable ways to solve the related problems. Main proposal is a hierarchical
game based negotiation protocol. A cooperative game is introduced into nding coalitions
among MSAs when it is necessary. Stackelberg game is used to nd equilibrium of the
negotiation between MA and MSA or coalition. Then, a two-person game is applied to
nd the nal allocation scheme between MAs and MSAs based on the above acquired
coalitions and equilibriums. Details of the hierarchical game will be discussed in Chapter
3.
Moreover, this research applies game theory into negotiation. Final objective of negoti-
ation between multi-MA and multi-MSA is to determine allocation scheme of IJ game.
Thus, an ecient way to solve I  J game will be another purpose of this research. It
is solved by decomposing I  J game into J-person cooperative game to nd coalition
if necessary, two-person Stackelberg game to nd equilibrium, and two-person game to
determine nal allocation scheme.
1.4 Thesis Outline
Remaining chapters of this dissertation are outlined as follows:
The second chapter gives a detail description of coalition formation mechanism. In
this chapter, MSAs are allowed to nd partners to establish coalitions when order of MA
is out of their abilities. Both coalition formation determination for single-item involved
negotiation and multi-item involved negotiation are discussed. Prot allocation among
members of coalition is discussed after coalition is determined. Moreover, a modied
coalition formation is proposed when multi-attribute is involved during negotiation.
In chapter 3, SASI negotiation between MA(s) and MSAs is presented. A two-stage
negotiation protocol for SASI negotiation between one MA and multi-MSA is proposed.
Stackelberg game is introduced to nd equilibriums of negotiations between MA and MSAs
or coalitions. Then, negotiation is extended between multi-MA and multi-MSA, where
a hierarchical-game based negotiation protocol is presented. Simulations are provided to
verify feasibility and eectiveness of proposed protocols. Finally, a compared protocol, in
which MAs split orders into pieces and allocated to dierent MSAs, is provided. Internal
comparisons of proposed protocols is provided to evaluate parameter settings and exter-
nal comparison between proposed protocol and compared protocol is presented to verify
eectiveness and superiority of the proposed protocols.
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In chapter 4, SASI negotiation is generalized into SAMI negotiation when there is one
MA and multi-MSA and when there are multi-MA and multi-MA, respectively. Coalition
formation based negotiation protocols are provided, where coalition formations for com-
plementary and substitution are combined together. Simulations and comparisons are
provided as well.
In chapter 5, MASI negotiation is discussed. Three attributes including price, quantity
and lead time are considered simultaneously. Concessions among attributes are addressed
as well. Simulations when there is one-MA and multi-MSA and when there are multi-MA
and multi-MSA are provided to illustrate feasibility of the proposed protocols, respectively.
Finally, comparison protocols are presented and compared with the proposed protocols.
Chapter 6 focuses on MAMI negotiation between MA(s) and MSAs. A modied coali-
tion formation mechanism is presented to get used to the changing of abilities of MSAs
(coalitions). Not only is concessions among attributes, but also weights of attributes of
MAs and MSAs are considered. MAs and MSAs can determine the weights according to
their own preferences. Simulation and comparisons are provided as well.
Chapter 7 summarizes entire research work and concluding remarks as well as direction
of future research activities are discussed.
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Chapter 2 Coalition Formation Mechanism
2.1 Introduction
Coalition formation problem considers techniques and criteria that might be used by
a collection of (rational) agents to decide how they might group together to improve
individual or social utility. Coalitions are ubiquitous in real-life settings. Theoretical
underpinnings of approaches to coalition formation lie in literature on multi-player games
in game theory. Players negotiate among themselves about payos to decide which coali-
tion to join. In reality, it is more complex than that. Self-interested agents, operating
in dynamic environment such as supply chain (SC), are under heterogeneous constraints.
Furthermore, each agent has its own strategies that increase or decrease the value of each
constraint thus aects decision making of agents [Sombattheera et al., 2004]. While time
is changing in dynamic environment, the value of a constraint varies thus aecting utility
of agent. In contrast to traditional coalition formation study, where coalition value is
predened and thoroughly known among agents, an agent has to calculate, according to
its constraints and strategies, for coalition that would give it maximum utility. The key
components of successful coalition formation of self-interested agents are: quickly negoti-
ating with other agents, and selecting the best possible coalition. Each agent, bounded
by its own constraints, may negotiate with others to form a coalition, which is likely to
yield maximum benet. Such a coalition, however, may not be formed due to the con-
straints. So the agent has to look for the next best possible coalition by consulting with
its internal utility mechanism. Negotiation and decision must be done in a timely fashion.
In this chapter, collaboration among material supplier agents (MSAs) in SC is discussed.
It includes two important components: a negotiation protocol and a decision mechanism.
The negotiation protocol allows agents to exchange necessary information before deciding
which coalition to join.
2.2 Cooperative Game based Coalition Formation Model
A coalition structure in a n-person game is a partition of the set of players. A game in
characteristic function form, or simply a game, is a pair (N; v), where N is a nite set (the
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set of players), and v is a real-valued characteristic function on the family of subsets of N .
A payo vector for N is a real-valued function x on N ; it may be thought of as a vector
whose coordinates are indexed by the players. A coalition structure S on N is a partition
of N . A game with coalition structure S is a triple (N , v, S) [Aumann et al., 1974].
Main assumption in cooperative game theory is that grand coalition will form. The
challenge is then to allocate the payo among players in some fair way. This assumption
is not restrictive, because even if players split o and form smaller coalitions, we can
apply solution concepts to the subgames dened by whatever coalitions actually form.
A solution concept is a vector that represents the allocation to each player. Researchers
have proposed dierent solution concepts based on dierent notions of fairness. Some
properties to look for in a solution concept include:
 Eciency: the payo vector exactly splits the total value;
 Individual rationality: No player receives less than what he could get on his own;
 Existence: The solution concept exists for any game;
 Uniqueness: The solution concept is unique for any game;
 Computational ease: The solution concept can be calculated eciently;
 Symmetry: The solution concept allocates equal payments to symmetric players;
 Additivity: The allocation to a player in a sum of two games is the sum of the
allocations to the player in each individual game;
 Zero Allocation to Null Players: The allocation to a null player is zero.
Main solution concept for the cooperative game are: Core, Shapley value, Kernel, and
Nucleolus. This research focuses on the core of the game. Let v be a game, the core of
v is the set of payo vectors: C(v) = fx 2 R : P
i2N
xi = v(N);
P
i2S
xi  v(S); 8S  Ng.
In words, the core is the set of imputations under which no coalition has a value greater
than the sum of its members' payos. Therefore, no coalition has incentive to leave the
grand coalition and receive a larger payo.
In light of cooperative game theory, a supply network can be modelled as a coalition of
partners pooling their resources and sharing the same utility function (prot). Partnership
building problem can then be modelled as a cooperative game with transferable utilities
(TU-game). A TU-game can thus be seen as a target model on which partners can agree
to estimate the maximal value of chain and shares of global prot acceptable to all of
them [Hennet and Mahjoub, 2010]. A coalition can be dened as a group of agents that
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have decided to cooperate in order to achieve a common goal. Let Sj = (Sj1;    ; SjN)
denotes all the partitions (coalition structure) for MSA j, Sij = (sij1,   , sijl,   ) is one
possible coalition of MSA j for MA i, l is index of the coalition. Let Sij be the optimal
coalition set of the game, which can maximize utility of MSA j. A supply network can
be modeled as a coalition of partners pooling their resources and sharing the same utility
function in light of cooperative game theory [Esmaeili et al., 2009]. For example, MSA
j in Figure 2.1 is out of ability of order of MA i, thus, it needs to negotiate with other
MSAs to nd a coalition. sijl in Figure 2.1 is one of coalitions which consists of MSA j,
MSA 1, and MSA j + 1.
MSA 1
MSA 2
MSA j-1MSA j+1
MSA J
MSA j
s i
jl
Leader
Follower
Figure 2.1: Coalition formation of MSA j
In real market, order happens frequently out of abilities of MSAs. MSAs will be com-
pelled to reject order against their wills due to their limited abilities. In order to resolve
this problem, researchers tend to decompose order into pieces and then allocate to mul-
tiple MSAs under this situation [Kraus, 1997, Chai et al., 2010]. However, it wastes time
to decompose orders into pieces and allocate to dierent MSAs, and may cause external
fee (e.g. transport fee) when MAs have diversied items (products) to order. Thus, this
research tries to nd another way to solve this problem which can maintain integrity of
order. All MSAs in proposed model are allowed to make unions to increase their powers
and share their tasks when orders are out of their abilities, and then compete for orders
with the other MSAs or coalitions after coalition is successfully established.
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Denitions, assumptions, and rules used in this chapter are given as follows:
Denition 2.1: The MSA, which launches coalition formation mechanism and cannot
nish order by itself, is dened as a leader-MSA (LMSA); and the other MSAs, which
agree to establish a coalition, are dened as follower-MSAs (FMSAs).
Denition 2.2: Coalition formation of MSA j is called as a coalition for comple-
mentary if MSA j can supply item k but ability of item k is less than requested quantity
(0 < Aijk < q
M
ijk); while coalition formation is called as a coalition for substitution if MSA
j cannot supply item k at all (Aijk=0).
Assumption 2.1: If there are more than one MSAs agree to establish partnerships
with MSA j, MSA j selects MSA with the lowest cost.
Assumption 2.2: FMSAs accept to establish a coalition if one of following conditions
is satised: 1) they cannot nish the order by themselves but the order is protable; 2)
prot of belonging to a coalition is greater than that of completing the order by themselves.
Assumption 2.3: FMSAs can accept to be a member of coalition if and only if the
order is in their abilities.
Assumption 2.4: If there are more than one MSAs invite MSA j to establish part-
nerships, MSA j accepts order with the highest prot.
Rule 2.1: When an order is out of ability of FMSA j1, FMSA j1 accepts to establish
a coalition with LMSA j2 if and only if combined price of coalition (p
C
ij1lk
) is greater than
or equals to its minimum price (pSij1k); when order is in its ability, FMSA j1 accepts to
establish a coalition with LMSA j2 if and only if combined price of coalition (p
C
ij1lk
) is
greater than its initial price (pSIij1k).
Rule 2.2: An agreement can be obtained if and only if all members in coalition have
positive prots.
Rule 2.3: Order is allocated according to contribution to the order of each item of each
member.
MSA j checks order to make sure whether the order is in its ability or not when MA i
announces its order (pMIijk , q
M
ijk, lt
M
ijk). Ability of MSA j for order of MA i is calculated by
equation (2.1). Evaluate matrix can be got as E = [eijk] according to Aijk and q
M
ijk. The
value of eijk equals to 1 if Aijk is greater than or equals to q
M
ijk, and it equals to 0 if Aijk is
less than qMijk. Coalition formation mechanism is triggered if eijk equals to 0. Combined
price of coalition is calculated by equation (2.3), where the rst multiplier is discount of
24
coalition and the second multiplier is average price of all members in coalition which can
supply item k. Payo of coalition sijl, upper bound and lower bound of price of MSA j
are calculated by equation (2.7), equation (2.8), and equation (2.9), respectively.
Aijk = jkLT
MAX   X
i2OLj
QSijlk; 8i; 8j; 8k (2.1)
LTMAXjk = maxflti0jkM ; ji0 2 OLjgg; 8j; 8k (2.2)
pCIijlk = (1 + jk)
P
j02sijlk
pSIij0k
Nijlk
; 8i; 8j; 8l; 8k (2.3)
pCLijlk =
P
j02sijlk
pSLij0k
Nijlk
; 8i; 8j; 8l; 8k (2.4)
pCUijlk =
P
j02sijlk
pSUij0k
Nijlk
; 8i; 8j; 8l; 8k (2.5)
ACijlk =
X
j02sijl
Aij0k; 8i; 8j; 8l; 8k (2.6)
Cijl =
X
j02sijl
KX
k=1
(pCij0lk   Cj0k)QSij0lk; 8i; 8j; 8l (2.7)
pSUjk = (1 + 
U
jk)Cjk; 8j; 8k (2.8)
pSLjk = (1 + 
L
jk)Cjk; 8j; 8k (2.9)
Where
i: index of MA
j: index of MSA
l: index of coalition
k: index of item
t: index of iteration of negotiation
Ujk: upper bound of the percentage of prot of item k of MSA j
Ljk: lower bound of the percentage of prot of item k of MSA j
jk: productivity of item k of MSA j
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Aijk: ability of item k of MSA jfor MA i
ACijlk: ability of item k of coalition sijl
Cjk: cost of of item k MSA j
LTijk: lead time of item k of the order of MA i
Nijlk: number of MSAs in coalition sijl can supply item k
OLj: order list
1 of MSA j
pCIijlk: initial price of item k of coalition sijl
pSIijk: initial price of item k of MSA j
pSLjk : lower bound of price of item k of MSA j
pSUjk : upper bound of price of item k of MSA j
QSijlk: quantity of MSA j of item k obtained from sijl
sijl: l
th coalition of MSA j for MA i
jsijlj: number of members in sijl
Cijl: prot of coalition sijl
2.3 Coalition Formation Protocol
Coalition formation protocol is concluded as follows based on rules and assumptions
proposed in section ??. Each MSA has a candidate list 2 to record all possible coalitions
and sorts them by their combined price in descending order. Flowchart of coalition for-
mation is shown in Figure 2.2 and protocols for LMSA and FMSA are shown as follows:
(a) For LMSA
 Step L1: Updates its candidate list;
1The order list is used to record all accepted orders of MSA j.
2A candidate list of MSA j is used to record all coalitions which have sent a request to it, and then
it selects the rst one of candidate list with which it has maximum prot.
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list
(Step L1)
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and send a request
(Step L2)
Accepted ?
(Step L3)
In ability?
End
Yes 
Delete all the 
candidates related 
to this MSA
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order
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Check the combined 
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(Step F2)
Accept the 
order
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Yes 
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Yes
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(Step F3)
First one?
Accept the 
order
Yes 
Reject the order
Start
NoNoEstablish a coalition
(Step L4)
Reject the order
Any response?
No
Yes
Yes
No
Figure 2.2: Flowchart of the coalition formation protocol
 Step L2: Selects the rst candidate, sends a request to it, and waits for its response;
 Step L3: If candidate accepts the request, goes to step L4, if candidate rejects the
order, then deletes all candidates related to this MSA and goes back to step L1;
 Step L4: Establishes a coalition with this candidate and coalition formation ends.
LMSA makes decision according to Assumption 2.1 when there are more than one
FMSAs agree to establish partnerships.
(b) For FMSA
 Step F1: Checks owner of the order. If it is in its ability, goes to step F2; else goes
to step F3;
 Step F2: Checks combined price of the coalition. If it is greater than its own price,
accepts the request; else rejects the request;
 Step F3: Checks its candidate list. If the LMSA is the rst one, accepts the request;
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else rejects the request.
2.3.1 Coalition formation determination
Each player j 2 J seeks to maximize its prot SCijlj by belonging to a coalition sijl. The
coalition is determined only if all MSAs in sijl reach an agreement based on Rule 2.1
and Rule 2.2. All MSAs want to belong to coalitions with the highest prot.
2.3.1.1 Single-item involved coalition determination
Determination of nal coalition of MSA j for MA i, in which there are only one item
involved (k = 1), can be solved by nding solution of following problem [Yu et al., 2012b]:
SF ij = argmaxsijl
fSCijljg; 8i; 8j (2.10)
s.t. ACijlk  qMijk; 8i; 8j; 8l; 8k (2.11)
SCijlj > 0; 8i; 8j; 8l (2.12)
where SCijlj is prot of MSA j by belonging to sijl and is calculated by equation (2.25).
Equation (2.11) indicates determined coalition must be in ability of order of MA i. Equa-
tion (2.12) means prot of MSA j of belonging to sijl must be positive.
2.3.1.2 Multi-item involved coalition determination
When there are multi-item (k > 1) involved in coalition formation, MSA j which is
out of ability of items will trigger coalition formation mechanism to nd partners. For
example, MSA j in Figure 2.3 is out of ability of item 1 and item K, thus, it needs to
nd partners to supply item 1 and item K, respectively. sijl1 = fMSA j, MSA j  1, and
MSA Jg and sijlK = fMSA j, MSA 2, MSA j +1, and MSA j   1g in Figure 2.3 are one
of possible coalitions for item 1 and item K.
Multi-item involved coalition determination is discussed in follows. The coalition for-
mation can be divided into coalition formation for complementary and coalition formation
for substitution according to Denition 2.2. Hence, determination can be divided into
two categories as well.
(a) Coalition for complementary
Coalition formation for complementary is negotiation among MSAs which supply the
same item. MSA j wants to nd partners which can supply item k for complementary
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MSA J MSA 2
MSA 1
MSA j-1MSA j+1
MSA j
Leader
Follower
Item 1 Item 2 ...
sijl1
LMSA
FMSA
In ability
Out of ability
sijlK
Item K
Figure 2.3: Multi-item involved coalition formation of MSA j
(e.g. The LMSA j in Figure 2.4 can supply item k but it is out of its ability. Thus, it
selects MSA j0 and MSA j which can supply item k but doesn't select MSA j" for it
cannot supply item k). It selects coalition which can maximize its prot and total ability
must be greater than or equal to requested quantity of MA as well.
MSA j’
MSA j
LMSA
Item 1 Item 2 ... Item K ...Item k 
Item 2 Item k 
MSA j”
Item k-1 
MSA j*
Item k 
FMSA
Can supply & in ability
Can supply & out ability
Figure 2.4: Coalition formation for complementary
Therefore, nal coalition of MSA j for item k of MA i is determined as SFCijk by
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solving following problem:
SFCijk = argmaxsijl
f(pCIijlk   Cjk)QSijljkg; 8i; 8j; 8k (2.13)
s.t. ACijlk  qMijk; 8i; 8j; 8l; 8k (2.14)Y
j02sijlk
Aij0k 6= 0; 8k (2.15)
where equation (2.13) is used to nd coalition, in which it can get maximum prot.
QSijljk is obtained quantity of item k of MSA j by belonging to sijlk and is calculated
by equation (2.24). Equation (2.14) is used to ensure coalition sijlk has enough ability
for order of MA i. Equation (2.15) is used to ensure that coalition is for complementary
(each member in sijlk can supply item k).
(b) Coalition for substitution
Coalition formation for substitution is triggered when Aijk=0, which means MSA j
cannot supply item k at all and wants to nd partners who can supply item k. It is
assumed that MSA j in coalition formation for substitution only selects FMSAs which
can supply item k but cannot supply the items that are in abilities of LMSA j in order
to ensure its prot will not be shared by the other MSAs (e.g. The LMSA j in Figure 2.5
cannot supply item k. Thus, it selects MSA j00 which can supply item k, but doesn't
select MSA j0 and MSA j, because MSA j0 cannot supply item k at all and MSA j can
supply item k but also can supply item 2 which is in ability of LMSA j).
MSA j
Item 1 ... Item K Item 2 Item k 
MSA j’
Item 2 
MSA j”
Item k 
MSA j*
Item k Item 2
LMSA
FMSA
Can supply & in ability
Can not supply 
...
Figure 2.5: Coalition formation for substitution
As we know, LMSA j wants to enhance its competitiveness as well. Therefore, it has
30
prone to selecting partners which has minimum price of item k. Thus, nal coalition of
MSA j for item k is determined as SFSijk by solving following problem:
SFSijk = argminsijl
f
P
j02sijlk p
SI
ij0k
Nijlk
g; 8i; 8j; 8k (2.16)
s.t. ACijlk =
X
j02sijlk
Aij0k  qMijk; 8i; 8j; 8l; 8k (2.17)X
j02sijlk;Aijk0qMijk0
Aij0k0 = 0; 8i; 8j; 8j0 6= j; 8k0 6= k (2.18)
where equation (2.16) is used to nd coalition, which has minimum price of item k,
to enhance possibility to win the order. Equation (2.17) is used to ensure the selected
coalition sijlk has enough ability for order of MA i, and equation (2.18) is used to ensure
the selected coalition is for substitution.
(c) Combined coalition formation
Both coalition formation for complement and coalition formation for substitution are
in ideal situations. In the rst one, it assumes that MSA j selects coalition in which
all members supply the same item(s). In the later one, it assumes that MSA j selects
coalition in which all members cannot supply item(s) which is(are) in its ability. However,
in real case, it may be much more complex. The member MSA j0 2 sijl may not only
can supply item(s) which is(are) out of MSA j's ability but also can supply item(s) which
is(are) in MSA j's ability. Therefore, it's better to form a combined coalition for order of
MA instead of forming a coalition for each item. Final coalition of MSA j for MA i can
be determined as SFij by solving following problems:
SFij = argmax
sijl
f
KX
k=1
(pSFIijlk   Cjk)QFijlk; 8i; 8j (2.19)
s.t. ACijlk  qMijk; 8i; 8j; 8l; 8k (2.20)
pSFIijlk = (1  Sign(Aijk))
P
j02SFS
ij0k
pSIij0k
Nij0lk
+ Sign(Aijk)
P
j02SFC
ij0k
pSIij0k
Nij0lk
; (2.21)
8i; 8j; 8l; 8k
QFijlk =
Aijkq
M
ijk
ACijlk
; 8i; 8j; 8l; 8k (2.22)
Sign(x) =
(
1; if x > 0
0; otherwise
(2.23)
where equation (2.19) is used to nd coalition which maximizes utility of MSA j. Equa-
31
tion (2.20) means coalition sijl must be in ability of each item k. Equation (2.21) is used
to calculate nal price of item k of coalition sijl, when MSA j can supply item k but
out of ability, it equals to average price of coalition obtained from the coalition for com-
plementary, and when MSA j cannot supply item k at all, it equals to average price of
coalition obtained from the coalition for substitution. Equation (2.22) is used to calculate
nal acquired quantity of item k, and equation (2.23) is used to check whether MSA j0
can supply k or not.
2.3.2 Prot allocation
The problem of prot allocation among members after coalition gets order is discussed
in this section. Prot is allocated according to abilities of members when the order just
meets supplies of all members. However, it is possible that total ability of coalition ACijlk
is greater than qMijk. In other words, the order is not enough to fulll supply of the coalition.
Each player in coalition mainly interests in its individual benet and tries to maximize
its own prot. [Hartman and Dror, 1996] proposed three necessary criteria for good cost
allocation: stability, justiability, and computability. It can applied to allocation of prot
as well, since during coalition formation no participants should be enticed by reward
system to secede. All members in coalition should perceive that what they are obtained
is fair, and they will resist imposition of prots they nd unfair or unjustied. Prot
allocation policies that do not reect prot benets to members nor provide a level eld
will cause dissention. Thus, prot should be assigned impartially in order to maintain
stability of coalition. Allocation rule has been presented in section ?? for this purpose as
Rule 2.3.
Let SCijl be prot of player j 2 sijl. According to Rule 2.3, we have equation (2.24),
which means the order is allocated according to abilities of members. Then, prot is
allocated as equation (2.25).
QSijlk =
Aijkq
M
ijkP
j02sijl Aij0k
; 8i; 8j; 8l; 8k (2.24)
SCijl = 
C
ij0l
QSijlk
qMijk
; 8i; 8j; 8l (2.25)
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2.4 Modied Coalition Formation
A static coalition formation based negotiation protocol was proposed in section 2.3,
where coalition is established at the rst iteration of negotiation when MSAs are out of
abilities of orders and it doesn't change once established. However, the coalition which is
in ability at initial rounds may become out of ability during multi-attribute negotiation.
That's because in multi-attribute negotiation not only price is changing but also lead
time, which will lead to the change of ability of coalition. Therefore, a modied coalition
formation protocol which takes change of lead time into account is required during multi-
attribute negotiation.
A matrix E[t] = [eijk[t]] is dened for MSA j to evaluate whether order of MA i at t
is in its ability or not. eijk[t] equals to 1 when item k of order of MA i at t is in ability
of MSA j (Aijk[t]  qMijk[t]), and it equals to 0 if the order is out of MSA j's ability
(Aijk[t] < q
M
ijk[t]). Thus, order of MA i is said to be in ability of MSA j if and only if
for all items are in ability (Aijk[t]  qMijk[t], 8k), and it is out of ability at least one of
items is out of ability of MSA j (Aijk[t]  qMijk[t], 9k). At each iteration t, MSA j tries to
negotiate with other MSAs to establish a coalition if there exists item k and eijk[t] equals
to 0.
2.4.1 Modied coalition determination
At each negotiation iteration t, coalition SFij[t] which maximizes prot of MSA j at t
is determined as nal coalition by solving following problem [Yu et al., 2013a]:
SFij[t] = argmax
sijl[t]
f
KX
k=1
[(pfijlk[t]  Cjk)QFijlk[t]]; 8i; 8j; 8t (2.26)
s.t. ACijlk[t]  qMijk[t]; 8i; 8j; 8l; 8k; 8t (2.27)
pSFijlk[t] = (1  Sign(Aijk[t]))
P
j02SFS
ij0k[t]
pSIij0k
Nij0lk[t]
+Sign(Aijk[t])
P
j02SFC
ij0k[t]
pSIij0lk
Nij0lk[t]
; 8i; 8j; 8l; 8k; 8t (2.28)
QFijljk[t] =
Aijk[t]q
M
ijk[t]
ACijlk[t]
; 8i; 8j; 8l; 8k; 8t (2.29)
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where equation (2.26) is used to nd coalition which can maximize prot of MSA j at t,
and equation (2.27) indicates that nal determined coalition must be in ability of each
item k of MA i at t. Equations (2.28) - (2.29) are used to calculate nal price and quantity
of MSA j in sijl[t].
2.4.2 Prot allocation
Another important issue of coalition formation is how to allocate prot among its mem-
bers after coalition is determined. For single-attribute negotiation, prot was allocated
according to contributions to coalition, and was nally reduce to allocation of quantity
of the order. However, in multi-attribute negotiation, prot is evaluated according to all
attributes. Therefore, prot of coalition must be allocated according to all attributes of
its members. Thus, prot of each member j in sijl[t] is calculated by
SCijlj[t] =
KX
k=1
pMijk[t]QSijljk[t] 
KX
k=1
CjkQSijljk[t] + (LT
M
ijk[t]  ltSijk[0])cltSk ;
8i; 8j; 8l; 8t (2.30)
QSijljk[t] =
Aijk[t]q
M
ijk[t]P
j02sijl[t]Aij0k[t]
; 8i; 8j; 8l; 8k; 8t (2.31)
where the rst part of equation (2.30) is payment of MSA j received from coalition, the
second part is cost of MSA j to supply received part, and the third part is prot or loss of
extending or shortening lead time. Equation (2.31) is used to calculate obtained quantity
of MSA j by belonging to sijl[t].
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Chapter 3 Coalition Formation Based
Single-Attribute Single-Item Negotiation
3.1 Introduction
As we know, in real market, there are a lot of small-and-medium-sized companies. They
may have to reject large order of MA due to their limited abilities. This research mainly
focuses on situation when MSAs cannot nish orders independently. Researchers have
prone to let MA split its order and then allocate to dierent MSAs when the order is out of
abilities of MSAs [Kraus, 1997, Chai et al., 2010]. However, it wastes time to decompose
orders into pieces and allocate to dierent MSAs when MAs have large quantity orders.
Thus, this research tries to nd another way to solve this problem which can maintain
integrities of orders. All MSAs in proposed model are allowed to establish coalitions
when orders are out of their abilities, and then compete for orders with other MSAs
or coalitions after coalition is successfully established. Coalition formation based single-
attribute single-item (SASI) negotiation will be discussed in this chapter to show how
the proposed protocol solves negotiations between one-MA and multi-MA, and between
multi-MA and multi-MSA.
3.2 Single-Attribute Single-Item Negotiation between One-MA
and Multi-MSA
SASI negotiation between one-MA and multi-MSAs is discussed in this section. SASI
negotiation model of SCNs is shown in Figure 3.1. MA broadcasts an order (pMI , QM ,
LTM) to all MSAs, where pMI is initial price of MA, QM is quantity of the order, and
LTM is lead time of the order. Price of MA will be changed during negotiation, while
quantity QM and lead time LTM are constants and never change during negotiation. We
assume that:
Assumption 3.1: The negotiation environment is static1 .
Assumption 3.2: MA has initiative and has more negotiation power.
1Static means no new participant is allowed entering the negotiation after the negotiation starts
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Assumption 3.3: MSAs only can accept orders which are in their abilities.
Assumption 3.4: MSAs in negotiation model are allowed to trigger coalition forma-
tion mechanism (as Chapter 2) when the order is out of their abilities.
...
MSA 1
MAMSA 2
MSA J
(pMI, QM, LTM)
Figure 3.1: SASI negotiation model between one-MA and multi-MSA
3.2.1 Two-stage negotiation protocol
MA wants to nd the optimal MSA with the lowest price. It has been assumed that
MSAs only accept orders which are able to fulll by themselves. A two-stage negotiation
protocol is proposed as follows [Yu et al., 2012b]:
 Stage 1: Negotiation among MSAs. MSAs evaluate the order and check whether
it can be nished by themselves. If they can do it, they can directly go to the second
stage of negotiation; if they cannot, then they can negotiate with the other MSAs to
build coalitions. A cooperative game is used for coalition formation. At the end, the nal
determined coalitions or MSAs enter into the second stage.
 Stage 2: Negotiation between MA and MSA or nal coalition. MA negotiates with
the nal coalition to nd the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Flowchart is shown in Figure 3.2. The rst stage is used for preparation. There are
MSAs which cannot complete the order by themselves. Thus, they should nd partners
to build coalitions. The nal negotiation about price is started at the second stage.
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order in the market 
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End
MA adjusts the bid 
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Evaluate the order
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Coalition formation 
In ability?
No  
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Stackelberg game 
based negotiation 
No  
Second stage 
First stage
Exist such 
coalitions 
Yes
MA modifies the 
order
No  
Figure 3.2: Flowchart of the two-stage negotiation protocol
3.2.2 Negotiations among MSAs
MSA starts to negotiate with other MSAs in SCNs to establish a coalition if it cannot
complete the order by itself. The way to establish coalitions, determination of nal
coalition, and prot allocation have been discussed in section 2.3, section 2.3.1.1 and
section 2.3.2, respectively. Thus, nal determined coalition of MSA j for MA is indicated
as:
SFj =
8<: argmaxsjl f
SC
jl g; if Aj < QM
j; if Aj  QM
(3.1)
pSFIj =
P
j02SFj p
SI
j0
Nj
(3.2)
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pSFLj =
P
j02SFj p
SL
j0
Nj
(3.3)
AFj =
X
j02SFj
Aj0 (3.4)
where equation (3.1) indicates nal coalition of MSA j equals to itself if the order is in
its ability and equals to the coalition sjl which maximizes its prot when the order is out
of its ability. The price, lower bound of price, and ability of nal determined coalition
SFj equal to related price, lower bound of price, and ability of itself when the order is
in its ability and equal to those of coalition sjl which maximizes prot of MSA j when
the order is out of its ability, and are calculated by equation (3.2), equation (3.3), and
equation (3.4), respectively. And
Aj : ability of MSA j
ACj : ability of sjl
AFj : ability of SFi
Nj : the number of members in SFi
SCjl : prot of MSA j in coalition sjl
pCIjl : initial price of sjl
pCLjl : lower bound of price of sjl
pSIj : initial price of MSA j
pSLj : lower bound of price of MSA j
pSFIj : initial price of SFi
pSFLj : lower bound of price of SFi
The prot SCjl of MSA j of belonging to sjl is calculated by
SCjl = (p
CI
jl   Cj)QSjl (3.5)
QSjl =
AjQ
M
ACjl
(3.6)
where QSjl is the acquired quantity of MSA j by belonging to coalition sjl.
38
3.2.3 Negotiation between MA and MSA (coalition)
Negotiation between MA and nal determined coalition SFj of MSA j starts to reach an
agreement on price after SFj is determined. However, target of SFj is contrary to the one
of MA. MA aims to determine pMj [t] as lower as possible to maximize its prot, while MSA
wants to get the higher price the better. Moreover, it was assumed in Assumption 3.1
that MA in proposed model has initiative and more negotiation power. Decision makings
of MA and nal coalition in this model are not simultaneously. MA announces an oer
rstly, and then nal coalition gives a counteroer. Thus, interaction between MA and
SFj can be seen as a MA-Stackelberg game
2 [Esmaeili et al., 2009, Hu et al., 2011], where
MA is considered to be the Stackelberg leader. Objective of the leader is to design its
move to maximize its prot after considering all rational moves follower may devise. The
solution of this structure is to nd the Stackelberg equilibrium. MA chooses its strategy
from low to high, and MSA chooses the strategy from high to low. Final strategy equals
to the strategy pMj [t] of MA which maximizes prot of MA and is accepted by SFj.
Iteration of the negotiation is discussed in details in following sections.
3.2.3.1 Strategies without and with concession
(a) Strategies without concession
Strategies of MA and SFj are dened as:
pSFj [t] = p
SF
j [t  1] 
pSFj [t  1]  pMj [t]
(TN   tTS)=TS (3.7)
pMj [t] = p
M
j [t  1] +
pMU   pMj [t  1]
(TN   tTS)=TS (3.8)
pSFj [0] = p
SFI
j (3.9)
pMj [0] = p
ML (3.10)
where
pMj [t] : price of MA at t
pSFj [t] : price of SFj at t
2The Stackelberg leadership model is a strategic game in economics in which the leader rm moves
and then the follower rms move sequentially.
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pML : lower bound of price of MA
pMU : upper bound of price of MA
TN : Total negotiation time
TS : negotiation time of each iteration
(b) Strategies with concession
Sim et al. ([Sim and Wong, 2001, Sim, 2004]) proposed a MDA model for designing
negotiation agents that make adjustable rates of concession for a given market situation
by considering factors such as trading opportunity, competition, remaining trading time
and eagerness. Eect of the remaining trading time is considered here and concession
strategies are given as followings based on Sim's:
 For MA:
Mp [t] = T
M
p (tTS; TN; ")(p
MU   pM [t  1]) (3.11)
TMp (tTS; TN; ") = (
tTS
TN
)
1
" (3.12)
where
Mp [t]: the spread of price of MA at iteration t
Dierent strategies in making concession related to the remaining trading time are clas-
sied as follows ([Ren et al., 2009]):
- " = 0: means agent is totally not interested in negotiating;
- " = 1: makes a constant rate of concession;
- 0 < " < 1: makes a smaller concession in early rounds and larger concession in later
rounds.
 For MSA j:
Sjp[t] = T
S
jp(tTS; TN; ")(p
S
j [t  1]  pSLj ) (3.13)
T Sjp(tTS; TN; ") = (
tTS
TN
)
1
" (3.14)
where
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Sjp[t]: the spread of MSA j of price at round t.
Thus, equation (3.7) and equation (3.8) are reduced to:
pSF
0
j [t] = p
SF
j [t  1]  (
tTS
TN
)
1
" (pSFj [t  1]  pMj [t]) (3.15)
pM
0
j [t] = p
M
j [t  1] + (
tTS
TN
)
1
" (pMU   pMj [t  1]) (3.16)
3.2.3.2 Determination of equilibriums
Stackelberg strategy is applied when there is an asymmetry in power or in moves of
players [Kogan and Tapiero, 2007]. Determination of the negotiation agreement between
MA and SFj is transformed into determining equilibrium PFj of the Stackelberg game,
where SFj is nal determined coalition from section 3.2.2. We give following rule to nd
equilibrium:
Rule 3.1: The strategy of MA at t can be determined as the equilibrium if and only if
prot of SFj of taking this strategy is positive.
Thus, determination of the Stackelberg equilibrium can be transformed into solving the
following problem:
PFj = argmax
pMj [t]
fMj = (psell   pMj [t])QMg (3.17)
s.t. SFj > 0 (3.18)
AFj > Q
M (3.19)
where equation (3.17) indicates that the strategy of MA which maximizes its prot is
determined as the equilibrium, equation (3.18) means the determined strategy of MA
must be accepted by SFj as well, and equation (3.18) means the order of MA must in
ability of SFj. p
M
j [t] in equation (3.17) is calculated by equation (3.8) and equation (3.16)
when MA takes concession into account and doesn't take the concession into account. The
prot SFj of MSA j by belonging to SFj is calculated by equation (3.5) where p
CI
jl equals
to pMj [t] and QSjl equals to
AjQ
M
AFj
.
3.2.3.3 Determination of nal supplier
MA selects the MSA which maximizes its prot as nal supplier:
argmaxSFj fMj = (psell   PFj)QMg (3.20)
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s.t. PFj = argmax
pMj [t]
fMj = (psell   pMj [t])QMg (3.21)
SFj = argmax
sjl
fSCjl g: (3.22)
3.2.4 Simulation and analysis
It is supposed that there are one MA and 5 MSAs distribute in SCNs. Initial values
of MSAs are shown in Table 3.1 and the MA is price prior. Other parameters are set as:
Ljk = 0.2, j = 0.2, TN = 60s, TS = 2s, p
MU = 11, psell = 15, QM = 3000, and LTM
= 10.
Table 3.1: Parameter settings of MSAs
Supplier jk Cjk p
SU
jk
MSA 1 125 7.116 10.283
MSA 2 224 7.604 10.660
MSA 3 220 7.216 10.140
MSA 4 104 7.040 9.971
MSA 5 201 7.545 10.166
3.2.4.1 Verication
Feasibility of proposed protocol is veried in this part. All possible coalitions which
are in abilities of MSAs and related equilibriums are shown in Table 3.2. Final supplier
will be determined as coalition f314g with the lowest price 9.059 based on the results of
Table 3.2.
3.2.4.2 Analysis
We can see from above that feasibility of proposed protocol was veried. The results
indicate that proposed protocol is a good way to solve SASI negotiations between one-MA
and multi-MSA.
(a) Calculation time
Then, simulation is executed by 1000 times to verify eectiveness of proposed protocol.
Results are shown as Table 3.3, where average and standard derivation of calculation time
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Table 3.2: All possible coalitions and related equilibriums for MSAs
Index MSA1 MSA2 MSA3 MSA4 MSA5
sjl
1 f12g f21g f31g f412g f51g
2 f123g f213g f312g f4123g f512g
3 f1234g f2134g f3124g f41235g f5123g
4 f12345g f21345g f31245g f4125g f51234g
4 f1235g f2135g f3125g f413g f5124g
6 f124g f214g f314g f4135g f513g
7 f1245g f2145g f3145g f415g f5134g
8 f125g f215g f315g f42g f514g
9 f13g f23g f32g f423g f52g
10 f134g f234g f324g f4235g f523g
11 f1345g f2345g f3245g f425g f5234g
12 f135g f235g f325g f43g f524g
13 f145g f24g f34g f435g f53g
14 f14g f245g f345g f45g f534g
15 f245g f35g f54g
PFjl
1 9.218 9.218 9.087 9.146 9.198
2 9.186 9.186 9.186 9.140 9.260
3 9.140 9.140 9.140 9.180 9.225
4 9.180 9.180 9.180 9.195 9.180
5 9.225 9.225 9.225 9.059 9.195
6 9.146 9.146 9.059 9.130 9.172
7 9.195 9.195 9.130 9.133 9.130
8 9.260 9.256 9.172 9.192 9.133
9 9.087 9.252 9.252 9.169 9.363
10 9.059 9.169 9.169 9.212 9.282
11 9.130 9.212 9.212 9.243 9.212
12 9.172 9.282 9.282 9.061 9.243
13 9.133 9.192 9.061 9.155 9.232
14 9.198 9.243 9.155 9.172 9.155
15 9.363 9.232 9.172
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of proposed protocols with and without concessions to nd solutions are presented. We
can see the proposed protocols both with and without concession are eective and stable
in solving SASI negotiation, and the protocol with concession is more superior than the
protocol without concession.
Table 3.3: Calculation time of SASI negotiation between one-MA and multi-MSA
Calculation time (sec) Without concession With concession
Avg. 0.00089 0.00069
S.D. 0.00626 0.00321
(b) Comparisons of the protocols with & without concession
Comparisons between the protocols without concession and with concession are pro-
vided where " = 0.3. We take negotiation between MA and f14g as an example. Results
are shown in Figure 3.3. We can see that the protocol with concession reaches the same
agreement with the protocol without concession. However, it is faster than the protocol
without concession to reach an agreement of the negotiation.
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Figure 3.3: Comparisons of the protocol without concession and with concession
Furthermore, convergence rate of negotiation related to concession rate " is discussed
in follows. Negotiation is simulated under " = 0.1, " = 0.2, " = 0.3, " = 0.3, " = 0.4, "
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= 0.6, " = 0.7, " = 0.8, " = 0.9, " = 1, and " = 2, respectively.
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Figure 3.4: Negotiations under dierent concession rate "
Results are shown in Figure 3.4, and we can see that convergence rate greatly depends
on value of " and the higher the value of " the faster to reach an agreement.
3.3 Single-Attribute Single-Item Negotiation between Multi-MA
and Multi-MSA
SASI negotiation between multi-MA and multi-MSA is discussed in this section. SASI
negotiation model is shown in Figure 3.5, where I MAs and J MSAs are involved. Ne-
gotiation between multi-MA and multi-MSA can be seen as a I  J game. A game in
normal form consists of: players, a set of strategies available to each player, and payos
received by each player [Leng and Parlar, 2005].
All MAs should play with all MSAs to determine nal trade partnerships. MSA should
trigger coalition formation mechanism (see section 2.3) to nd possible coalitions if the
order is out of its ability. There are many strategies for MAs and MSAs (coalitions)
to select during negotiation. Thus, MAs and MSAs (coalitions) should play with each
other to determine nal strategies. A hierarchical structure is proposed and is shown in
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Figure 3.5: SASI negotiation model between multi-MA and multi-MSA
Figure 3.6. There are three layers in hierarchical structure: physic layer, logic layer for
coalition, and logic layer for equilibrium. All MAs and MSAs (coalitions) are actually in
the same physic layer. When the order of MA is out ability of MSA then the logic layer for
coalition is triggered to nd coalitions. It is a changeable hierarchical game. It is a two-
layer game when all orders are in abilities of all MSAs. However, it is a three-layer game
when there are some orders out of abilities of some MSAs. The rst layer game is between
multi-MA and multi-MSA (coalitions) and it aims to nd the optimal allocation scheme to
maximize total prot of SCNs. The second layer game is not necessary, and it is triggered
to nd coalitions among MSAs if and only if the order of MA i is out of ability of MSA
j. The third layer game is between strategies of MA and MSA (coalition) to determine
nal equilibrium of product. These three layer games constitute the hierarchical-game.
3.3.1 Hierarchical-game based negotiation protocol
Protocol of hierarchical-game based negotiation is described in details as follows:
 Step 1: MAs announce orders to all MSAs and wait for responses. If there are some
MSAs agree to start negotiation, and then go to Step 2; else go to Step 6.
 Step 2: The rst layer game between MAs and MSAs (coalitions) starts and then
each MSA evaluates each order and checks whether the order is in its ability or not. If it
is in its ability, it agrees to start negotiation, and then goes to Step 4; if it is not in its
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Figure 3.6: Hierarchical structure of SASI negotiation
ability, and then it goes to Step 3.
 Step 3: MSA tries to nd partners to establish coalitions using cooperative game,
and then checks whether there exists such coalitions. If there exists, it agrees to start
negotiation, gives a response to MAs, and goes to Step 4; if there does not exist, then it
rejects the order and gives a response to MAs.
 Step 4: The Stackelberg game between MA and MSA (or each possible coalition
of MSA) is triggered to nd the Stackelberg equilibrium of each game, and then checks
whether equilibrium is found or not. If it is found, MSA feeds it back to the rst layer
game and goes to Step 5; if it is not found, and then both MA and MSA (coalition) modify
their strategies and negotiation iterates until equilibrium is found or terminal condition
is reached.
 Step 5: The rst layer game tries to determine the optimal solution so as to determine
nal allocation scheme to maximize total prot of SCN.
 Step 6: MAs modify initial values of orders, and then go to Step 1 to re-announce
the orders.
Flowchart of hierarchical-game based negotiation is described in Figure 3.7. The rst
layer game, which aims to nd the optimal allocation scheme to maximize total prot
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of SCNs, is between multi-MA and multi-MSA. The second layer game is among MSAs
to nd all possible coalitions. The third layer game is between multi-strategy of MA
and MSA (coalition) to determine nal strategy. These three layer games constitute the
hierarchical-game. There is a nested structure in hierarchical structure, where the second
and the third layer games are nested inside the rst layer game. The rst layer game
starts, and then the second and the third layer games are triggered if necessary. However,
the rst layer game can be nished if and only if the second and the third layer games
have been nished. In other words, the rst layer game is based on results of the second
and the third layer games. Details of the protocol will be discussed in following sections.
3.3.1.1 First-layer game based negotiation
In the rst layer game, it tries to determine nal allocation scheme after all MSAs send
their responses. It can be seen as a two-person game (see Figure 3.8), where all MAs
are considered as player 1 and all MSAs are combined as player 2. Strategy of player 1
is allocation scheme Uw of assigning MAs to MSAs, where Uw = [u1; :::; uI ], and ui = j
indicates that MA i is allocated to MSA j. Strategy of player 2 ~Uv is allocation scheme of
assigning obtained orders from MAs to coalitions of MSAs, where ~Uv = [~uji]JI , ~uji = l
indicates obtained order of MSA j from MA i is allocated to the lth coalition sijl[TFijl] of
MSA j at TFijl, and ~uji =  indicates MA i is not allocated to MSA j. Objective of the
game is to decide strategies of players which can maximize total prot of SCNs. Therefore,
allocation scheme can be called as an equilibrium of the game if none of members of
the players can benet by changing its strategy while the other player keep its strategy
unchanging. The innovative point is the players in the two-person game actually consist
of multiple players.
Prots of player 1 and player 2 are dened as:
1 =
IX
i=1
Mij =
IX
i=1
(pselli   PFij)QMi (3.23)
2 =
JX
j=1
Sij =
JX
j=1
X
i2OLj
(PFij   Cj)QSijj0 (3.24)
where
1: prot of player 1
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Figure 3.8: Two-person game
2: prot of player 2
Mij : prot of MA i with MSA j
Sij: prot of MSA j with MA i
Cj: cost of MSA j
OLj: order list of MSA j
pselli: selling price of MA i
PFij: nal equilibrium of the negotiation between MA i and SFij
qMi : quantity of MA i
QSMij : acquired quantity of MSA j
0 by belonging to SFij
PFij is nal equilibrium determined in section 3.3.1.2. Then, strategy determinations
of player 1 and player 2 are discussed in following. Both player 1 and player 2 aim to
maximize their prots. Player 1 has prone to selecting supplier with the lowest price to
increase its prot, and player 2 has prone to selecting manufacturer with the highest price
to increase its prot. Following assumption is obtained:
Assumption 3.5: MSA j chooses MAs according to their price from the highest to
the lowest if there are more than one MAs want to select MSA j as nal supplier, but
MSA j cannot accept all of them.
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Final allocation scheme are determined according to M and Nij. Matrixes M = [mij]
and Nij = [nijl] are given to show nal schemes of order allocation, where mij and nijl
equal to 1 or 0. There is only one matrix M to record nal allocation of orders of MAs to
MSAs. The value of mij equals to 1 means MA i is allocated to MSA j and mij equals to
0 means MA i is not allocated to MSA j. Matrix Nij is used to record allocation of the
order MSA j obtained from MA i to its coalitions. It exists only if eij equals to 0 and mij
equals to 1. The value of nijl equals to 1 means the order is allocated to the l
th coalition
of MSA j and nijl equals to 0 means the order is not allocated to the l
th coalition of MSA
j.
Determination of nal coalitions and nal strategies are given in section 3.3.1.2 and
3.3.1.3, respectively. It leads to local optimal solution if we determine the optimal alloca-
tions after determining nal coalitions and strategies. Thus, all three layers are combined
together to nd the optimal scheme to maximize total prot of SCNs. Thus, whole prob-
lem is:
max f1 +2g
=
IX
i=1
JX
j=1
LX
l=1
nijlQ
M
i (pselli   PFijl) +
IX
i=1
JX
j=1
LX
l=1
nijlQSijlj0(PFijl   Cj)(3.25)
s.t.
JX
j=1
LX
l=1
(nijl
X
j02sijl
Aij0)  QMi ; 8i (3.26)
IX
i=1
LX
l=1
nijlQSijlj0  AUj ; 8j (3.27)
JX
j=1
LX
l=1
nijl = 1; 8i (3.28)
nijl 2 f0; 1g; 8i; 8j; 8l (3.29)
where
Aij0 : ability of MSA j
0 for MA i
AUj : upper bound of the ability of MSA j
PFijl: nal equilibrium of the negotiation between MA i and coalition sijl
QSijlj0 : acquired quantity of MSA j
0 by belonging to coalition sijl
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and nijl is a decision variable. In equation (3.25), what we should pay attention to are
PFijl and QSijlj0 , where PFijl and QSijlj0 respectively equal to PFij and Q
M
i when MA
i negotiates with MSA j and the order is in ability of MSA j. Equations (3.28) - (3.29)
mean that each order must and only can be allocated to one MSA or coalition.
Final trade allocation scheme M3 and N are determined according to nijl after solving
equations (3.25) - (3.29), where:
mij =
NCX
l=1
nijl; 8i; 8j (3.30)
equation (3.30) indicates that if one of the coalition of MSA j gets order of MA i, then
we can see MSA j gets order of MA i as well.
3.3.1.2 Second-layer game based negotiation
Negotiation among MSAs is to nd coalitions when orders of MAs are out abilities of
MSAs (see section 2.3). Final coalition of MSA j is determined as SFij.
3.3.1.3 Third-layer game based negotiation
Equilibrium of negotiation between MA i and SFij is determined in the third layer.
Strategies in the third layer are prices of MA and MSA (coalition). MA rstly announces
its strategy, and then SFij reacts by playing the best move based on strategy of MA. We
give following rule to nd equilibrium:
Rule 3.2: The strategy of MA at t can be determined as the equilibrium if and only if
the strategy of SFj at t is less than this strategy.
As we have mentioned in section 3.2.3 that problem of nding the Stackelberg equilib-
rium can be determined by solving equations (3.31) - (3.37).
PFij = argmax
pMij [t]
f(pselli   pMij [t])QMij g; 8i; 8j (3.31)
s.t. pSLj  pSij[t]  pMij [t]; 8i; 8j (3.32)
pMij [t]  pMUi ; 8i; 8j; 8t (3.33)
pMij [0] = pselli=(1 + 
U
i ); 8i (3.34)
pMUi = pselli=(1 + 
L
i ); 8i (3.35)
3If order of i is in ability of j, then all sijl equal to j. Thus, all nijl are allocations of i to j.
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pMij [t] = p
M
ij [t  1] +
pSij[t  1]  pMij [t  1]
(TN   tTS)=TS ; 8i; 8j; 8t (3.36)
pSij[t] = p
S
ij[t  1] 
pSij[t  1]  pMij [t]
(TN   tTS)=TS ; 8i; 8j; 8t (3.37)
where
Ui : upper bound of prot of MA i
Li : lower bound of prot of MA i
pMij [t]: price of MA i for MSA j at t
pMUi : upper bound of price of MA i
pSij[t]: price of MSA j for MA i at t
TN : total negotiation time
TS: negotiation time of each negotiation step
Thus, the problem is transformed into determination of pMij [t], which can maximize
prot of MA in equation (3.31). Equation (3.32) indicates that nal strategy PFij must
be accepted by MSA j. Equation (3.33) indicates nal price must be less upper bound of
price of MA i. Equations (3.34) - (3.35) are initial value and upper bound of price of MA,
respectively. Equations (3.36) - (3.37) are strategies of MA and MSA, respectively. Final
strategy PFij is obtained by solving equations (3.31) - (3.37). Then, this nal strategy
PFij is fed back to the rst layer game.
3.3.2 Simulation and analysis
It is supposed that there are 5 MA and 5 MSAs in SCNs. Initial values of MAs and
MSAs are shown in Table 3.4. jl = 0.1, 
min
i = 0.3, 
U
i = 0.5, 
L
j = 0.2, 
U
j = 0.5. ILOG
CPLEX 12.0 is used to nd solution of proposed protocol. Then, we verify proposed
protocol for negotiation between multi-MA and multi-MSA.
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Table 3.4: Parameter settings of MAs and MSAs
Cj j pselli Q
M
i LT
M
i
MSA 1 7.116 125 MA 1 13.131 4002 20
MSA 2 7.604 224 MA 2 13.712 5715 28
MSA 3 7.216 220 MA 3 13.416 675 3
MSA 4 7.040 104 MA 4 13.656 7427 37
MSA 5 7.545 201 MA 5 13.387 5000 80
3.3.2.1 Verication
Firstly, MAs announce their orders, and then MSAs check their abilities. The evalua-
tion matrix can be obtained as: E=
0BBBBBBB@
0 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 1
1CCCCCCCA. MSAs which cannot nish the
order (e.g. e14 = 0 means order of MA 1 is out of ability of MSA 4) will try to nd pos-
sible coalitions. All possible coalitions of MSAs for MAs are obtained by using coalition
formation mechanism and are shown in Table 3.5, where f14g indicates coalition which
consists of MSA 1 and MSA 4.
Then, related nal strategies (equilibriums) are obtained by solving equations (3.31) -
(3.37) and shown as Table 3.6. For example, 9.155 (the second line, second column of
Table 3.6) means nal price between MA 1 and coalition f14g (the second line and second
column of Table 3.5) is determined as 9.155.
Finally, two-person game is used to determine nal allocation scheme. Final allocation
scheme is determined by solving equation (3.25) to nd the optimal solution based on
results of Table 3.5 and Table 3.6. Then, we can get the optimal allocation scheme
according to equation (3.30) as:
M =
0BBBBBBB@
0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
1CCCCCCCA, N31 =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0

.
We can see from matrix M that MA 1 is allocated to MSA 5 (m15 = 1), MA 2 is
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Table 3.5: All possible coalitions for each MSA
Index MSA1 MSA2 MSA3 MSA4 MSA5
MA1 1 f14g f2g f3g f41g f5g
MA2 1 f14g f2g f3g f41g f51g
2 f145g f415g f514g
3 f15g f45g f54g
MA3 1 f12g f21g f31g f41g f51g
2 f123g f213g f312g f412g f512g
3 f1234g f2134g f3124g f4123g f5123g
4 f12345g f21345g f31245g f41235g f51234g
5 f1235g f2135g f3125g f4125g f5124g
6 f124g f214g f314g f413g f513g
7 f1245g f2145g f3145g f4135g f5134g
8 f125g f215g f315g f415g f514g
9 f13g f23g f32g f42g f52g
10 f134g f234g f324g f423g f523g
11 f1345g f2345g f3245g f4235g f5234g
12 f135g f235g f325g f425g f524g
13 f14g f24g f34g f43g f53g
14 f145g f245g f345g f435g f534g
15 f15g f25g f35g f45g f54g
MA4 1 f14g f2g f3g f41g f5g
MA5 1 f1g f2g f3g f4g f5g
allocated to MSA 2 (m22 = 1), MA 3 is allocated to MSA 1 (m31 = 1), MA 4 is allocated
to MSA 3 (m43 = 1), and MA 5 is allocated to MSA 4 (m54 = 1). However, MA 3 is out of
ability of MSA 1, for e31 equals to 0. Thus, there exists a matrix N31 to record allocation
among coalitions of MSA 1 of the order MA 3. n3;1;13 equals to 1 means order of MA
3 is allocated to the thirteenth coalition of MSA 1 (see the second column of Table 3.5,
there are fteen possible coalitions of MSA 1 for MA 3). Therefore, nal supplier of MA
3 is coalition f14g (the seventh column and fourth row of Table 3.7). Order allocation
of each MSA or coalition, which maximizes total prot of SCNs, is shown in Table 3.7.
The column FS is nal supplier of each MA. Final prot of each agent under determined
allocation scheme (as M) is shown in Table 3.8, where the number is index of MA or
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Table 3.6: Final strategy between MA and MSA (coalition)
MSA1 MSA2 MSA3 MSA4 MSA5
MA1 9.155 10.079 9.789 8.605 10.036
MA2 9.348 10.274 9.983 9.348 9.519
9.454 9.454 9.453
9.519 9.519 9.493
MA3 9.440 9.440 9.309 9.249 9.420
9.408 9.408 9.408 9.368 9.482
9.362 9.362 9.362 9.362 9.447
9.402 9.402 9.402 9.402 9.402
9.447 9.447 9.447 9.417 9.417
9.368 9.368 9.281 9.281 9.395
9.417 9.417 9.352 9.352 9.352
9.482 9.482 9.394 9.355 9.355
9.309 9.473 9.474 9.414 9.585
9.280 9.391 9.391 9.391 9.504
9.352 9.434 9.434 9.434 9.434
9.394 9.504 9.504 9.461 9.465
9.250 9.414 9.284 9.284 9.454
9.355 9.465 9.378 9.377 9.377
9.420 9.585 9.454 9.394 9.394
MA4 8.949 10.255 9.964 8.949 10.211
MA5 9.275 9.640 9.349 9.217 9.596
MSA.
3.3.2.2 Analysis
We can see from above results that feasibility of proposed protocol was veried. Results
indicate that proposed protocol is a good way to solve SASI negotiations between multi-
MA and multi-MSA.
(a) Calculation time
Simulation is executed by 1000 times to verify eectiveness of proposed protocol in
solving SASI negotiation between multi-MA and multi-MSA as well. Results are shown
as Table 3.9, where average and standard derivation of calculation time are presented. We
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Table 3.7: Final trade partnerships and order allocation
MSA1 MSA2 MSA3 MSA4 MSA5 FS
MA 1 0 0 0 0 4002 f5g
MA 2 0 5715 0 0 0 f2g
MA 3 368 0 0 307 0 f14g
MA 4 0 0 7427 0 0 f3g
MA 5 0 0 0 5000 0 f4g
Table 3.8: Final prot under the optimal allocation
MA MSA SCN
1 12386.52 9967.69
2 19651.43 15257.82
3 2812.25 3865.22
4 27416.66 20407.72
5 20848.04 10886.69
Total 83114.90 60385.14 143500.04
can see the proposed protocol is eective and stable in solving SASI negotiation between
multi-MA and multi-MSA as well.
Table 3.9: Calculation time of SASI negotiation between multi-MA and multi-MSA
Calculation time (sec)
Avg. 0.000906
S.D. 0.003653
(b) Comparisons related to average time (AT ) and success rate ()
Performances of proposed protocols are discussed in this section. Impacts of upper
bound of productivity Up on performances of average time (AT ) and success rate ()
as the changing of upper bound of quantity QUp of the order are discussed in follows.
Figure 3.11.
We compare performances of proposed protocol under Up equals to 100, 200, 300, 400,
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500, 600, 700, 800, 900, 1000 and 1100. Fluctuations of AT and  are shown in Figure 3.9,
Figure 3.10, and we can get:
 For AT : (see Figure 3.9):
- There is a turning point of QUp, before which AT increases as QUp increases, and
after which it decreases as QUp increases, and nally asymptotic converges to a
certain region. AT increases because it takes much more time to reach an agreement
among coalitions when L increases. Increase of L is due to increase of number of the
members in coalition. AT decreases because L decreases when QUp keeps increasing.
Decrease of L is because of symmetry of L.
- Final converged value of AT deceases as Up increases, and there are only a few im-
provement when Up is greater than or equals to 900.
 For  : (see gures 3.10 and 3.11)
- There is a turning point of QUp, before which  decreases as QUp increases, and after
which it increases as QUp increases, and nally converges to a certain region.
- Final converged value of  deceases as Up increases and it is much higher when Up is
greater than or equals to 200 than Up = 100. However, there are no improvements
at all when Up is greater than or equals to 900.
Analysis: As we known that productivity Up is an important factor for MSAs. It
takes cost to enhance Up. Up for MSA is the smaller, the better. Therefore, we can
get conclusion that there is no need to set Up greater than 900 in order to improve
performance of the algorithm under any QUp from above analysis. In other words, the
optimal setting of Up equals to 900. We have veried that there are the same tendencies
under both situations of changing numbers of MA and MSA. Other results of uctuations
of AT and  related to numbers of MA and and MSA are presented in Appendix A2
and A3 of this dissertation.
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3.4 Comparison protocol
3.4.1 Greedy protocol
In this chapter, coalition formation mechanism is introduced for MSAs to establish
coalitions when order(s) of MA(s) is(are) out of abilities of MSAs. However, it is a
possible way for MA(s) to decompose its(their) order(s) into pieces and then allocated to
dierent MSAs. It is dened as a greedy protocol in which MA selects MSA with the
lowest price as supplier. If the selected MSA cannot complete the order by itself, then MA
splits the order and allocates remaining quantity to MSA with the second lowest price
and so on.
3.4.2 Comparisons and analysis
3.4.2.1 Comparison of equilibriums
Negotiation protocols proposed in section 3.2 and section 3.3 are compared in this
section. Equilibriums are obtained according to Rule 3.1 and Rule 3.2 in section 3.2
and section 3.3, respectively. Results are shown in Table 3.10, where SF , PF , M , C ,
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and T are nal determined coalition, nal determined equilibrium, prot of MA, prot
of SF , and total prot of SCNs, respectively.
Table 3.10: Results according to Rule 3.1 and Rule 3.2
Rule 3.1 Rule 3.2
SF f314g f314g
PF 8.52 9.07
M 19443.18 17795.49
C 4175.99 7602.90
T 23619.17 25398.39
Analysis: We can see Rule 3.1 is better than Rule 3.2 for MA, however, it's more re-
alistic to take Rule 3.2, because MSAs want to maximize their prots as well. Moreover,
Rule 3.2 is better from the view of total prot of SCNs.
3.4.2.2 Comparison of protocols with and without coalition
Proposed protocol is compared with greedy protocol under three cases to verify supe-
riority of using coalition formation mechanism.
 Case 1: MA submits an Order (1000, 8.5, 10), which means that in this case all MSAs
can complete order by themselves;
 Case 2: MA submits an Order (2000, 8.5, 10), we can see from Table 3.1 that some
MSAs cannot complete order by themselves, thus, they need to nd partners;
 Case 3: MA submits an Order (3000, 8.5, 10), we can see from Table 3.1 that no
MSA can complete order by itself.
Comparisons are shown in Table 3.11. We can see that:
- In Case 1 : All MSAs in both protocols can complete order by themselves, and MSAs
don't need to form coalitions. However, if MSAs are allowed forming coalitions, nal
coalition for MA will be f14g, and all prots of MA, MSAs, and total SC increase.
- In Case 2 : The order is out of abilities of some MSAs. Final suppliers for greedy
algorithm is f4, 1g which means MA rst allocates its order to MSA 4 with quantity
QS4 = A4 = 1040 and then allocates remain parts QS1 = 2000 - QS4 = 960 to MSA
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1. Final supplier for the proposed protocol is f14g which indicates the order is
allocated to coalition consists of MSA 1 and MSA 4. All prots of MA, MSAs, and
total SCNs in proposed protocol are higher than that of greedy algorithm.
- In Case 3 : All MSAs in SCNs cannot nish the order by themselves. Final suppliers
for greedy algorithm is f4, 1, 3g which means MA rst allocates its order to MSA 4
with the quantity QS4 = A4 = 1040, then allocates its order to MSA 1 with quantity
QS1 = A1 = 1250, and nally allocates remain parts QS3 = 3000 - QS4 - QS1 =
710 to MSA 3. Final supplier for proposed protocol is f134g which indicates the
order is allocated to coalition consists of MSA 1, MSA 3 and MSA 4. All prots
of MA, MSAs, and total SCNs in proposed protocol are higher than that of greedy
algorithm.
Table 3.11: Comparisons of greedy algorithm and proposed protocol under three cases
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Greedy Proposed Greedy Proposed Greedy Proposed
Final suppliers f4g f14g f4,1g f14g f4,1,3g f314g
Prot of MA 5470.00 5963.41 10885.28 11926.81 16245.03 17795.49
Prot of MSAs 2490.00 2523.94 4961.76 5047.88 7415.01 7602.90
Total prot 7960.00 8487.35 15847.04 16974.69 23660.04 25398.39
Analysis: We can see from above results that greedy algorithm adopts method of
splitting the order and allocating it to multiple MSAs. It increases workload of MA.
Proposed protocol solves this problem from side of MSAs. It tries to build coalitions
and MA just announces order and waits for responses. Proposed protocol is much more
superior to greedy algorithm. It doesn't only maintain integrity of the order, but also
reduces workload of MA and increases prots of MA, MSAs, and total SCNs (see prot
of MA, MSAs and total prot in Table 3.11)
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Chapter 4 Coalition Formation Based
Single-Attribute Multi-Item Negotiation
4.1 Introduction
It was assumed that there is only one kind of product (item) in Chapter 3. However, in
real manufacturing system, it is a common situation that a MA must buy multiple kinds
of items to produce its product. For example, a car company must buy screws, valves,
lamps, bumpers, horns and so on to produce a car. Therefore, the research is extended into
more general cases in this chapter, where the focus is xed on single-attribute multi-item
(SAMI) negotiation between MA(s) and MSAs.
Most works on multi-item auctions suppose two simplifying conditions: quantities
of items to sell are xed as well as quantities requested by buyers. However, these
two hypotheses do not meet requirements of many situations where negotiations are
used. Researchers try to relax these assumptions where available quantities are not
xed [Lengwiler, 1999] as well as quantities requested by buyer [Ben-ameur et al., 2002].
[Roh and Yang, 2008] proposed an iterative multi-item unit-demand and unit-supply dou-
ble auction mechanism, in which buyers want to buy at most one item out of the many
available and each seller has a single item to sell. [Ito et al., 2002] focused on multi-item
negotiation, where items are substitute and sellers exchange items when they do not have
enough abilities. None of them focused on the coalition formation among sellers (suppli-
ers). As we have mentioned, this research tries to let MSAs combine together as a coalition
when the order is out of their abilities and then compete for the order of MA. It is not
uncommon in real-world that coalitions of complementary component-suppliers selling
kits are formed [Nagarajan and Sosic, 2009]. The reasons for forming supplier alliances in
SCs are manifold: potential cost savings, risk pooling, improve capacity utilization, and
increase bargaining power. [Greys, 2011] and [Nagarajan and Sosic, 2009] have studied
an assembly SC in which n suppliers sell complementary components to a downstream
assembler. They assumed that suppliers can form alliances among themselves. However,
all of these researches were assumed that MSAs supply the same item and only single-item
negotiation was discussed. In this chapter, we try to extend coalition formation among
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MSAs which can supply dierent items.
4.2 Single-Attribute Multi-Item Negotiation between One-MA
and Multi-MSA
Consider a SAMI negotiation with one MA and J MSAs. The negotiation model is
shown in gure 4.1, where pMIk is initial price of item k of MA, Q
M = (QM1 ,...,Q
M
K ) is
quantities of items of MA, and LTM is lead time of the order of MA. It is assumed in this
section that only single-attribute (price) is discussed for simplication. MA wants to buy
K items to produce its product. We assume that quantity QMk of each item k is xed,
but there are some constraints of quantity of each item from the point of inventory. The
quantity of each item must be in proportion (e.g. a car needs one steering wheel and four
tyres, therefore, it's better for car company to buy quantities of steering wheel and tyre
in proportion of 1 : 4). The abilities of MSAs in this model are not identical. Some of
them may only be able to aord one item while the others may be able to supply dierent
kinds of items. Moreover, we assume that MSA j in this model is allowed to establish a
coalition with other MSAs when the order of MA is out of its ability.
MSA1
MSA2
䈈
(pj1M) Item 1 
Item 2 
Item K 
䈈
MSA J
Multi-itemCoalition 
(pkMI, QM, LTM)
MA
(pj2M)
(pjKM)
Figure 4.1: SAMI negotiation model between one-MA and multi-MSA
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4.2.1 Single-attribute multi-item negotiation protocol
The protocol can be divided into two parts. The rst part is for MSAs which cannot
nish the order by themselves to nd coalitions, and the second part is negotiation between
MA and MSA (coalition) to decide nal equilibrium. It can be concluded as follows:
 Step 1: MA announces its initial strategies about how many items, how many
quantities of items and what price it wants to buy;
 Step 2: Each MSA evaluates the order, if it is in its ability, it gives a response to
start negotiation and goes to Step 5, if it is out of its ability, then goes to Step 3;
 Step 3: Combined coalition formation is triggered to nd a coalition which can
maximize prot of MSA, and goes to Step 4;
 Step 4: MSA checks whether it can establish a coalition, if it can establish, it gives
a response to start negotiation and goes to Step 5, if it cannot establish, then rejects the
order, gives a response and negotiation goes to Step 5;
 Step 5: MA negotiates with MSA (coalition) to nd agreement of prices of items, if
it succeeds in nding the equilibrium, goes to Step 7, if it doesn't succeed in nding the
equilibrium, then goes to Step 6;
 Step 6: Checks terminal condition, if terminal condition is satised, goes to Step 7,
if it is not satised, then two partners of negotiation try to modify their strategies and
negotiation goes to Step 5;
 Step 7: Checks whether all MSAs have replied, if all MSAs have replied, goes to
Step 8, if not, then wait until all MSAs give responses and goes to Step 8;
 Step 8: Determines nal supplier which maximizes its prot and negotiation ends.
Flowchart of multi-item negotiation is shown in gure 4.2, and details of the negotiation
such as how does MSA establish a coalition and how does the negotiation nd equilibrium
are discussed in following sections.
4.2.2 Negotiation among MSAs
MSA starts to negotiate with other MSAs in SCNs to establish a coalition if it cannot
complete the order by itself. Multi-item involved coalition formation has been discussed
in section 2.3.1.2. Thus, the nal determined coalition of MSA j for MA is indicated as
SFj =
8<: argmaxsjl f
SC
jl g; if Ajk < QMk
j; if Ajk  QMk
(4.1)
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Start 
End
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No  
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Figure 4.2: Flowchart of SAMI negotiation protocol
pSFIjk =
P
j02SFj p
SI
j0k
Njk
(4.2)
pSFLjk =
P
j02SFj p
SL
j0k
Njk
(4.3)
AFjk =
X
j02SFj
Aj0k (4.4)
where equation (4.1) indicates the nal coalition of MSA j equals to itself if the order is
in its ability and equals to the coalition sjl which maximizes its prot when the order is
out of its ability. The price, lower bound of the price, and ability of the nal determined
coalition SFj equal to the related price, lower bound of the price, and ability of itself
when the order is in its ability, and equal to those of coalition sjl which maximizes the
prot of MSA j when the order is out of its ability, and are calculated by equation (4.2),
equation (4.3), and equation (4.4), respectively. The prot SCjlj0 of MSA j
0 of belonging
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to sjl is calculated by
SCjlj0 =
KX
k=1
(pCIjlk   Cj0k)QSjlj0k (4.5)
QSjlj0k =
Aj0kQ
M
k
ACjlk
(4.6)
and
Aj0k : ability of item k of MSA j
0
ACjlk : ability of item kof sjl
AFjk : ability of item k of SFi
Njk : the number of member in SFi which can supply item k
SCjlj0 : prot of MSA j
0 in coalition sjl
pSFIjk : initial price of item k of SFi
pSFLjk : lower bound of price of item k of SFi
pSIjk : initial price of item k of MSA j
pSLjk : lower bound of item k of price of MSA j
QSjlj0k : acquired quantity of item k of MSA j
0 by belonging to coalition sjl.
4.2.3 Negotiation between MA and MSA (coalition)
4.2.3.1 Determination of strategies
Negotiation of price starts after SFj is determined. Strategies of MA and SFj are
calculated by:
pMjk [t] = p
M
jk [t  1] + (pMUk   pMjk [t  1])(
tTS
TN
)
1
" (4.7)
PMj[t] =
KX
k=1
pMjk [t]Q
M
k (4.8)
pMjk [0] = p
MI
jk (4.9)
pSjk[t] = p
S
jk[t  1]  (pSjk[t  1]  pMjk [t])(
tTS
TN
)
1
" (4.10)
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PSj[t] =
KX
k=1
pSjk[t]Q
M
k (4.11)
pSjk[0] = p
SFI
jk (4.12)
where
pMjk [t]: price of item k of MA at t
PMj[t] : total price of all items of MA at t
pSjk[t] : price of item k of SFj at k
PSj[t] : total price of all items of SFj at t
qMk :quantity of item k of MA
4.2.3.2 Determination of equilibriums
As we have mentioned before, the interaction between MA and SFj can be seen as
a MA-Stackelberg game and the strategy of MA which maximizes MA's prot and is
accepted by SFj will be determined as the nal equilibrium. As we have analyzed in
section 3.4.2.1 that it's better to adopt Rule 3.2. Thus, the equilibrium can be obtained
by solving:
PFj = arg max
PMj [t]
f
KX
k=1
psellkQ
M
k   PMj[t]g (4.13)
s.t. PSj[t]  PMj[t] (4.14)
PMj[t] 
KX
k=1
pMUk Q
M
k (4.15)
where equation (4.13) indicates that PMj[t] which maximizes the prot of MA will be
determined as the nal equilibrium (price) PFj, equation (4.14) means all the members in
SFj must be protable by choosing the determined price, and the prot of each member
in SFj is calculated by equation (4.16). Equation (4.15) means the nal determined price
must be protable for MA as well.
SFCjlj0 [t] =
KX
k=1
(pMjk [t]  Cj0k)QSFj0k   CSj;8j0 2 SFj (4.16)
QSFj0k =
Aj0kQ
M
k
AFjk
(4.17)
And
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SFCjlj0 [t]: prot of MSA j
0 by belonging to SFj at t
CSj : setup cost of MSA j per order
QSFj0k : acquired quantity of item k of MSA j
0 by belonging to SFj
4.2.3.3 Determination of nal supplier
SFj, with which MA has the maximum prot, is selected as nal supplier of MA after
all nal equilibriums are determined:
argmax
SFj
fMj =
KX
k=1
psellkQ
M
k   PMj[t]g (4.18)
s.t. PFj = argmax
pMj [t]
fMj =
KX
k=1
psellkQ
M
k   PMj[t]g (4.19)
SFj = argmax
sjl
fSCjl g: (4.20)
4.2.4 Simulation and analysis
In this section, we consider SAMI negotiation between one MA and 5 MSAs. In order
to consider all possible situations, we assume that MSA 1 can supply all items by itself;
MSA 2 cannot supply some items but the others are in its ability; MSA 3 cannot supply
some items but one of the others, which can be supplied, is out of its ability; MSA 4 can
supply all items but all of them are out of its ability; and MSA 5 only can supply one
item. The data settings are shown in Table 4.1, QMk =(1000, 4000, 2000, 2000), and LT
M
=10.
Table 4.1: Parameter settings of MSAs
Cj1 Cj2 Cj3 Cj4 j1 j2 j3 j4
MSA 1 26 36 20 22 150 400 300 200
MSA 2 16 21 0 0 300 250
MSA 3 35 40 150 300 0 0
MSA 4 34 35 18 19 50 300 150 100
MSA 5 28 500 0 0 0
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Table 4.2: All possible coalitions
l sjl 
S
j l sjl 
S
j l sjl 
S
j
1 1 12437.4 17 f21g 2385.9 33 f412g 64899.1
2 f12g 10972.6 18 f213g 4819.8 34 f413g 101288.1
3 f13g 70391.0 19 f214g 13921.8 35 f415g 79367.6
4 f14g 121190.3 20 f215g 5252.6 36 f4123g 93734.1
5 f15g 14653.7 21 f2134g 12540.5 37 f4125g 73495.9
6 f123g 77199.7 22 f2135g 5625.2 38 f4135g 116513.9
7 f124g 104573.6 23 f2145g 16141.0 39 f41235g 109406.1
8 f125g 24166.1 24 f21345g 14059.2 40 f51g 779.1
9 f134g 159378.9 25 f31g 12540.5 41 f512g 1388.3
10 f135g 90386.6 26 f314g 75516.8 42 f513g -725.8
11 f145g 123785.3 27 f315g 49779.5 43 f514g 6413.0
12 f1234g 140561.1 28 f3124g 85134.5 44 f5123g -1473.9
13 f1235g 99467.7 29 f3125g 62217.3 45 f5124g 7257.9
14 f1245g 107596.2 30 f3145g 81705.5 46 f5134g -1526.6
15 f1345g 179419.9 31 f31245g 93999.6 47 f51234g -2168.4
16 f12345g 159265.1 32 f41g 72569.3
We can see that coalition formations of MSA 2 and MSA 5 are for substitution, because
items which can be supplied by MSA 2 and MSA 5 are in ability, and they wants to
nd partners which can supply the items which cannot be supplied by themselves. The
coalition formation of MSA 3 is for both of complementary and substitution, and the
coalition formation of MSA 4 is for complementary.
4.2.4.1 Verication
Result of all possible coalitions are shown in Table 4.2, where l is index of coalitions,
sjl (the second, fth, and eighth columns of Table 4.2) are possible coalitions for each
MSA which have enough ability for the order of MA, Sj is acquired prot of MSA j of
belonging to sjl, and f12g is a coalition of MSA 1, which consists of MSA 1 and MSA 2.
All coalitions, which are not shown in Table 4.2, mean they do not have enough ability
for the order. However, coalitions which are shown in this table do not mean they are
formed coalitions. That's because coalition can be determined if and only if all members
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in the coalition reach an agreement. In Table 4.2, although all coalitions have enough
abilities, some of them have negative prots (e.g. when l = 42, MSA 5 gets negative prot
(-725.3) if it agrees to establish a coalition with MSA 1 and MSA 3). MSAs which have
negative prots absolutely reject to belong to these coalitions.
As we have mentioned above that MSA 1 can supply the whole order by itself and it
agrees to form a coalition if and only if prot of belonging to a coalition is greater than
that of completing by itself (according to Rule 2.1 ). Therefore, MSA 1's best choice is
belonging to coalition f1345g (l = 15), in which MSA 1 has the highest prot 179419.96.
However, prot of MSA 5 in coalition f5134g is -1526.59 (l = 46). Thus, it rejects to
belong to this coalition. That means members of coalition f1345g failed to reach an
agreement. Then, MSA 1 selects the second best choice of belonging to coalition f134g
with prot 159378.88 (l = 9). MSA 3 and MSA 4 cannot nish the order by themselves,
and they accept to form a coalition if prots of belonging to a coalition are positive. We
can see from Table 4.2 that prot of MSA 3 by belonging to f134g is 75516.8 (l = 26)
and prot of MSA 4 by belonging to f134g is 101288.1 (l = 34), and both of them are
positive. Therefore, all members of f134g reach an agreement and the coalition is formed.
According to above analysis, the nal coalition for MSA 1 is determined as f134g.
After the nal coalition is determined as f134g, negotiation between MA and f134g
starts. It tries to nd equilibrium which can maximize prot of MA. We can get results as
Table 4.3, where PF is nal equilibrium of price of the order, S is total prot of f134g,
M is prot of MA, and T is total prot of SCNs.
Table 4.3: Final equilibrium and prots
PF S M T
458288.45 266077.45 229144.22 495221.67
The order is allocated according to equation (4.17) among members of coalition f134g
and is shown as table 4.4, where 430 means the quantity of MSA 1 of item 1 acquired from
coalition f134g equals to 430. Quantities of MSA 3 of item 3 and 4 equal to 0 because it
cannot supply item 3 and item 4 at all.
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Table 4.4: Order allocation among the members of coalition f134g
Item
1 2 3 4
MSA 1 430 1600 1334 1334
MSA 3 428 1200 0 0
MSA 4 142 1200 666 666
4.2.4.2 Analysis
We can see from above results that feasibility of the proposed protocol was veried.
Results indicate that proposed protocol is a good way to solve SAMI negotiations between
multi-MA and multi-MSA. Simulation is executed by 1000 times to verify the eectiveness
as well. Results are shown as Table 4.5, where average, standard derivation of calculation
time, and success rate are presented. We can see the proposed protocol is eective and
stable in solving SAMI negotiation between multi-MA and multi-MSA as well.
Table 4.5: Calculation time of SAMI negotiation between one-MA and multi-MSA
Calculation time (sec)
Avg. 0.00327
S.D. 0.00636
4.3 Single-Attribute Multi-Item Negotiation between Multi-MA
and Multi-MSA
Consider multi-item negotiation with I manufacturers and J material suppliers. Multi-
agent system is utilized for modeling and analyzing SC, where each entity of SC is modeled
as an agent. Thus, there are two dierent kinds of agents involved in this research:
manufacturer agent (MA) and material supplier agent (MSA). K items are involved in
the negotiation. Multi-agent based negotiation model is shown in gure 4.3, where MAs
announce orders (expected price, quantity of each item, lead time) to all MSAs and
then MSAs give responses (price, ability). MAs and MSAs negotiate with each other to
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determine nal prices and allocation scheme. We can see from gure 4.3 that negotiations
not only exist between MAs and MSAs, but also exist amongst MAs and amongst MSAs.
MSAs coordinate with each other to establish a coalition when an order is out of their
abilities and cooperate to decide nal allocation of all orders when there are conicts
among MSAs. MAs cooperate to decide nal selection of all suppliers when there are
conicts as well.
MSA1
MSA2
MSA J
…
(p1j1M) Item 1 
Item 2 
Item K 
䈈
Multi-item
Coalition
(p1MI, Q1M, LT1M)
(p1j2
M)
(p1jKM)
MA 1
(p2j1M) Item 1 
Item 2 
Item K 
䈈
Multi-item
(p2MI, Q2M, LT2M)
(p2j2M)
(p2jKM)
MA 2
(pIj1M)
Item 2 
Item K 
䈈
Multi-item
(pIMI, QIM, LTIM)
(pIj2
M)
(pIjKM)
MA I
…
Item 1 
Figure 4.3: SAMI negotiation model between multi-MA and multi-MSA
4.3.1 Coalition formation based negotiation protocol
In real manufacturing system, it is a common situation that a MA must buy multi-item
to produce its product. However, it wastes time for MAs to nd a supplier for each item
when there are diversity items to buy. Furthermore, due to the limited abilities of MSAs,
MA may need to nd more than one suppliers for each item. Thus, it will be a very heavy
workload for MAs to nd suppliers for all items they want to buy. This research tries
to nd another way to solve this problem, which can greatly reduce workloads of MAs
and maximally maintain integrities of orders. A coalition formation protocol is proposed,
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where MSAs are allowed to nd partners to establish coalitions when orders of MAs are
out of abilities of MSAs. After coalitions are determined, MAs negotiate with MSAs to
determine nal allocation scheme. Protocol for the multi-item negotiation is proposed as
follows:
 Step 1: MA i announces its order to all MSAs and waits for their responses.
 Step 2: Each MSA j evaluates each order and checks whether the order is in its
ability. If the order is in its ability, agrees to start negotiation and goes to Step 7; if the
order is out of its ability, then goes to Step 3.
 Step 3: MSA j checks each item k of the order. If item k is in ability (Aijk  QMik ),
goes to Step 5; if the item is out of ability, then goes to Step 4.
 Step 4: MSA j checks which coalition formation is needed for item k. If MSA
j cannot supply item k at all (Aijk = 0), the coalition formation for substitution is
triggered; if MSA j can supply item k with limited ability, then the coalition formation
for complementary is triggered. After coalition formation is decided then goes to Step 5.
 Step 5: MSA j checks whether all items have been checked. If all items have been
checked (k = K), MSA tries to determine nal coalition and goes to Step 6; if not yet,
goes back to Step 3 until all items are checked.
 Step 6: MSA j checks whether a coalition is successfully established. If all members
of the coalition reach an agreement, MSA j agrees to start negotiation with MA i and
then goes to Step 7; if not succeed, then rejects the order and negotiation goes to Step 7.
 Step 7: MA i checks whether exists MSAs agree to start negotiation. If there are
some MSAs agree to start, then goes to Step 8; if there doesn't exist any MSA agrees to
start negotiation, then MA i modies its order and goes back to Step 1.
 Step 8: MA i negotiates with MSA j to nd equilibrium and checks whether an
equilibrium is found or not. If they are succeed in nding equilibrium, negotiation goes
to Step 10; if they are failed to nd equilibrium, and then goes to Step 9.
 Step 9: MA i and MSA j modify their strategies according to equations (4.37) -
(4.40) and then go back to Step 8.
 Step 10: MA i checks whether all MSAs have replied or not. If all MAs have received
replies from all MSAs, goes to Step 11; if not all MSAs have replied, then goes back to
Step 7 and negotiation repeats until all MSAs give replies to all MAs.
 Step 11: Final allocation scheme is determined based on results of equilibriums and
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coalitions, and negotiation ends.
Flowchart of multi-item negotiation is shown in gure 4.4, where the processes in the
dashed area are the combined coalition formation.
4.3.1.1 Determination of coalitions
In multi-item negotiation, both coalition formation for complementary and coalition
formation for substitution are involved. The nal coalition will be determined as SFij
according to section 2.3.1.2:
SFij = argmax
sijl
fSCijljg; 8i; 8j (4.21)
s.t. ACijlk  QMik ; 8k (4.22)
IFj = IFj0 ; 8j0 2 sijl (4.23)
SCijlj0
(
> 0; if 9k, eij0k=0
> Sij0 ; if 8k;Aijk  QMik
;8j0 2 sijl; j0 6= j (4.24)
where
SCijlj0 =
KX
k=1
(pCijlk   Cj0k)QSijlj0k; 8j0 2 sijl (4.25)
pCijlk = eijkp
SU
jk + (1  eijk)(1  Sign(Aijk))
P
j02SFSijk
(1 + Uj0k)Cj0k
NSijlk
+(1  eijk)Sign(Aijk)
P
j02SFCijk
(1 + Uj0k)Cj0k
NCijlk
; 8i; 8j; 8k (4.26)
ACijlk =
X
j02sijl
j0kLT
M
i ; 8i; 8j; 8l; 8k (4.27)
QSijlj0k =
j0kLT
M
i Q
M
ik
ACijlk
; 8i; 8j0 2 sijl; 8l; 8k (4.28)
Sign(Aijk) =
(
0; if Aijk=0
1; if 0 < Aijk < Q
M
ik
(4.29)
and
SCijlj: prot of MSA j by belonging to coalition sijl
Sij0 : prot of MSA j
0 with MA i
Sj0k: percentage of prot from item k of MSA j
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Figure 4.4: Flowchart of SAMI negotiation between multi-MA and multi-MSA
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Aijk: ability of item k of MSA j for MA i
ACijlk: ability of item k of coalition sijl
Cjk: cost of item k of MSA j
LTMi : lead time of the order of MA i
IFj: index of nal coalition of MSA j
NSijlk: number of members in SFSijk who can supply item k
NCijlk: number of members in SFCijk who can supply item k
pCijlk: price of item k of coalition sijl
pSUjk : upper bound of price of item k of MSA j
QMik : quantity of item k of MA i
QSijlj0k: acquired quantity of item k of MSA j
0 by belonging to coalition sijl
Cjk and QSijlj0k are decision variables. We can see from equation (4.21) that LMSA j
wants to nd the coalition sijl, in which it has the lowest cost and can get the highest
quantity of the order. Equation (4.22) means the coalition sijl must be in ability of all the
items. IFj in equation (4.23) is the index of the coalition of MSA j expected to belong to,
and equation (4.23) means all the members of the nal determined coalition must reach
an agreement. In other words, the nal selected index IFj0 of each j
0 2 sijl must be the
same. What should we pay attention to is the indexes of all the coalitions of all the MSAs
are the same. Thus, the negotiation can decide whether the members reach an agreement
by matching these indexes. Equations (4.26) - (4.28) are the upper bound of the price of
LMSA j, the combined ability of sijl, and the order allocation among the members of sijl,
respectively. eijk is the evaluation of MSA j for item k of MA i, and if MSA j can supply
item k independently (Aijk  QMik ), then eijk equals to 1, otherwise it equals to 0. SFSijk
and SFCijk are the coalitions for substitution and complementary of item k of MSA j,
respectively. The details have been discussed in section 2.3.1.2. Thus, equation (4.26)
means that the nal price of the combined coalition will equal to the price of MSA j if
MSA j can supply item k by itself, it will equal to the price of SFSijk if MSA j cannot
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supply item k at all, and it will equal to the price of SFCijk if MSA j can supply item k
but cannot supply the whole amount.
The coalition can be determined if and only if all the members reach an agreement.
FMSAs need to decide whether to accept to be a member of the coalition for there are
multi-MA in the SCNs. They have the prone to selecting the coalition which can maximize
their prots. What should we pay attention to is although only one coalition is determined
as the nal coalition, it is allowed that the member of the coalition is a coalition.
4.3.1.2 Determination of equilibriums
The negotiation, in which price of order is determined, is discussed in this section. As we
know that MA wants to buy items at the lower price the better, while MSA wants to sell
items at the higher price the better. MAs in proposed model are assumed have initiatives
and have more negotiation powers. Thus, interaction between MA and MSA can be seen as
a Stackelberg game, where MA is considered to be the Stackelberg leader. Determination
of negotiation agreement between MA i and SFij is transformed into determining the
equilibrium PFij of the Stackelberg game, where SFij is nal determined coalition from
section 4.3.1.1.
We assume nal determined strategy is the strategy of MA which can maximize its
prot and is accepted by SFij, because in this research we focus on situation where MAs
have more negotiation powers. For SFij, it accepts the strategy of MA at t according to
Rule 4.1.
Rule 4.1: When there are still much negotiation time, SFij accepts the strategy of MA
at t if and only if prot of taking the strategy of MA is greater than that of taking its own
strategy; when there are no negotiation time, SFij accepts the strategy of MA at t if and
only if prot of taking the strategy of MA is positive.
Thus, nal equilibrium PFij can be obtained by solving following problem:
PFij = argmax
pMij [t]
fMij [t]g; 8i; 8j (4.30)
s.t. pMij [t] 
KX
k=1
pMUik Q
M
ik (4.31)
SMij [t]  Sij[t]; if t < TN=TS (4.32)
SMij [t] > 0; if t = TN=TS (4.33)
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where
Mij [t]: prot of MA i with MSA j at t
SMij [t]: prot of MSA j takes strategy of MA i at t
pMij [t]: price of all items of MA i for MSA j at t
pMUik : upper bound of price of item k of MA i
PFij: nal determined price of the negotiation between MA i and MSA j
and equation (4.31) is used to ensure strategy belongs to the acceptable region of MA.
Equations (4.32) - (4.33) are used to ensure that the strategy is protable for SFij, equa-
tion (4.32) means SFij accepts the strategy of MA at t if it can get much more prot than
its own strategy when there are still some negotiation time, equation (4.33) means SFij
accepts the strategy of MA at t = TN=TS if the prot of taking strategy of MA is positive,
because for SFij it's better to reach an agreement than without reaching an agreement,
and SMij [t] and 
S
ij[t] are calculated by equations (4.35) and (4.36), respectively.
Mij [t] = psellij[t]  pMij [t]; 8i; 8j (4.34)
Sij[t] = p
S
ij[t] 
KX
k=1
CjkQ
M
ik   CSj; 8i; 8j (4.35)
SMij [t] = p
M
ij [t] 
KX
k=1
CjkQ
M
ik   CSj; 8i; 8j (4.36)
pMij [t] = p
M
ij [t  1] + (pSij[t  1]  pMij [t  1])(
tTS
TN
)
1
" ; 8i; 8j (4.37)
PMij[t] =
KX
k=1
pMik [t]Q
M
ik ; 8i; 8j (4.38)
psellij[t] = (1 + i)p
M
ij [t]; 8i; 8j (4.39)
pSij[t] = p
S
ij[t  1]  (pSij[t  1]  pMij [t])(
tTS
TN
)
1
" ; 8i; 8j (4.40)
pSij[0] =
KX
k=1
pSUjk Q
M
ik ; 8i; 8j (4.41)
where
i: percentage of prot of MA i
CSj : setup cost of MSA j per order
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pMLik : lower bound of price of item k of MA i
pSij[t]: price of MSA j for MA i at t
pSUij : upper bound of price of MSA j for MA i at t
psellij[t]: selling price of MA i with MA i at t
and equation (4.35) is the prot of SFij, equation (4.36) is the prot of SFij of taking
the strategy pMij [t] of MA i, and equation (4.37) is the strategy of MA i at t, and it
related to the strategies of itself and SFij at t   1, and the remaining negotiation time.
Equation (4.38) is the initial price of MA, and it's the sum of the best strategies of all
the items MA wants to buy. Equation (4.40) is the strategy of SFij at t, and it related
to the strategy of itself at t  1, the strategy of MA at t, and the remaining negotiation
time. Equation (4.41) is the initial price of SFij of all items. In addition, when it's
the negotiation between MA and the coalition sijl, PFij and p
M
ij [t] in equation (4.30)
will be replaced by PFijl and p
M
ijl[t]. 
C
ijl[t] and 
CM
ijl [t], which are the total prot of
all the members in the coalition, will instead of Sij[t] and 
SM
ijl [t] of the constraints of
equations (4.35) - (4.36). Moreover, QMik in equations (4.35) and (4.36) will be replaced
by QSijljk.
4.3.1.3 Determination of nal allocation scheme
Determination of nal allocation scheme is discussed in this section. There are multi-
MA and multi-MSA in SCNs negotiate with each other to determine nal allocation
scheme. Each MA wants to select the MSA with the lowest price to decrease its production
cost, and each MSA wishes to select the MA with the highest price to increase its prot.
We can see that all MAs or MSAs compete with each other for the partner with the
highest prot. It can be seen as a two-person game, where all MAs are considered as player
1 and all MSAs are combined as player 2. Player 1 and player 2 make their strategies
simultaneously. Strategy of player 1 in the rst layer is the scheme to allocate orders of its
members to MSAs. Strategy of player 2 is allocation of all orders fromMAs to its members.
The agreement is reached if and only if strategy of player 1 consists with strategy of player
2. Therefore, the optimal solution of the game in proposed protocol is the allocation
scheme which can maximize total prot of whole supply chain. The innovative point is
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players in the two-person game consist of multi-players actually. Strategies of player 1
and player 2 consist of all strategies of their members. Thus, the nal optimal solution
can be got if none of members of players can benet by changing player's strategies while
the other one keep its strategy unchanging.
Matrix M = [mijl], which is used to record nal allocation of orders of MAs to MSAs
or coalitions, is given to show nal allocation scheme. The value of mijl equals to 1 or 0,
and mijl equals to 1 means MA i is allocated to sijl of MSA j, mijl equals to 0 means MA
i is not allocated to sijl of MSA j. Therefore, the allocation scheme, which maximizes
total prot of SCNs, is determined to solve conicts amongst agents, and the problem is
transformed into nding solution of following optimal problem:
maxf
IX
i=1
JX
j=1
LX
l=1
mijl(PsellFijl   PFijl) +
IX
i=1
JX
j=1
LX
l=1
mijl(PFijl
  X
j02sijl
KX
k=1
QSijlj0kCj0k)g (4.42)
s.t. mijlACijlk  mijlQMik (4.43)
JX
j=1
LX
l=1
mijl = 1 (4.44)
IX
i=1
LX
l=1
mijlQSijlk  AUjk (4.45)
PFijl = arg max
PMijl[t]
fMijl[t]g (4.46)
PsellFijl = arg max
psellijl[t]
fMijl[t]g (4.47)
AUjk = jk
I
max
i=1
fmijlLTMi g (4.48)
mijl 2 f0; 1g (4.49)
where equation (4.42) aims to maximize total prot of the SCNs, the rst part is prots
of all MAs, and the second part is prots of all MSAs. Equation (4.43) is used to ensure
that the order of each MA i must be in ability of the nal determined supplier (MSA j or
coalition sijl). Equation (4.44) indicates that each MA i must be allocated to one MSA j
or coalition which is used to keep the integrity of the order of MA i. It can be loosen ( 1)
if MAs are allowed not nding suppliers. However, this research assumes that all MAs
must be allocated to one MSA or coalition. Equation (4.45) is used to ensure that all the
received orders of each MSA must be in its ability, QSijlk is the acquired quantity of MSA
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j in coalition sijl (see equation (4.28) in section (4.3.1.1). AUjk is the maximum ability
of MSA j according to all the orders it received and is calculated by equation (4.48).
Equations (4.46) - (4.47) indicate that the price PMijl[t] and selling price psellijl[t] of
MA, at which the prot of MA is maximized, are determined as the nal price and nal
selling price of the negotiation between MA i and sijl. mijl is the decision variable and is
dened in equation (4.49).
We can see from equations (4.42) - (4.49) that the determination of the nal allocation
scheme depends on PFijl and ACijlk, which are the nal total price of MSA j or coalition
sijl for the order of MA i and the nal ability of each item k of MSA j or coalition sijl
for the order of MA i, respectively. They are obtained from section 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.1.2,
respectively. Furthermore, it is assumed in section 3.3.1.1 that all MAs must and only be
allocated to one MSA or coalition. However, it's possible that exist MA(s) cannot nd
any MSA or coalition in real cases for the price(s) is too low or the lead time is too short,
and so on. Therefore, we modied constraints of allocation of MAs as equation (4.44).
4.3.2 Simulation and analysis
A car company which wants to buy auto parts to produce cars is cited as an example,
and the company wants to buy steering wheels, tyres, rear view mirrors and headlights
to produce cars. Simulations are given in this section in order to illustrate and verify
the proposed protocol when there are 5 MAs and 6 MSAs in SCNs, and the maximum
number of items MA want to buy is 4. Parameter settings of MAs and MSAs are shown
in table 4.6, where pMLik , Q
M
ik , jk, and Cjk obey the uniform distribution. Eclipse IDE
for Java Developers and ILOG CPLEX 12.0 are used to execute simulations to verify the
feasibility of proposed protocol.
4.3.2.1 Verication
Firstly, MSAs which are out of abilities try to nd all possible coalitions. Details of all
possible coalitions of each MSA are omitted. After the coalitions are found, MAs start to
negotiate with in ability MSAs or coalitions to nd equilibriums by solving equation (4.30).
The details of equilibriums between MAs and all possible coalitions are omitted. The ne-
gotiation between MA 1 and coalition f246g is taken as an example to illustrate processes
of how to reach equilibrium. Fluctuations of prices of MA 1 and coalition f246g is shown
82
Table 4.6: Parameter settings of MAs and MSAs.
Parameters
PMLik U(0,100)
QMik U(0,5000)
LTMik Q
M
ik =300
jk U(100,600)
Cjk U(0,50)
in gure 4.5, where PMij[t] is price of MA 1 at t, and PSij[t] is price of coalition f246g
at t. The nal equilibrium is reached if prot of coalition f246g of taking the price of
MA 1 (SMij [t]) is greater than that of taking its own price at t (
S
ij[t]) according to equa-
tion (4.32). Therefore, we can see from gure 4.6 that at t = 25 the prot SMij [25] =
304281.7 is greater than Sij[25]=298432.9. Hence, the equilibrium is reached at t = 25
where PMij[t] = 503472.6.
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Figure 4.5: Fluctuation of prices of MA 1 and f246g
Dierence of SIMA negotiation between multi-MA and multi-MSA and SIMA negoti-
ation between one-MA and multi-MSA is that it needs to determine allocation scheme.
Final allocation scheme of SIMA negotiation are as follows:
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where MAs are allocated to SF as shown in Table 4.7. MA 1 is allocated to the 2nd
coalition f52g of MSA 5; MA 2 is allocated to the 11th coalition f325g of MSA 3; MA 3
is allocated to the 6th coalition f512g of MSA 5; MA 4 is allocated to the 11th coalition
f325g of MSA 3; and MA 5 is allocated to the 1st coalition f21g of MSA 2. Prots of
MAs and nal determined suppliers SF under the allocation scheme are shown as M
and SF in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7: Prots of MAs and MSAs under the allocation scheme
SF M SF T
MA 1 f52g 400231.4 569227.3 6207644.0
MA 2 f325g 679473.4 808855.3
MA 3 f512g 773130.7 869531.9
MA 4 f325g 394876.0 490945.3
MA 5 f21g 494559.9 726812.7
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4.3.2.2 Analysis
We can see from above results that the proposed protocol was feasible in solving SAMI
negotiation. Nextly, we will discuss about eectiveness of proposed protocol in solving
SAMI negotiation. The simulation is executed by 1000 times and the results are shown as
Table 4.8, where the average and standard derivation of the calculation time are presented.
We can see the proposed protocol is eective and stable in solving SAMI negotiation.
Table 4.8: Calculation time of SAMI negotiation between multi-MA and multi-MSA
Calculation time (sec)
Avg. 0.0757
S.D. 0.0194
4.4 Comparison and analysis
Equilibriums obtained according to Rule 3.1, Rule 3.2 and Rule 4.1 are compared
in this section. We take negotiation between MA 1 and coalition f12g as an example.
Results of comparison are shown in Table 4.9. We can see that:
- The negotiations has the same total prot under all three rules;
- It's the fastest to reach agreement under Rule 3.1 ;
- Rule 3.2 and Rule 4.1 almost have the same performance and that's because we use
total price of all orders rather than using each price of each item.
Table 4.9: Results according to three rules
PF M C T TF
Rule 3.1 246631.89 179888.91 103.89 179992.80 18
Rule 3.2 295459.19 131061.61 48931.19 179992.80 56
Rule 4.1 295459.20 131661.60 48931.20 179992.80 57
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Chapter 5 Coalition Formation Based
Multi-Attribute Single-Item Negotiation
5.1 Introduction
Multi-attribute negotiation protocol has been widely studied and represents a promising
eld since most of negotiation problems in real-world are complex ones including multiple
issues ([Choi et al., 2001, Ito et al., 2008]). In reality, attributes are constrained each
other. It is a common situation that people must negotiate multi-attribute simultaneously,
for example, quantity, price, and delivery time in a supply contract, and the position,
wage, and training opportunity will be cared in labor market oer. Moreover, it is also
benecial for people to introduce multi-attribute into negotiation when they have dierent
preferences on attributes, because they may achieve benets by trading o multi-attribute.
SASI negotiation has been discussed in Chapter 3. It was assumed that quantity of order
of MA was xed and only price is negotiated. However, in real market, quantity must
be related to demand of market. Thus, in this chapter, the negotiation is extended to
multi-attribute single-item (MASI) between MA(s) and MSAs, in which demand is not
xed and depends on selling price of MA. Three attributes (price of product, quantity of
order, and lead time of order) are considered in MASI negotiation.
5.2 Multi-Attribute Single-Item Negotiation between One-MA
and Multi-MSA
MASI negotiation between one-MA and multi-MSA will be discussed in this section
[Yu et al., 2012a]. Negotiation model is shown in Figure 5.1, where pMj [t], q
M
j [t], and
ltMj [t] are price, quantity and lead time of MA at iteration t, respectively. We can see
from Figure 5.1 that quantity and lead time of MA depends on demand of market, and
market demand is aected by price of MA.
MA negotiates with MSAs to reach agreements on strategies of three attributes. We
assume that demand of market is in an additive form as equation (5.1) and depends on
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Figure 5.1: MASI negotiation model between one-MA and multi-MSA
selling price of MA.
Dj[t] = a  bpsellj[t]: (5.1)
where
a: maximum demand of market, and a > 0
b: coecient of variation related to selling price, and b > 0
Dj[t]: market demand of MA at t
psellj[t]: selling price of MA at t
5.2.1 Modied two-stage negotiation protocol
A modied two-stage negotiation protocol is proposed in this section based on two-stage
negotiation protocol which was proposed in section 3.2.
 Stage 1: Negotiation among MSAs
- Step 1: MA forecasts demand of market, determines its initial price, quantity and lead
time of the order which it wants to place, and then broadcasts the order to all MSAs.
- Step 2: MSAs evaluate the order and check whether the order can be nished by
themselves. If they can do it, themselves will be determined as the nal coalition
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SFj and fed back to MA; if they cannot do it, then they negotiate with other MSAs
to build coalitions and feed back to MA. A cooperative game is used for coalition
formation.
- Step 3: MA checks whether there exists any SFj can fulll the order, if there exists,
goes to the second stage, if there does not exist, then MA modies the order and
re-broadcasts the order.
 Stage 2: Negotiation between MA and SFj
- Step 4: MA starts to negotiate with SFj. MA-Stackelberg game is introduced to nd
nal solution.
- Step 5: MA checks whether an agreement is reached. If agreement is reached, negoti-
ation ends, if agreement is not reached, then MA checks whether negotiation time
is used up. If there are some negotiation time then MA modies its strategies and
goes back to Step 4, else negotiation ends and fails to nd equilibrium.
Flowchart of modied two-stage negotiation is shown in Figure 5.2. Processes in left-hand
side of the gray dash line are done by MA, and processes in right-hand side are done by
MSA. Details of negotiation protocol will be discussed in following subsections.
5.2.2 Negotiation among MSAs
Negotiation among MSAs aims to nd coalition when order is out of their abilities.
Final determined coalition SFj of MSA j and related ability is determined according to
equation (2.10) and equation (2.6), respectively.
5.2.3 Negotiation between MA and SFj
MA and SFj make their decisions sequentially, and SFj in multi-attribute negotiation
wants to increase its price, quantity and lead time to improve its prot. However, MA
wants to decrease price and lead time to increase its prot. Therefore, main point of this
part is to nd a balance between prots of SFj and MA. Objective of negotiation is to
nd equilibrium of the MA-Stackelberg game.
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Figure 5.2: Flowchart of MASI negotiation protocol
5.2.3.1 Determination of the strategies
Concessions among attributes and strategies of three attributes of MA and SFj are
determined as:
(a) Concessions among attributes
As we known, for MA, it determines its strategies according to its own preferences.
Concessions among attributes of MA are as follows:
- Price: It gives concession of price related to remaining time, and also give concession
if MSAs shorten their lead time in order to reduce losses of potential prots.
- Quantity: It increases its quantity to buy if MSAs give discounts of prices.
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- Lead time: It extends its lead time if MSAs give discounts of prices.
MSAs determine their strategies according to strategies of MAs at t, and make concessions
as follows:
- Price: They give concessions of prices related to remaining time, and also give conces-
sions if MA increases its quantity to buy or extends its lead time.
- Quantity: They reduce their minimum quantities to buy if MA increases its price or
extends its lead time.
- Lead time: They shorten their lead time if MA increases its price.
We dene zx;y(y) as concession rate of attribute x related to attribute y of z, and is
calculated by equation (5.2), where x; y 2 fp; q; ltg, and z 2 fM;Sg. p, q and lt indicate
concession is respectively related to price, quantity and lead time. M and S indicate it's
concession of MA and MSA, respectively. x;yg is threshold value of concession of attribute
x related to attribute y, and yg is piece-wise constant of attribute y. All these threshold
values and piece-wise constants are dened as Table 5.1, where g is index of concession.
zx;y(y) =
8>><>>:
0; if y  y1
x;yg 1; if yg 1 < y < yg
x;yg ; if y  yg
(5.2)
Table 5.1: Threshold values related to concession functions
z x y x;yg 
z
x;y(y)
M p lt LTMLij + g(LT
MU
ij   LTMLij )=G (G  g)(PMUijk   PMLijk )=G
q p PMLijk + g(P
MU
ijk   PMLijk )=G (G  g)(QMUijk  QMLijk )=G
lt p PMLijk + g(P
MU
ijk   PMLijk )=G (G  g)(LTMUijk   LTMLijk )=G
S p q QSLijk + g(Q
SU
ijk  QSLijk)=G g(P SUijk   P SLijk )=G
lt LT SLij + g(LT
SU
ij   LT SLij )=G g(P SUijk   P SLijk )=G
q p P SLijk + g(P
SU
ijk   P SLijk )=G t(G  g)(PMUijk   PMLijk )=G2
lt LT SLijk + g(LT
SU
ijk   LT SLijk )=G t(G  g)(PMUijk   PMLijk )=G2
Figure 5.3 illustrates piece-wise functions of MA and MSAs. We can see from Figure 5.3
(a), (b), and (c) that MA will give higher concession of price if SFj gives shorter lead
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time, it will give higher concession of quantity if SFj gives lower price, and it will give
higher concession of lead time if SFj gives lower price. On the other hand, we can see
from Figure 5.3 (d), (e), and (f) that SFj will give higher concession of price if MA buys
higher quantity, and it will give higher concession of price if MA gives longer lead time.
(b) Strategies of MA:
Strategies of MA for SFj at iteration t are (p
M
j [t], q
M
j [t], lt
M
j [t]), where:
pMj [t] = p
M
j [t  1] +
pMU   pMj [t  1]
(TN   tTS)=TS + 
M
p;lt(lt
S
j [t  1]) (5.3)
qMj [t] = Dj[t] + 
M
q;p(p
S
j [t  1]) (5.4)
ltMj [t] = lt
M
j [t  1] + Mlt;p(pSj [t  1]) (5.5)
psellj[t] = p
M
j [t](1 + 
U) (5.6)
pMj [0] = p
ML (5.7)
qMj [0] = Dj[t] (5.8)
ltMj [0] = lt
ML (5.9)
and
U : upper bound percentage of prot of MA
ltMj [t]: lead time of MA at t
ltML: lower bound of lead time of MA
ltSj [t  1]: lead time of SFj at t  1
pMj [t] : price of MA at t
pML : lower bound of price of MA
pMU : upper bound of price of MA
pSj [t  1] : price of SFj at t  1
qMj [t] : quantity of MA at t
Equation (5.3) is used to calculate price of MA at t, the second part is concession related
to remain negotiation time, and the third part is concession of price related to lead time
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Figure 5.3: Piece-wise functions of MA and MSA related to attributes.
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of SFj at t   1. Quantity of MA depends on demand of market and is calculated by
equation (5.4). The second part of equation (5.4) is concession of quantity of MA related
to price of SFj at t  1. Equation (5.5) is used to calculate lead time of MA at t, and the
second part is concession related to price of SFj at t  1. Equations (5.7) - (5.9) are used
to calculate initial value of price, quantity, and lead time of MA, respectively.
(c) Strategies of SFj:
Strategies of SFj at t are (p
S
j [t], q
S
j [t], lt
S
j [t]), where:
pSj [t] = p
S
j [t  1] 
pSj [t  1]  pMj [t]
(TN   tTS)=TS   
S
p;q(q
M
j [t])  Sp;lt(ltMj [t]) (5.10)
qSj [t] = fq(p
S
j [t]) (5.11)
ltSj [t] = q
S
j [t]=j (5.12)
fq(p
S
j [t]) =
8>><>>:
Uq ; if p
S
j [t]  pSFLj
q[t]; if p
SFL
j < p
S
j [t] < p
SFU
j
Lq ; if p
S
j [t]  pSFUj
(5.13)
q[t] = AFj  
( csj
pSj [0] Cj
  AFj)pSFLj
pSFUj   pSFLj
+ pSj [t]
csj
pSj [0] Cj
  AFj
pSFUj   pSFLj
(5.14)
pSj [0] = p
SFI (5.15)
qSj [0] = AFj (5.16)
ltMj [0] =
qSj [0]
Fj
(5.17)
Fj =
X
j02SFj
0j (5.18)
and
j: productivity of MSA j
Fj : productivity of SFj
AFj: ability of SFj
Cj: production cost of MSA j
csj: setup cost of MSA j
pSFLj [t] : lower bound of price of MSA j
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pSFUj [t] : upper bound of price of MSA j
qSj [t]: quantity of SFj
Equation (5.10) is used to calculate price of SFj at t, the second part is concession related
to remain negotiation time, the third part is concession related to quantity of MA at t,
and the nal part is concession related to lead time of MA at t. Equation (5.11) is used
to calculate quantity of SFj at t, and fq(p
S
j [t]) is a piece wise function related to price
of SFj (see Figure 5.3(f)) and is dened as equation (5.13). Equation (5.14) is used to
calculate threshold value of quantity, and equations (5.15) - (5.17) are used to calculate
initial values of price, quantity, and lead time of SFj, respectively. Equation (5.18) is
used to calculate productivity of SFj.
5.2.3.2 Determination of equilibriums
MA has its own preferences for price, quantity and lead time and it looks for oer that
best satises these preferences. As we have mentioned above that objective of negotiation
is to nd equilibrium which can maximize prot of MA and accepted by SFj at the same
time. Rule 5.1 is given for SFj to check whether strategies of MA at t can be accepted.
Rule 5.1: When there is still many remain negotiation time (t < TN
TS
), SFj accepts the
strategies of MA at t if prot of taking the strategies of MA is greater than or equals to
that of taking its own strategy; when there is no remain negotiation time (t = TN
TS
), SFj
accepts the strategies of MA at t if prot of taking the strategies of MA is greater than 0
1 .
Prots of MA and SFj are summations of prots related to all three attributes and
calculated by:
Mj [t] = psellj[t]Dj[t] + Sign(q
M
j [t] Dj[t])(qMj [t] Dj[t])sv   Sign(Dj[t]  qMj [t])
(Dj[t]  qMj [t])cst  pMj [t]qMj [t] 
cfDj[t]
qMj [t]
  h
MqMj [t]
2
(5.19)
SMj [t] =
X
j02SFj
(pMj [t]  C 0j)qMj [t] + cltSj (ltSj [0]  ltMj [t])  csj  
hSj q
M
j [t]
2
(5.20)
Sj [t] =
X
j02SFj
(pSj [t]  Cj)qSj [t] + cltSj (ltSj [0]  ltSj [t])  csj  
hSj q
S
j [t]
2
(5.21)
1That's because for MSAs reaching an agreement is always better than without reaching an agreement
if the order is protable.
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where
SMj : prot of SFj of taking the strategies of MA
Sj : prot of SFj of taking its own strategies
sv : salvage value of unit unsold product of MA
cf : xed cost per order of MA
cltSj : cost of saving or extending lead time per-day of SFj
cst : shortage cost of MA
hM : holding cost per unit of MA
hSj : holding cost per unit of SFj
and the rst part of equation (5.19) is prot of sold part of MA, the second part is salvage
value of unsold part of MA, the third part is shortage loss, the fourth part is x cost, and
the last part is hold cost. Equation (5.20) is prot of SFj at t by adopting strategies of
MA, the rst part is payment it can get from MA, the second part is prot or loss of SFj
by extending or shortening lead time, the third part is setup cost, and the last part is hold
cost. Equation (5.21) is prot of SFj at t by adopting its own strategies, and dierent
parts are the same with equation (5.20).
Thus, equilibrium can be obtained by solving following problem according toRule 5.1 :
PFj = argmax
pMj [t]
fMj [t]g (5.22)
s.t. SMj [t]  Sj [t]; if t < TNTS (5.23)
SMj [t] > 0; if t=
TN
TS
(5.24)
qMj [t]  AFj (5.25)
where equation (5.22) indicates that price of MA which maximizes prot of MA will be
determined as nal equilibrium PFj. Equations (5.23) and (5.24) indicate SFj accepts
strategies of MA at t if prot of taking the strategies of MA is greater than or equals to
that of taking its own strategy when there is still many remain negotiation time (t < TN
TS
),
and SFj accepts strategies of MA at t if prot of taking the strategies of MA is greater
than 0 when there is no remain negotiation time (t = TN
TS
), respectively. Equation (5.25)
indicates the order must be in ability of SFj.
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5.2.3.3 Determination of nal supplier
Finally, MA decides nal supplier which can maximize its prot based on equilibriums
acquired by solving equations (5.22) - (5.25):
argmax
SFj
fMj g (5.26)
s.t. PFj = argmax
pMj [t]
fMj = (psell   pMj [t])qMj [t]g (5.27)
SFj = argmax
sjl
fSCjl g: (5.28)
5.2.4 Simulation and analysis
Firstly, we discuss about details of MASI negotiation between one MA and 5 MSAs.
Parameter settings of MSAs are shown as Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Parameter settings of MA and MSAs
MSA MA
j U(100,300) 
max 0.5
minj 0.2 
min 0.3
maxj 0.5 a U(1000,2000)
hSj 3 b U(0,100)
cpj U(7,8) cf
M 100
csj U(200,300) cst
M 5
J 5 hM 3
psInMi U(13,14)
svM 2
5.2.4.1 Verication
All possible coalitions and related equilibriums are omitted. We take negotiation be-
tween MA and coalition f12g as an example to illustrate iteration of nding equilibriums
during MASI negotiation. Fluctuations of three attributes are shown in Figure 5.4 -
Figure 5.7.
We can see that:
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Figure 5.5: Fluctuation of quantities of MA and SFj in SIMA negotiation
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 At t = 3: Prot of coalition f12g takes strategies of MA is greater than takes his own
strategies (see Figure 5.7, where SMj [3] > 
S
j [3]), that means equation (5.23) is satised.
However, quantity of MA is greater than ability of coalition f12g (see quantity at k=3 of
Figure 5.5, where qMj [3] > AFj[3]), that means equation (5.25) is not satised. Therefore,
the agreement is not reached and negotiation goes by.
 At t = 18: MA reaches an agreement with coalition f12g on price (see Figure 5.4) and
equation (5.23) is satised. However, equation (5.25) is still not satised because qMj [18] >
AFj[18] from Figure 5.5. Therefore, the agreement is not reached and negotiation goes
by.
 At t = 20: Price of MA keeps unchanging, but it makes a concession of its lead time
(see Figure 5.6) and then equation (5.25) is satised (see Figure 5.5, where qMj [20] <
AFj[20]). Therefore, both constraints of equation (5.23) and equation (5.25) are satised.
Thus, we can see that nal equilibrium between MA and coalition f12g is the strategies
of MA at t = 20 where the strategies are (10.704, 4489, 16). Similarly, we can get all
equilibriums and then MA decides the nal supplier which can maximize his prot. In
this case, nal supplier for MA is coalition f32g with nal strategies (10.703, 6735, 16)
and prot equals to 25501.295.
5.2.4.2 Analysis
What should we pay attention to are:
 The equilibrium not always exists;
 The order of MA may become out of ability of SFj even it was in ability at the rst
time.
Simulation is executed by 1000 times and results are shown as Table 5.3, where average
and standard derivation of calculation time are presented. We can see that the proposed
protocol is eective and stable in solving MASI negotiation between one-MA and multi-
MSA.
5.3 Multi-Attribute Single-Item Negotiation Between Multi-MA
and Multi-MSA
MASI negotiation between multi-MA and multi-MSA will be discussed in this section,
where MAs try to negotiate with MSAs about strategies of product they want to buy. We
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Table 5.3: Calculation time of MASI negotiation between one-MA and multi-MSA
Calculation time (sec)
Avg. 0.02384
S.D. 0.01032
can see from Figure 5.8 that quantities and lead time of MAs are aected by demand of
market, while demand of market depends on prices of MAs.
...
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(p2jM[t], q2jM[t], lt2jM[t])
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(pIjM[t], qIjM[t], ltIjM[t])
MA 1
MA I
(p1jM[t], q1jM[t], lt1jM[t])
...
Figure 5.8: MASI negotiation model between multi-MA and multi-MSA
Market demand of MA i at certain lead time is in an additive form as equation (5.29)
without upper bound, which means demand decreases as selling price increases.
Dij[t] = ai   bipsellij[t]; 8i; 8j; 8t (5.29)
where
ai: maximum demand of MA i
bi: coecient of variation related to selling price of MA i
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Dij[t]: demand of MA i with MSA j at t
psellij[t]: selling price of MA i with MSA j at t
It is assumed that MAs and MSAs mainly care three attributes: price of product, quantity
of order, and lead time of order.
5.3.1 Modied hierarchical-game based negotiation protocol
A hierarchical-game based negotiation protocol was proposed in section 3.3.1, where
quantity of MA was xed. In this section, a modied hierarchical-game based negotiation
protocol is proposed, where quantity of MA depends on market demand. Protocol of the
modied hierarchical-game based negotiation is described in details as follows:
 Step 1: MAs calculate market demand, determine their strategies, broadcast to all
MSAs and goes to Step 4.
 Step 2: MSAs evaluate orders, if the order is in their abilities, determine their
strategies, if the order is out of their abilities, then trigger coalition formation mechanism
and goes to Step 3.
 Step 3: MSAs check whether exist coalitions, if there exists, try to determine coalition
which maximize its prot and determine their strategies, if there doesn't exist, then reject
the order and give a response to MAs.
 Step 4: MAs check whether exist any MSAs or coalitions which can fulll their
orders. If there exists, go to Step 5, if there doesn't exist, then modify their strategies
and go back to Step 1.
 Step 5: Stackelberg game is introduced to nd nal strategies between MAs and
MSAs or coalitions. If equilibrium is found, go to Step 6, if equilibrium is not found, then
both MAs and MSAs or coalitions modify their strategies and negotiation repeats until
an equilibrium is found or terminal condition is reached.
 Step 6: MAs check whether all MSAs give responses. If all MSAs give responses, go
to Step 7, else wait until all MSAs give replies.
 Step 7: MAs negotiate with MSAs or coalitions to determine nal allocation scheme.
Flowchart of the modied hierarchical-game based negotiation is shown in Figure 5.9.
There is a nested structure in the hierarchical structure, where the second and third layer
games are nested inside the rst layer game. The rst layer game starts and then the
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second and third layer games are triggered if necessary. But the rst layer game can be
nished only if the second and third layer games have been nished. In other words, the
rst layer game is based on results of the second and third layer games. Details of the
protocol are discussed in following sections.
5.3.1.1 Determination of coalitions
In the second layer game (see the area marked by dotted line in Figure 5.9), MSAs
negotiate with each other to nd partners to establish coalitions when orders of MAs are
protable but out of their abilities. Matrix E = [eij] is used to evaluate order of MA i for
MSA j, where eij equals to 1 means order of MA i is in ability of MSA j, and eij equals
to 0 means order of MA i is out of ability of MSA j. The second layer game is triggered
to nd coalitions when eij = 0. Coalition formation and determination mechanisms have
been discussed in details in section 2.3, and nal coalition of MSA j for MA i is determined
as SFij
5.3.1.2 Determination of equilibriums
In the third layer game (see the area marked by dot-dashed line in Figure 5.9), MA
negotiates with SFij to determine nal equilibrium. MA rstly announces its strategies,
and then SFij reacts by playing the best move based on strategies of MA. Both MA and
SFij want to maximize their prots by choosing their preferential strategies. Interaction
between MA and SFij can be seen as a MA-Stackelberg game as we have discussed before.
Following rule is provided for SFij to decide whether accept strategies or not:
Rule 5.2 When there are still much negotiation time, SFij accepts strategy of MA at
t if and only if prots of all members in SFij are greater than their minimum expected
prots; when there are no negotiation time, SFij accepts strategy of MA at t if and only
if prots of all members in SFij are positive.
Therefore, equilibrium of MA-Stackelberg game can be solved by tackling following
problem:
PFij = argmax
pMij [t]
Mij [t]; 8i; 8j (5.30)
s.t. SCMijlj0 [t]  Minij0 ; 8t <
TN
TS
; 8j0 2 SFij (5.31)
SCMijlj0 [t] > 0; 8t =
TN
TS
; 8i; 8j0 2 SFij (5.32)
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Figure 5.9: Flowchart of MASI negotiation protocol
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ACijl[t]  qMij [t]; 8i; 8j; 8l; 8t (5.33)
where
Mij [t]: prot of MA i with MSA j at t
SCMijlj0 [t]: prot of MSA j
0 in SFij takes the strategy of MA i
Minij0 :minimum expected prot of MSA j
0
ACijl[t]: ability of coalition sijl at t
qMij : quantity of MA i for MSA j
SFij: coalition of MSA j for MA i
and PFij is nal decided equilibrium (price) of negotiation. Equations (5.31) - (5.32) are
used to ensure that nal strategies must be protable, and equation (5.33) indicates the
order must be in ability of MSA j or coalition sijl.
In order to solve equation (5.30), we should know prots of MA and MSA (coalition).
Specially, prot of MSA (coalition) takes strategies of MA and that of takes its own
strategies. We dene prots of MA and MSA (coalition) at t as follows:
Mij [t] = (psellij[t]  pMij [t])Dij[t]  cltMi (ltMij [t]  ltMij [0]) + Sign(qMij [t] Dij[t])
(qMij [t] Dij[t])svi   Sign(Dij[t]  qMij [t])(Dij[t]  qMij [t])csti   pMij [t]qMij [t]
 cfiDij[t]
qMij [t]
  h
M
i q
M
ij [t]
2
; 8i; 8j; 8t (5.34)
Sij[t] = (p
S
ij[t]  Cj)qSij[t] + cltSj (ltSij[0]  ltSij[t])  csj  
hSj q
S
ij[t]
2
; 8i; 8j; 8t (5.35)
SMij [t] = (p
M
ij [t]  Cj)qMij [t] + cltSj (ltSij[0]  ltMij [t])  csj  
hSj q
M
ij [t]
2
;
8i; 8j; 8t (5.36)
Cijlj0 [t] = 
S
ij0(p
S
ij[t]; QSijlj0 [t]; lt
S
ij[t]); 8i; 8j; 8l; 8t (5.37)
SCMijlj0 [t] = 
S
ij0(p
M
ij [t]; QSijlj0 [t]; lt
M
ij [t]); 8i; 8j; 8l; 8t (5.38)
where
Sij[t]: prot of j at t
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SMij [t]: prot of j takes the strategies of MA i at t
Cijl[t]: prot of sijl at t
Cj: cost of MSA j
cfi: xed cost per order of i
cltMi : cost of MA i to shorten or extend the lead time per day
cltSj : cost of MSA j to shorten or extend the lead time per day
csj: set-up cost per order of MSA j
csti: shortage cost of MA i
hMi : holding cost of MA i
hSj : holding cost of MSA j
ltMij [t]: lead time of MA i at t
ltSij[t]: lead time of MSA j at t
pMij [t]: price of MA i at t
pSij[t]: price of MSA j at t
qMij [t]: quantity of MA i at t
qSij[t]: quantity of MSA j at t
svi: salvage value per unit of unsold product of MA i
The rst item of equation (5.34) is prot of sales, the second item is increased or reduced
prot by shortening or extending lead time, the third item is salvage values of unsold parts,
the fourth item is shortage cost, the fth item is purchase cost, the sixth item is xed cost
per order, and the last item is holding cost. The rst items of equations (5.35) - (5.36) are
net prots, the second items are increased or reduced prots by extending or shortening
lead time, the third parts are setup costs per order, and the last items are holding costs.
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Equations (5.37) - (5.38) are used to calculate prots of members in sijl, where QSijlj0 [t]
is order allocation when total order equals to qMij [t].
Determination algorithm of nal equilibrium are dened as follows and owchart is
shown in Figure 5.9.
 Step 1: MA i denes its initial strategies of product it wants to buy as equa-
tions (5.39) - (5.41) and then announces to j. If MSA j is in ability, goes to Step 2, if it
is out of its ability, then triggers coalition formation to nd coalition SFij and then goes
to Step 2.
pMij [0] = p
ML
i (5.39)
qMij [0] = ai   bipMLi (1 + Ui ) (5.40)
ltMij [0] =
qMij [0]
U
(5.41)
where
U : upper bound of prot of MA i
U : upper bound of productivity
pMLi : lower bound of price of MA i
 Step 2: SFij evaluates strategies of MA i. If it agrees, negotiation ends; if it doesn't
agree, then it makes a counter quote as equations (5.42) - (5.44) based on strategies of
MA i and then feeds back counter quote (pSij[t], q
S
ij[t], lt
S
ij[t]) to MA i, and negotiation
enters into Step 3.
pSij[t] = p
S
ij[t  1] 
pSij[t  1]  pMij [t]
(TN   tTS)=TS   
S
p;q(q
M
ij [t])  Sp;lt(ltMij [t]) (5.42)
qSij[t] = fq;p(p
S
ij[t]) (5.43)
ltSij[t] = q
S
ij[t]=j (5.44)
pSij[0] = p
SU
j (5.45)
fq;p(p
S
ij[t]) =
8>><>>:
SUq ; if p
S
ij[t]  pSLj
Sq [t]; if p
SL
j < p
S
ij[t] < p
SU
j
SLq ; if p
S
ij[t]  pSUj :
(5.46)
SUq = q
S
ij[0] (5.47)
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SLq = csj=(p
S
ij[0]  Cj) (5.48)
Sq [t] = 
SU
q  
(SUq   SLq )pSLj
pSLj   pSUj
+
(SUq   SLq )pSij[t]
pSLj   pSUj
(5.49)
pSUj = (1 + 
SU
j )Cj (5.50)
pSLj = (1 + 
SL
j )Cj (5.51)
where
SLj : lower bound of prot of MSA j
SUj : upper bound of prot of MSA j
j: productivity of MSA j
pSLj : lower bound of price of MSA j
pSUj : upper bound of price of MSA j
Sp;q and 
S
p;lt are concession functions of price of MSA related to quantity and lead time of
MA i. They are piece-wise function as shown in Figure 5.3. All threshold values yg can
be dened by MSA j according to its preferential strategies. Equation (5.46) is piece-wise
function of quantity of MSA j related to its price. Equations (5.47) - (5.49) are upper
bound of concession, lower bound of concession, and concession rate at t, respectively.
Equations (5.50) - (5.51) are upper bound and lower bound of price of MSA.
 Step 3: MA i evaluates counter quote from SFij. If it agrees with the strategies,
negotiation ends; if it doesn't agree, then it makes a counter quote based on strategies of
its own and SFij at round t  1 as follows and then re-announces the counter quote:
pMij [t] = p
M
ij [t  1] +
pMUi   pMij [t  1]
(TN   tTS)=TS + 
M
p;lt(lt
S
ij[t  1]) (5.52)
qMij [t] = Dij[t] + 
M
q;p(p
S
ij[t  1]) (5.53)
ltMij [t] = lt
M
ij [t  1] + Mlt;p(pSij[t  1]) (5.54)
psellij[t] = p
M
ij [t](1 + 
U
i ) (5.55)
where pMUi is upper bound of price of MA i, and equations (5.52) - (5.54) are price,
quantity, and lead time of MA i at t. Equation (5.55) is selling price of MA i based on
strategies at round t.
Negotiation iterates until an agreement is reached.
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Figure 5.10: Flowchart of the determination of the nal equilibrium
5.3.1.3 Determination of nal allocation scheme
There are multi-MA and multi-MSA in SCNs, and not only MSAs have competitors,
but also MAs have contestants. All MAs and MSAs have rights to select trade partners
to maximize their prots. All MAs have prone to selecting supplier with the lowest price
to increase their prots and all MSAs want to select manufacturer with the highest price
to increase their prots. Therefore, main point is transformed into how to allocate orders
among MSAs. A two-person like game was proposed in previous work [Yu et al., 2013b]
to solve this problem. We generalize it to multi-attribute negotiation. All MAs are
considered as player 1 and all MSAs are combined as player 2. Player 1 and player 2
make their strategies simultaneously. Strategies of player 1 in the rst layer are scheme to
allocate orders of its members to MSAs. Strategies of player 2 is allocation of all orders
from MAs to its members. The agreement is reached only if strategy of player 1 consists
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with strategy of player 2. Final allocation scheme is determined as matrixes M and Nij,
where M = [mij] is allocation of orders of MAs among MSAs and Nij = [nijl] is order
allocation among coalitions of MSA j when order of MA i is out of ability of MSA j.
There is only one matrix M to record nal allocation of orders of MAs to MSAs. The
value of mij equals to 1 means MA i is allocated to MSA j and mij equals to 0 means
MA i is not allocated to MSA j. Nij exists only if eij equals to 0 and mij equals to 1.
The value of nijl equals to 1 means the order is allocated to the lth coalition of MSA j
(sijl) and nijl equals to 0 means the order is not allocated to the lth coalition of MSA j.
Matrixes M and Nij can be got by solving following problem:
max f1 +2 =
IX
i=1
JX
j=1
mij
M
ij +
IX
i=1
JX
j=1
LX
l=1
nijl
C
ijlg (5.56)
IX
i=1
nijlQS
F
ijl  AFUj ; 8j (5.57)
AFUj = j maxfLT Fij g; 8j (5.58)
JX
j=1
mij = 1; 8i (5.59)
LX
l=1
nijl = 1; 8i; 8j; if mij = 1 (5.60)
where
QSFijlj: nal acquired quantity of MSA j by belonging to SFij
AFUj : nal upper bound of ability of MSA j
LT Fij : nal determined lead time between MA i and MSA j
Final allocation scheme is determined according toM and N after solving equations (5.56)
- (5.60), where the rst part and second part of equation (5.56) are prots of player 1
and player 2, respectively. Equation (5.57) is used to ensure that all allocated orders to
MSA j must be in its ability, equation (5.58) is used to calculate maximum ability at
the longest lead time of all accepted orders, and equations (5.59) - (5.60) mean that each
order must and only can be allocated to one MSA or coalition.
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5.3.2 Simulation and analysis
Simulations are provided to illustrate proposed protocol and verify feasibility of the
proposed protocol in MASI negotiation between multi-MA and multi-MSA. All settings
of parameters of MAs and MSAs are shown in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Parameter settings of MAs and MSAs
MSA MA
J 5 I 5
j U(100,300) h
M
i 3
csSj U(200,300) 
min
i 0.3
Cj U(7,8) 
max
i 0.5
minj 0.2 cf
M
i 100
maxj 0.5 cst
M
i 5
hSj 3 psij[0] U(13,14)
svMi 2
ai U(1000,2000)
bi U(0,100)
5.3.2.1 Verication of the proposed protocol for MASI negotiation
Evaluation matrix can be get as: E =
0BBBBBBB@
1 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1
1CCCCCCCA, and we can see all orders
are out of the abilities of MSA 2 and MSA 3. Thus, MSA 2 and MSA 3 should trigger
coalition formation mechanism to nd coalitions.
Take negotiation between MA 1 and coalition f21g as an example. Fluctuations of
three attributes as t goes by are shown in Figure 5.11 - Figure 5.13, we can get:
- pMijl[t] increases as t increases and p
C
ijl[t] decreases as t increases. We can see that p
M
ijl[t]
keeps unchanging from t = 7 to t = 33. That's because pMijl[t] must be greater than
pML1 . Furthermore, both p
M
ijl[t] and p
C
ijl[t] keep unchanging after t = 34. That's
because pCijl[33] is less than p
M
ijl[33] at t = 33 (see the area marked by ellipse in
Figure 5.11). It means MA 1 and coalition f21g reach an agreement on the price.
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- MA 1 makes a concession on lead time after price reaching an agreement (see the area
marked by ellipse in Figure 5.13).
- The best choice for coalition f21g to reach an agreement is at situation where prot of
taking strategies of MA 1 is greater than taking its own strategies. Therefore, nal
agreement should be reached at t = 7 (see the point which is marked by a dash line
in Figure 5.14). However, nal agreement is reached at t = 35 where strategies are
(9.985, 9648, 28). That's because the agreement can be reached only if the order is
in ability of coalition f21g. We can see from Figure 5.12 that the order is in ability
of coalition f21g only after t = 34. Thus, nal agreement is reached at t = 35, where
the order is in ability of coalition f21g, SMijl [35] equals to 6136.283 is greater than
Sijl[35] equals to 5558.548, and total prot (
M
ijl[35] + 
SM
ijl [35]) equals to 39430.73
(maximum value).
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Figure 5.11: Fluctuation of prices of MA 1 and f21g
Final strategies of negotiations between MAs and MSAs (coalitions) are shown in Ta-
ble 5.5, and MSAs (coalitions) which are not shown in Table 5.5 are failed to reach an
agreement with MAs. Strategies (pF , qF , ltF ), which are determined in the third layer
game, are nal strategies of negotiation between related MA and MSA (coalition). F is
related total prot of two partners of negotiation.
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Figure 5.14: Fluctuation of prots of MA 1 and f21g
Then, the rst layer game is used to nd the optimal allocation scheme based on results
above. We can get nal allocation scheme by solving equation (5.56) as follows:
M =
0BBBBBBB@
0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
1CCCCCCCA
N22 =

0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

N32 =

0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

N43 =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

That's means that MA 1 is allocated to MSA 4, MA 2 is allocated to coalition f24g of
MSA 2, MA 3 is allocated to coalition f214g of MSA 2, MA 4 is allocated to coalition
f31g of MSA 3, and MA 5 is allocated to MSA 5. It's the optimal allocation scheme
under constraints of three attributes, and total prot under above allocation scheme is
102956.86 by calculating equation (5.56).
5.3.2.2 Analysis
We can see from the verication that proposed protocol has characteristics as follows:
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Table 5.5: Final strategies between MAs and MSAs (coalitions)
SFij p
F qF ltF F SFij p
F qF ltF F
MA 1 f1g 9.58 4791 25 15843.9 f4g 9.44 4827 25 15557.7
f21g 9.99 9648 28 39430.7 f5g 9.44 4827 25 15557.7
MA 2 f1g 9.72 1361 9 4530.6 f31g 10.23 2559 9 10756.1
f21g 10.23 2658 9 11654.6 f4g 9.62 1419 9 5327.1
f24g 10.23 4845 12 22218.4 f5g 9.67 1391 9 4708.5
MA 3 f1g 9.79 1226 8 4175.9 f32g 10.44 2840 11 13837.8
f21g 10.45 2080 8 9683.3 f34g 10.55 3609 11 17565.6
f23g 10.44 3000 11 14697.2 f312g 10.53 5165 11 24521.9
f24g 10.56 3766 11 18794.9 f314g 10.53 5945 11 27749.5
f213g 10.53 5315 11 25292.8 f4g 9.47 1418 8 5006.0
f214g 10.56 6082 11 29201.9 f5g 9.79 1226 8 4329.9
MA 4 f1g 9.725 3062 17 10627.9 f4g 9.60 3122 17 12087.4
f21g 10.32 5947 17 27639.8 f5g 9.72 3062 17 10991.5
f31g 10.31 6071 20 26132.4
MA 5 f1g 9.77 2767 16 9799.9 f4g 9.56 2856 16 10824.6
f21g 10.03 5784 16 24311.6 f5g 9.67 2811 16 9846.5
f31g 10.00 5551 19 21195.6
 An agreement can be reached as long as constraints (5.23) - (5.25) are satised, no
matter MA cannot reach an agreement with SFj on price or not.
 The agreement may not be reached even MA has reached an agreement with SFj on
price.
 Attributes may not be monotone changing.
During simulation, we found that MSAs (coalitions) failed to reach agreements with
MAs because MAs decided their quantities based on demand of market. Demand increases
as nal price reduces. It may make MSAs (coalitions) nally cannot nish the order by
themselves, which may be in their abilities at the rst time.
Nextly, we will discuss about eectiveness of proposed protocol in solving MASI nego-
tiation. Simulation is executed by 1000 times and results are shown as Table 5.6, where
average and standard derivation of calculation time are presented. We can see that pro-
posed protocol is eective and stable in solving MASI negotiation between multi-MA and
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multi-MSA.
Table 5.6: Calculation time of MASI negotiation between multi-MA and multi-MSA
Calculation time (sec)
Avg. 0.4066
S.D. 0.0315
5.4 Comparison and analysis
5.4.1 Comparison of the proposed protocol with other protocols
We compare the proposed protocol with Kim's protocol ([Kim et al., 2007]) and Hin-
driks's protocol ([Hindriks et al., 2012]) under three cases, where   [100, 300],   [100,
250] and   [100, 200], respectively. Main dierences of three protocols are as follows:
 Kim's: the agreement is reached if pMj [t] > pSj [t], the nal price equals to (pMj [t] +
pSj [t])=2;
 Hindriks's: the agreement is reached if SMj [t] > minj , and minj is dened to ensure
the order is protable;
 Proposed: the agreement is reached only if equations (5.23) - (5.25) are satised,
the nal price equals to pMj [t], and it is allowed to nd coalitions when the order is out of
ability of MSA.
Then, we can get results as Table 5.7, and Figure 5.15 - Figure 5.17, where the column
Kim is results of Kim's protocol, the column Hind. is results of Hindriks's protocol, the
column Prop. is results of proposed protocol, FS is nal supplier of each protocol, M ,
S and T are prots of MA, MSA and total SCN, respectively, and E is evaluation of
ability of selected nal supplier of each protocol at the agreement point. E equals to 1
means the order is in ability of selected supplier FS, and E equals to 0 means the order
is out of ability of selected supplier FS.
We can see that:
 In Case 1: Final suppliers for Kim's, Hindriks's and proposed protocol are f3g, f1g,
and f4g, and all three protocol can nish the order independently. Kim's protocol gets
the best prots for all parties (see Figure 5.15).
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Table 5.7: Comparisons of three protocols in three cases.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Kim Hind. Prop. Kim Hind. Prop. Kim Hind. Prop.
FS f3g f1g f4g f5g f5g f5g f1g f2g f213g
E 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
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Figure 5.15: Comparisons of three protocols in Case 1
 In Case 2: Final suppliers for Kim's, Hindriks's and proposed protocol are f5g,
f5g, and f5g. Prots of MA, MSA and overall prot are shown as Figure 5.16. Kim's
protocol gets the best prots for MA, the proposed protocol gets the best prots of
MSA and total SCN. Both Kim's protocol and the proposed protocol can nish the order
independently. However, E of Hindriks's protocol equals to 0 (see the sixth column, fourth
row of Table 5.7), which means the order is out of ability of nal supplier f5g even at
the agreement point of Hindriks's protocol. In other words, f5g cannot nish the order
independently. Thus, we can see that Hindriks's protocol needs the coalition formation.
 In Case 3: Kim's protocol gets the best prots for MA and total SC (see M and
T of Kim's in Figure 5.17); E equals to 0 which means the order is out of ability of nal
supplier f1g even at the agreement point. Thus, we can see that Kim's protocol needs
the coalition formation as well. The proposed protocol only gets the best prot for MSA.
However, it can ensure the order of MA is in ability of the nal supplier at the agreement
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Figure 5.16: Comparisons of three protocols in Case 2
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Figure 5.17: Comparisons of three protocols in Case 3
That's because both Kim's and Hindriks's protocols don't consider quantity. They have
good performances when there is no need to take ability of MSA into account. However,
it is crucial to consider the ability of MSA in multi-attribute negotiation. Thus, Kim's
and Hindriks's protocols only suit for situation where all MSAs have big abilities. In real
market, there are a lot of suppliers with limited abilities. The proposed protocol provides
a good way for them to combine together as a coalition and then competed with other
suppliers. It's a win-win protocol for both MA and MSA. For MA, it can nd cheaper
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suppliers; and for MSAs, they can compete for the order by establishing a coalition which
may be rejected for their limited abilities. Furthermore, it is good for increasing the
competitiveness of the market.
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Chapter 6 Coalition Formation Based
Multi-Attribute Multi-Item Negotiation
6.1 Introduction
Both multi-attribute negotiation (discussed in literature [Bichler, 2000], [Kim et al., 2007],
[Park and Yang, 2008], [Lai and Sycara, 2009], and [Hindriks et al., 2012]) and multi-item
negotiation ([Lengwiler, 1999], [Ben-ameur et al., 2002], [Busch and Horstmann, 2002], and
[Shi and Hu, 2006]) are crucial for negotiation of SCNs. Since MA has its own prefer-
ences for attributes of products, and looks for oer that best satises these preferences
[Bichler, 2000]. On the other hand, it needs to buy multi-item to produce their products,
and needs to negotiate with MSAs. MSAs in market consist of large companies as well as
a large number of small-and-medium-sized enterprises. Thus, MA may need to negotiate
and nd a large number of MSAs to fulll its order due to large number of items and
quantities of its order, and limited abilities of MSAs. It will be a hard work for MA to
split its order into pieces and allocate to dierent MSAs when there are diversity items
to buy, and it also causes a lot of external fee (e.g. transport cost). Thus, MA would like
to select MSAs with low price and high ability to reduce its cost. As a result, MA may
have to give up MSAs with the lowest prices but limited abilities, and these MSAs may
lose opportunities to compete for protable orders. Therefore, in this chapter we try to
solve multi-attribute multi-item (MAMI) negotiation.
6.2 Multi-Attribute Multi-Item Negotiation between One-MA
and Multi-MSA
Considering negotiation between one MA and J MSAs, three attributes (price, quantity,
and lead time), and K items are involved. Negotiation model is shown in Figure 6.1, in
which a car company (dened as MA) is taken as an example. MA wants to buy K items
(glasses, tiers, bearings and so on) from MSAs, and attributes of each item are dened as
a triple (pM , qM , ltM). We can see that determination of quantity qM and lead time ltM
of MA depends on demand of market, and demand of market is aected by price pM of
MA. MSAs try to nd partners to establish coalitions when order of MA is out of their
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abilities (the dotted arrows among MSAs indicate negotiations to establish coalitions).
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MSA2
䈈
(p1M, q1M1, lt1M) Item 1 
Item 2 
Item K 
䈈
MSA J
Multi-item
Multi-attribute
Coalition 
(pM, qM, ltM)
MA D
em
an
d
MA: Manufacturer Agent;    MSA: material supplier agent
(p2M, q2M1, lt2M)
(pKM, qKM1, ltKM)
Figure 6.1: MAMI negotiation model between one-MA and multi-MSA
6.2.1 Modied coalition formation based negotiation protocol
Coalition formation of multi-attribute negotiation has been discussed in section 6.2
and it was assumed that coalition cannot be changed once established. However, it was
found that nal determined coalition may be out of ability of the order. That's because
the searchings for coalitions are based on abilities of MSAs which are only calculated at
initial step. Lead time and quantity may be changed during multi-attribute negotiation
which of course lead to the change of abilities of MSAs. Therefore, a dynamic searching
of all possible coalitions are required during multi-attribute negotiation. The MSAs,
which are out of abilities, try to update their coalitions according to strategies of MA at
each negotiation iteration t. A modied coalition formation based negotiation protocol is
proposed as follows and owchart of the protocol is shown in Figure 6.2.
 Step 1: MA calculates market demand and determines its strategies and broadcasts
to all MSAs.
 Step 2: MSAs evaluate the order to check whether the order is in their abilities or
not. If the order is in their abilities, go to Step 4, if the order is out of their abilities, then
go to Step 3.
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 Step 3: MSAs try to nd coalitions, which can maximize their prots at t. If they
succeed in nding coalitions, go to Step 4, if they failed in nding coalitions, then reject
the order.
 Step 4: MSAs determine their strategies and go to Step 5.
 Step 5: MA negotiates with MSAs (coalitions) to determine equilibriums. If equi-
libriums are found, go to Step 8, and if they are not found yet, then go to Step 6.
 Step 6: Check whether terminal condition is reached or not. If it is not reached, go
back to Step 1 and negotiation repeats until an agreement is reached or terminal condition
is reached; if it is reached, then go to Step 7, and failed to reach an agreement.
 Step 7: MA checks whether all MSAs have given reply. If all MSAs have replied, go
to Step 8, if not, then waits until all MSAs give responses.
 Step 8: MA determines nal supplier according to these equilibriums and negotia-
tions end.
6.2.2 Negotiation among MSAs
At each iteration t, MSAs which are out of abilities of MA will trigger the modied
coalition formation to nd coalitions (see section 2.4), and nal determined coalition for
MSA j is indicated as SFj[t] (see section 2.4.1):
SFj[t] =
8<: argmaxsjl[t] f
SC
jl [t]g; if Ajk[t] < qMjk [t]
j; if Ajk[t]  qMjk [t]
(6.1)
AFjk[t] =
X
j02SFj [t]
Aj0k[t] (6.2)
pSFIjk [t] =
P
j02SFj [t] p
SI
j0k
Njk[t]
(6.3)
where
Ajk[t]: ability of item k of MSA j
AFjk[t]: ability of item k of SFj[t]
Njk[t]: number of members in SFj[t] which can supply item k
pSIjk : initial price of item k of MSA j
pSFIjk [t]: initial price of item k of SFj[t]
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Figure 6.2: Flowchart of MAMI negotiation between one-MA and multi-MSA
122
qMjk [t]: quantity of item k of MA at t
SFj[t]: coalition of MSA j at t
6.2.3 Negotiation between MA and MSA (coalition)
Negotiation between MA and SFj[t] starts after SFj[t] has been determined to nd
equilibrium of MIMA negotiation.
6.2.3.1 Determination of strategies
In section 5.2, MA makes concession of price according to current price pMj [t], upper
bound of price pMU , and remain negotiation time. However, it takes longer time to nd
equilibrium if it always compare to its own upper bound of price. Therefore, we change
the upper bound of price pMU into price pSjk[t  1] of SFj at t  1.
(a) Strategies of MA
pMjk [t] = p
M
jk [t  1] +
pSjk[t  1]  pMjk [t  1]
(TN   tTS)=TS + 
M
p;lt(lt
S
jk[t  1]) (6.4)
qMjk [t] = d
M
jk [t] + 
M
q;p(p
S
jk[t  1]) (6.5)
ltMjk = lt
M
jk [t  1] + Mlt;p(pSjk[t  1]) (6.6)
LTMj = maxfltMjk [t]g (6.7)
dMjk [t] = kDj[t] (6.8)
Dj[t] = a  bPMj[t] (6.9)
PMj[t] = (1 + )
KX
k=1
kp
M
jk [t] (6.10)
where
: expected percentage of prot of MA
k :proportion of item k in one nal product
Dj[t]: demand of nal product of MA at t
dMjk [t]: demand of item k of MA at t
ltMjk [t]: lead time of item k of MA at t
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pMjk [t]: price of item k of MA at t
PMj[t]: total price of one nal product of MA at t.
Equation (6.4) is used to calculate price of item k of MA at t, the second part is conces-
sion related to price of SFj[t   1] and remaining negotiation time, and the third part is
concession of price related to lead time of SFj[t  1]. If SFj[t  1] can shorten lead time,
MA will give a discount of price. Equation (6.5) is used to calculate quantity of item k of
MA at t, the rst part is demand of item k of MA at t which depends on demand of nal
product calculated in equations (6.8) - (6.9), and the second part is concession of quantity
of MA related to price of SFj[t   1]. If SFj[t   1] can give a discount of price, MA will
buy more quantity of item k. Equation (6.6) is used to calculate lead time of item k of
MA at t, the second part is concession of lead time of MA related to price of SFj[t  1].
If SFj[t   1] can give a discount of price of item k, MA will agree to extend lead time
of item k. Equation (6.7) is lead time for whole order include all items. Equation (6.10)
is price of one nal product, and it equals to summation of prices of all items which are
needed in one nal product.
(b) Strategies of SFj[t]
pSjk[t] = p
S
jk[t  1] 
pSjk[t  1]  pMjk [t]
(TN   tTS)=TS   
S
p;q(q
M
jk [t])  Sp;lt(LTMj [t]) (6.11)
qSjk[t] = q
S
jk[t  1] 
AFjk[t]  qSFLjk
(TN   tTS)=TS   
S
q;p(p
M
jk [t]) (6.12)
ltSjk =
qSjk[t]
Fjk
(6.13)
qSFLjk =
X
j02SFj [t]
qSLjk (6.14)
Fjk =
X
j02SFj [t]
j0k (6.15)
pSjk[0] = p
SFI
jk (6.16)
qSjk[0] = AFjk[0] (6.17)
where
Fjk: productivity of item k of SFj[t]
ltSjk[t]: lead time of item k of SFj[t]
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pSjk[t]: price of item k of SFj[t]
qSjk[t]: quantity of item k of SFj[t]
qSFLjk : lower bound of quantity of item k of SFj[t].
Equation (6.11) is used to calculate price of item k of MA at t, the second part is concession
related to price of MA at t and remaining negotiation time, and the third part is concession
of price related to quantity of MA at t. If MA buys more quantity of item k, SFj[t] will
give a discount of price. The fourth part of equation (6.11) is concession of price related
to lead time of MA at t. If MA extends lead time of order, SFj[t] will give a discount of
price. Equation (6.12) is used to calculate quantity of item k of SFj[t], the second part
is concession of quantity of SFj[t] related to its minimum required quantity of item k,
and the third part is concession of quantity of SFj[t] related to price of MA at t. If MA
increases price of item k, SFj[t] will give a discount of the minimum required quantity
of item k. Equation (6.13) is used to calculate lead time of item k of SFj[t], and it
depends on quantity and productivity of item k of SFj[t]. Productivity of SFj[t] equals
to summation of productivity of all members in SFj[t] and calculated by equation (6.15).
6.2.3.2 Determination of equilibriums
In section 5.2, strategies of MA at t is determined as equilibrium if these strategies
maximize prot of MA and can be accepted by SFj. Strategies can be accepted by SFj if
prot of taking the strategies is greater than that of taking its own strategies. However, we
found that although overall prot of SFj is greater than take its own strategies, members
in coalition may have negative prots. Thus, following rule is proposed for SFj to check
whether accept strategies or not:
Rule 6.1: Strategies of MA at t can be accepted by SFj if and only if prots of all
members in SFj are greater than their minimum expected prots.
Thus, determination of equilibrium between MA and SFj[t] can be obtained by solving:
max Mj [t];8j (6.18)
s.t. SFCjlj0 [t]  Minj0 ;8j0 2 SFj[t] (6.19)
where
Mj [t] = Dj[t]PMj[t] 
KX
k=1
pMjk [t]q
M
jk [t] +
KX
k=1
(qMjk [t]  dMjk [t])svk
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 (LTMj [t]  LTMj [0])cltM (6.20)
SFj [t] =
KX
k=1
pMjk [t]q
M
jk [t] 
X
j02SFj [t]
KX
k=1
Cj0kQSj0lk[t] + (LT
M
j [t]  ltSj [0])cltSk (6.21)
SFCjlj0 [t] =
KX
k=1
pMjk [t]QSj0lk[t] 
KX
k=1
Cj0kQSj0lk[t]
+(LTMjk [t]  ltSj0k[0])cltSk ; 8j0 2 SFj[t] (6.22)
and
Mj [t]: prot of MA at t
SFj [t]: prot of SFj[t]
SFCjlj0 [t]: prot of MSA j
0 by belonging to SFj[t]
Minj : minimum expected prot of MSA j.
Equation (6.20) is used to calculate prot of MA at t, the rst part is prot of sold
quantity of nal product, the second part is payment it should pay for SFj[t], the third
part is salvage value of unsold quantity of item k, and the last part is prot or loss of
shortening or extending lead time. Equation (6.21) calculates prot of SFj[t], the rst part
is payment it get from MA, the second part is cost of SFj[t] to produce all items, and the
last part is prot or loss of SFj[t] by extending or shortening lead time. Equation (6.22)
is used to calculate prot of MSA j0 by belonging to SFj[t].
6.2.3.3 Determination of nal supplier
After MA found all equilibriums between all SFj[t], it selects the supplier which can
maximize its prot.
6.2.4 Simulation and analysis
We assume there is one MA and six MSAs in SCNs and four items are involved in
negotiation. Experimental parameters are presented in Table 6.1, and  = 0.5, 1 = 6,
2 = 3, 3 = 1, 4 = 2, TN = 60, TS = 1, and clt = 100.
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Table 6.1: Parameter settings of MSAs
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4
jk Cjk jk Cjk jk Cjk jk Cjk
MSA 1 500 1.5 0 0 200 5 0 0
MSA 2 0 0 350 10 0 0 0 0
MSA 3 350 1.7 200 12 150 5.5 0 0
MSA 4 0 0 0 0 220 4.9 200 80
MSA 5 250 1.65 200 10.5 100 5.1 100 90
MSA 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 300 75
6.2.4.1 Verication
After simulation, MA gets all prots by selecting equilibriums related to SFj[t]. MA
gets the highest prot by selecting f214g. f214g indicates the coalition consists of MSA 2,
MSA 1 and MSA 4 (All equilibriums of all possible coalitions are presented in Appendix
A3 of this dissertation). Therefore, the nal supplier of MA is decided as f214g and
related prots of MA and f214g is shown in Table 6.2, where FS is nal determined
supplier, Mj [11] is prot of MA of selecting f214g at t = 11, SFj [11] is prot of f214g
at t = 11, SFCj0 [11] is prot of MSA j
0 of belonging to f214g at t = 11, and Minj0 is the
minimum expected prot of related MSAs in f214g. Thus, we can see from Table 6.2
that prot of MA of selecting f214g equals to 401732.6454, and prot of f214g equals
to 208384. According to equation (6.19), we can see that equilibrium can be reached if
and only if all members in coalition are protable. Thus, we check prots of all members
of f214g. We can see from the fourth column and fth column of Table 6.2 that prots
of MSA 1, MSA 2, and MSA 4 of belonging to f214g equal to 2889, 28698, and 176797,
respectively. All of them are greater than their minimum expected prots. Therefore, we
can see that MSAs in f214g reach an agreement, and the nal iteration of negotiation to
reach equilibrium equals to 11.
Then, we take coalition f214g as an example to show how to nd equilibrium during
negotiation. Prots of all members of f214g are shown in Figure 6.3, where Min1 =
2107.3, Min2 = 2324.4 and 
Min
4 = 2168.4 are the minimum expected prots of MSA 1,
MSA 2 and MSA 4, respectively. Equilibrium can be reached if and only if prots of all
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Table 6.2: Final supplier of MA and related prots
FS Mj [11] 
SF
j [11] j
0 SFCj0 [11] 
Min
j0 [11]
f214g 401732.6 208384 1 2889.0 2107.3
2 28698.0 2324.4
4 176797.0 2168.4
members are greater than Min1 , 
Min
2 and 
Min
4 according to Rule 6.1. We can see that
both prots of MSA 2 (SC2 [5] = 7231) and MSA 4 (
SC
4 [5] = 30937) at t = 5 are greater
than their minimum expected prots, but prot of MSA 1 (SC1 [5] = -4719) is negative.
Therefore, the negotiation goes by and when t = 11 all prots of MSA 1 (SC1 [11] =
2889), MSA 2 (SC2 [11] = 28698), and MSA 4 (
SC
4 [11] = 176797) are greater than their
minimum expected prots. Therefore, the negotiation between MA and f214g reach an
equilibrium at t = 11.
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Figure 6.3: Fluctuation of prots of all members in f214g
Finally, iteration of MIMA negotiation is shown in Figure 6.4 - Figure 6.6 (Take coalition
f214g as an example). Final equilibrium is reached at t = 11, where prices of items
are (1.27, 13.84, 7.25, 108.80), quantities of items are (14770, 8862, 2954, 5908), and
lead times of items are (40, 29, 29, 40). We can see from Figure 6.4 - Figure 6.6 that
the equilibrium is reached even attributes haven't reached agreements. That's because
each side of negotiation starts by selecting their most protable strategies, and the nal
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equilibrium is evaluated not only by one attribute, but on all three attributes.
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6.2.4.2 Analysis
Simulation is executed by 1000 times and results are shown as Table 6.3, where average
and standard derivation of calculation time are presented. We can see that the proposed
protocol is eective and stable in solving MAMI negotiation between one-MA and multi-
MSA.
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Table 6.3: Calculation time of MAMI negotiation between one-MA and multi-MSA
Calculation time (sec)
Avg. 4.3045
S.D. 0.0783
6.3 Multi-Attribute Multi-Item Negotiation between Multi-MA
and Multi-MSA
Considering negotiation between I manufacturer agents (MAs) and J material supplier
agents (MSAs). Three attributes (price, quantity, and lead time), and K items are in-
volved. [Yu et al., 2012b] and [Yu et al., 2013b] discussed SASI negotiation between one
MA and multi-MSA and SASI negotiation between multi-MA and multi-MSA, respec-
tively. However, both of them assumed that only one item is ordered by MA(s). In this
research, the results are generalized to more common situation where MAs want to buy
multi-item at the same time and they want to maximally keep integrity of their orders.
Negotiation model is shown in Figure 6.7, in which a car company (dened as MA) is
taken as an example. MAs want to buy K items (glasses, tiers, bearings and so on) from
MSAs, and attributes of each item are dened as a triple (pMijk, q
M
ijk, lt
M
ijk). Determination
of quantity qMijk and lead time lt
M
ijk of MA i depends on demand of market, and demand of
market is aected by price pMijk of MA i. It is assumed that MSAs try to nd partners to
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establish coalitions when order of MA is out of their abilities (the dotted arrows among
MSAs indicate negotiations to establish coalitions). We assume that the earlier for MAs
to get material the better. That's because MAs may lose potential prots during waiting
for materials.
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Figure 6.7: MAMI negotiation Model between multi-MA and multi-MSA
6.3.1 Coalition formation based negotiation protocol
As we have mentioned in section 6.2.1 that coalition which is in ability at initial rounds
will become out of ability during multi-attribute negotiation. That's because in multi-
attribute negotiation not only price is changing but also lead time, which will lead to
change of ability of coalition. Therefore, a coalition formation which takes change of lead
time into account is required. Coalition formation based negotiation protocol is proposed
as follows:
 Step 1: At each negotiation iteration t, MAs calculate market demand and determine
their strategies and broadcast to all MSAs.
 Step 2: At each negotiation iteration t, MSAs evaluate the order to check whether
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the order is in their abilities or not. If al items are in their abilities, go to Step 4; if some
items are out of their abilities, then go to Step 3.
 Step 3: MSAs try to nd coalitions which can maximize their prots at t. If coalitions
exist, check whether all items have been checked, if all items have been checked go to Step4
and if not then go back until all items have been checked. If coalitions does not exist,
then check whether terminal condition has been arrived. If terminal condition has been
arrived, reject the order and go to Step 7; if has not been arrived, then t plus one and go
back to Step 1.
 Step 4: MSAs determine their strategies and go to Step 5.
 Step 5: MAs negotiate with MSAs (coalitions) to determine equilibriums, if equilib-
riums are found, go to Step 7, and if they are not found yet, then go to Step 6.
 Step 6: Check whether terminal condition is reached or not. If it is reached, nego-
tiation ends and fails to reach an agreement and go to Step 7; if it is not reached, then t
plus one, and go back to Step 1.
 Step 7: Check whether all MSAs have given responses. If all MSAs have given
responses, go to Step 8; if not all MSAs have given responses, then wait until all MSAs
give replies.
 Step 8: MA determines nal allocation scheme according to equilibriums obtained
from Step 5 and negotiation ends.
Flowchart of the protocol is shown in Figure 6.8. Details of related protocol are dis-
cussed in following sections.
6.3.2 Coalition formation mechanism
The coalition SCij[t] which can maximize its prot will be determined as nal coalition
according to section 2.4 by solving following problems:
SCij[t] = argmax
sijl[t]
(pMijk[t]  Cjk)QSijljk[t] (6.23)
s.t. ACijlk[t]  qMijk[t];8k (6.24)
where
QSijlj0k[t] = Aij0k[t]q
M
ijk[t]=ACijlk[t];8j0 2 sijl[t];8k (6.25)
ACijlk[t] =
X
j02sijl[t]
j0kLT
M
ij [t] (6.26)
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Figure 6.8: Flowchart of coalition formation based MAMI negotiation protocol
133
SCijlj0 [t] =
KX
k=1
pMijk[t]QSijlj0k[t] 
KX
k=1
Cj0kQSijlj0k[t] +
KX
k=1
(ltMijlk[t] (6.27)
 ltSij0k[0])cltSj0
and
SCijlj0 [t]: prot of MSA j
0 by belonging to coalition sijl[t]
j0k: productivity of item k of MSA j
Aijk[t]: ability of item k of MSA j at t
ACijlk[t]: ability of item k of coalition sijl[t]
cltSj0 : prot or loss of MSA j
0 by extending or shortening the lead time per day
Cjk: cost of item k of MSA j
pMijk[t]: price of item k of MA i for MSA j at t
ltMijlk[t]: lead time of item k of MA i for coalition sijl[t]
LTMij [t]: lead time of MA i for MSA j at t
qMijk[t]: quantity of item k of MA i for MSA j at t
QSijljk[t]: acquired quantity of item k of MSA j by belonging to sijl[t]
ACijlk[t]: coalition of MSA j for MA i at t.
Equation (6.23) is used to nd coalition sijl[t] in which prot of MSA j is maximized,
equation (6.24) is used to ensure that determined coalition must in abilities of all items
of MA i, and related acquired quantity QSijljk[t] and total ability ACijlk[t] are calculated
by equation (6.25) and equation (6.26), respectively. Prot is allocated according to
contributions of its members as equation (6.27) after coalition is formed, where the rst
part is payment of MSA j can receive by belonging to coalition sijl[t], the second part is
cost of MSA j to supply received part, and the last part is prot or loss of extending or
shortening lead time.
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6.3.3 Determination of equilibriums
Determination of equilibrium depends on strategies of MAs and MSAs (coalitions).
Thus, determination of strategies of MAs, MSAs, and coalitions are discussed at rst.
They determine their strategies according to their own preferences. !Mi;p, !
M
i;q, and !
M
i;lt are
respectively dened as weights of price, quantity and lead time of MA i, and !Sj;p, !
S
j;q,
and !Sj;lt are dened as weights of price, quantity and lead time of MSA j, respectively.
Concessions, which are not only among attributes but also among items, are taken into
account during determination of strategies. MAs and MSAs make concessions according
to their related weight of each attribute. zx;y(y) is concession rate of attribute x related to
attribute y of z and calculated by equation (5.2), where x, y 2 fp, q, ltg, and z 2fM , Sg.
p, q, and lt indicate concession is related to price, quantity and lead time, respectively.
M and S indicate it's concession of MA and MSA, respectively. x;yg is threshold value of
concession of attribute x related to attribute y, and yg is piece-wise constant of attribute
y.
6.3.3.1 Strategies of MAs
It is assume that MAs in this research have more negotiation powers and initiatives.
They announce their strategies rstly. Concessions among attributes have been discussed
in section 5.2.3. Thus, we can get:
pMijk[t] = p
M
ijk[t  1] + !Mi;p(PMUik   pMijk[t  1])=(TN   tTS)=TS
+!Mi;p
M
p;lt(lt
S
ijk[t  1]) (6.28)
qMijk[t] = d
M
ijk[t] + !
M
i;q
M
q;p(p
S
ijk[t  1]) (6.29)
ltMijk[t] = lt
M
ijk[t  1] + !Mi;ltMlt;p(pSijk[t  1]) + !Mi;ltMlt;q(qMijk[t]) (6.30)
LTMij [t] =
K
max
k=1
fltMijk[t]g (6.31)
dMijk[t] = ikD
M
ij [t] (6.32)
DMij [t] = ai   biPMij [t] (6.33)
PMij [t] = (1 + i)
KX
k=1
ikp
M
ijk[t] (6.34)
where
i: percentage of prot of MA i
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ik: proposition of item k of MA i
dMijk[t]: demand of item k of MA i for MSA j at t
DMij [t]: demand of nal product of MA i at t
PMUik : upper bound of price of item k of MA i
PMij [t]: total price of unit nal product of MA i at t
pSijk[t  1]: price of item k of MSA j for MA i at t  1.
Equations (6.28) - (6.30) are used to calculate price, quantity and lead time of MA i at
tth iteration of negotiation with MSA j. The second part of equation (6.28) is concession
related to remain negotiation time, and the third part is concession related to lead time
of MSA j at t   1. The second part of equation (6.29) is concession related to price of
MSA j at t   1. The second part of equation (6.30) is concession of lead time related
to price of MSA j at t   1, and the third part of equation (6.30) is concession of lead
time related to its own quantity. Equation (6.31) is used to calculate nal lead time of
the whole order and it equals to the maximal lead time of all items. Equation (6.32) is
used to calculate demand of each item k at t, and it depends on demand of nal product
DMij [t] at t. Demand of nal product at t is calculated by equation (6.33), it is assumed
in an additive form, and depends on price of nal product PMij [t] at t. Equation (6.34) is
used to calculate price of nal product, and it equals to summation of prices of all needed
items.
6.3.3.2 Strategies of MSAs
MSAs determine their strategies according to strategies of MAs at t, and make conces-
sions as discussed in section 5.2.3. Thus, all three attributes are dened as follows:
pSijk[t] = p
S
ijk[t  1]  !Sj;p(pSijk[t  1]  pMijk[t])=(TN   tTS)=TS   !Sj;pSp;q(qMijk[t])
 !Sj;pSp;lt(LTMij [t]) (6.35)
qSijk[t] = Aijk[t]  !Sj;qSq;p(pMijk[t])  !Sj;qSq;lt(LTMij [t]) (6.36)
ltSijk[t] = lt
SU
ijk [t]  !Sj;ltSlt;p(pMijk[t]) (6.37)
ltSUijk [t] = Aijk[t]=jk (6.38)
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Aijk[t] = jkLT
M
ij [t] (6.39)
pSijk[0] = P
SU
jk = (1 + 
SU
j )Cjk (6.40)
where
SUj : upper bound of percentage of prot of MSA j
ltSijk[t]: lead time of item k of MSA j at t
ltSUijk : upper bound of lead time of item k of MSA j
P SUjk : upper bound of price of item k of MSA j
qSijk[t]: quantity of item k of MSA j for MA i at t.
Equations (6.35) - (6.37) are used to calculate price, quantity and lead time of MSA j
at iteration t. The second part of equation (6.35) is concession of price of MSA j related
to remain negotiation time, the third part is concession related to quantity of MA i at
t, and the last part is concession related to lead time of MA i at t. The second part of
equation (6.36) is concession of quantity of MSA j related to price of MA i at t, and the
third part is concession related to lead time of MA i at t. Equation (6.37) is used to
calculate lead time of MSA j at t, the rst part is upper bound of lead time of MSA j for
item k, and the second part is concession related to price of MA i at t. Equation (6.38)
is to calculate upper bound of lead time of MSA j for item k. Aijk[t] in equation (6.36)
is ability of MSA j of item k at t, and is calculated by equation (6.39). Initial price of
MSA j equals to upper bound of its expected price, and is calculated by equation (6.40).
6.3.3.3 Strategies of coalitions
Strategies of coalition sijl[t] of MSA j are calculated by
pCijlk[t] = p
C
ijlk[t  1]  !Sj;p(pCijlk[t  1]  pMijk[t])=(TN   tTS)=TS   !Sj;pSp;q(qMijk[t])
 !Sj;pSp;lt(LTMij [t]) (6.41)
qCijlk[t] = ACijlk[t]  !Sj;qSq;p(pMijk[t])  !Sj;qSq;lt(LTMij [t]) (6.42)
ltCijlk[t] = lt
CU
ijlk[t]  wSj;ltSlt;p(pMijk[t]) (6.43)
ltCUijlk[t] = ACijlk[t]=
X
j02sijl[t]
j0k (6.44)
where
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ltCijlk[t]: lead time of item k of coalition sijl[t]
ltCUijlk[t]: upper bound of lead time of item k of coalition sijl[t]
pCijlk[t]: price of item k of coalition sijl[t]
qCijlk[t]: quantity of item k of coalition sijl[t].
Equations (6.41) - (6.44) are used to calculate price, quantity, lead time of item k,
and upper bound of lead time of coalition sijl[t], respectively. Calculations of concessions
among attributes are the same with calculations of MSAs.
6.3.3.4 Determination of equilibriums
It has been assumed above that MAs in proposed model have more negotiation power.
Thus, interaction between MA and MSA (coalition) can be seen as a MA-Stackelberg
game, where MA is the leader. Objective of the leader is to design its move to maximize
its prot after considering all rational moves follower may devise. Strategies of MAs
which can maximize their prots are determined as nal equilibriums. However, these
equilibriums must be accepted by MSAs or coalitions as well. In order to maintain
stabilities of coalitions, it is assumed that equilibriums are accepted by coalitions if and
only if all members in coalitions are protable. Prots of MAs and coalitions are dened
as:
Mij [t] = D
M
ij [t]P
M
ij [t] 
KX
k=1
pMijk[t]q
M
ijk[t] +
KX
k=1
(qMijk[t]  dMijk[t])svik (6.45)
 (LTMij [t]  LTMij [0])cltMi
Cijl[t] =
KX
k=1
pMijk[t]q
M
ijk[t] 
KX
k=1
X
j02sijl
Cj0kQSijlj0k + (LT
M
ij   LT Sij )cltSj (6.46)
where
Mij [t]: prot of MA i with MSA j at t
Cijl[t]: prot of coalition sijl[t]
cltMi : prot or loss of MA i by shortening or extending the lead time per day
svik: salvage value of item k of MA i.
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The rst part of equation (6.45) is prot of sold parts of MA i, the second part is salvage
value of unsold part, the third part is payment MA i should pay for coalition sijl[t], and
the last part is prot or loss of extending or shortening lead time. Equation (6.46) is used
to calculate prot of coalition sijl[t], the rst part is payment got from MA i, the second
part is total cost of members in coalition sijl[t] to supply all items, and the last part is
prot or loss of shortening or extending lead time.
Equilibrium of negotiation between MA i and coalition sijl[t] can be obtained by solving
following problem:
argmax fMij [t]g (6.47)
s.t. Mij [t] > 0 (6.48)
SCijlj0 [t] > 0;8j0 2 sijl[t] (6.49)
ACijlk[t]  qMijk[t];8k (6.50)
where equation (6.47) indicates that strategies of MA i at t can be determined as equilib-
rium if it can maximize prot of MA i. Equations (6.48) - (6.50) are constraints, where
equation (6.48) is used to ensure MA i is protable at t by accepting this equilibrium,
equation (6.49) is used to ensure all members in coalition sijl[t] are protable at t by
accepting this equilibrium, and equation (6.50) is used to ensure that coalition sijl[t] must
be in ability at t.
What should we pay attention to is sijl[t] equals to j and ACijlk[t] equals to Aijk[t] if it's
trying to nd equilibrium of negotiation between MA i and MSA j rather than coalition
sijl[t].
6.3.4 Determination of nal allocation scheme
The negotiation tries to determine nal allocation scheme after all MSAs sending their
responses. It can be seen as a two-person game as we have discussed in section 3.3.1.1,
where all MAs are considered as player 1 and all MSAs are combined as player 2. Strategy
of player 1 is allocation scheme Uw of assigning MAs to MSAs, where Uw = [u1; :::; uI ],
and ui = j indicates that MA i is allocated to MSA j. Strategy of player 2 ~Uv is allocation
scheme of assigning obtained orders from MAs to coalitions of MSAs, where ~Uv = [~uji]JI ,
~uji = l indicates obtained order of MSA j from MA i is allocated to the l
th coalition
sijl[TFijl] of MSA j at TFijl, and ~uji =  indicates MA i is not allocated to MSA j.
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Objective of the game is to decide strategies of players which can maximize total prot of
SCNs. Therefore, allocation scheme can be called as an equilibrium of the game if none
of members of players can benet by changing its strategy while the other player keep
its strategy unchanging. The innovative point is players in the two-person game actually
consist of multiple players. In order to reduce complexity to solve the problem, strategy
of player 1 Uw and strategy of player 2 ~Uv are combined together as mijl, where mijl
equals to 1 if and only if ui equals to j and ~uji equals to l, and otherwise it equals to 0.
Determination of mijl is done by a market mediator. Thus, nal equilibrium which can
maximize total prot of SCNs (SCNwv ) can be obtained by solving
max SCNwv =
IX
i=1
JX
j=1
LX
l=1
mijl(
M
ijl[TFijl] + 
C
ijl[TFijl]) (6.51)
s.t. mijlACijlk[TFijl]  qMijk[TFijl]; 8i; 8j; 8l; 8k (6.52)
Mijl[t] > 0 (6.53)
SCij [TFijl] > 0; 8j 2 sijl[TFijl] (6.54)
JX
j=1
LX
l=1
mijl = 1; 8i (6.55)
IX
i=1
LX
l=1
mijlQSijljk[TFijl]  AUjk[TFijl]; 8j; 8k (6.56)
AUjk = jk
I
max
i=1
fmijlLTMij [TFijl]g;8j;8k (6.57)
TFijl = argmax
t
fMijl[t]g (6.58)
mijl 2 f0; 1g; 8i;8j; 8l (6.59)
where
TFijl: nal iteration index of reaching equilibrium between MA i and coalition sijl[t]
AUjk: upper bound of ability of item k of MSA j.
Equation (6.51) is used to calculate total prot of whole SCNs, equation (6.52) is used
to ensure nal determined coalition is in ability of the related order, equation (6.53) is
used to ensure all MAs are protable, equation (6.54) is used to ensure that all members in
nal determined coalitions are protable, equation (6.55) is used to ensure that each MA
i must be allocated to only one coalition, equation (6.56) is used to ensure that each MSA
j can only accept orders which are in its ability, and equation (6.57) is used to calculate
140
upper bound of ability of MSA j at the longest lead time of all orders it received. TFijl
is nal iteration time to get equilibrium of negotiation between MA i and coalition sijl[t]
by solving equation (6.58).
6.3.5 Simulation and analysis
Simulations are provided in this section to imitate MAMI negotiation based on the
proposed protocol. We assume there is ve MAs and six MSAs in SCNs and four items
are involved in negotiation. Experimental parameters are presented in Table 6.4. We also
assume that ai equals to 5000, bi equals to 5, i equals to 0.3, 
U
j equals to 2, TN equals
to 60, TS equals to 1, and both cltMi and clt
S
j equal to 100. ik equals to 5, 3, 1, and 2 for
item 1, item 2, item 3 and item 4, respectively. svik of item 1, item 2, item 3, and item
4 equals to 0.1, 0.5, 1, and 5, respectively. !p = 0.5, !q = 0.25 and !lt = 0.25. Eclipse
IDE for Java Developers and ILOG CPLEX 12.0 are used to execute simulations to verify
feasibility of proposed protocol.
Table 6.4: Parameter settings of MSAs.
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4
jk Cjk Q
SL
jk jk Cjk Q
SL
jk jk Cjk Q
SL
jk jk Cjk Q
SL
jk
MSA 1 500 1.5 240 0 0 0 200 5 169 0 0 0
MSA 2 0 0 0 350 10 22 0 0 0 0 0 0
MSA 3 350 1.7 350 200 12 17 150 5.5 152 0 0 0
MSA 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 220 4.9 178 200 80 10
MSA 5 250 1.65 250 200 10.5 22 100 5.1 152 100 80 10
MSA 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 300 75 11
6.3.5.1 Verication
Details of coalitions and equilibriums are omitted, and nal strategies of player 1 and
player 2 are as follows:
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Uw1 =

2 6 3 2 3

, ~Uv1 =
0BBBBBBBBBB@
    
18   9 
  15  15
    
    
 6   
1CCCCCCCCCCA
,
where Uw1 and ~Uv1 are strategies of player 1 and player 2 in Case 1, respectively. Uw1
and ~Uv1 indicate that MA 1 is allocated to the 18
th coalition f2136g of MSA 2, MA 2
is allocated to the 6th coalition f612g of MSA 6, MA 3 is allocated to the 15th coalition
f356g of MSA 3, MA 4 is allocated to the 9th coalition f216g of MSA 2, and MA 5 is
allocated to the 15th coalition f356g of MSA 3 in Case 1.
Table 6.5: Final allocation scheme in Case 1.
sFijl 
MF
ijl 
CF
ijl TFijl 
SCN
wv
MA 1 f2136g 603325.9 204248 20 4168005.2
MA 2 f612g 818285.6 63604.2 11
MA 3 f356g 627854.4 163012.8 19
MA 4 f216g 805315.6 72204.0 11
MA 5 f356g 678699.5 131454.8 17
6.3.5.2 Analysis
We can see from above verication that the proposed protocol was feasible in solving
MAMI negotiation.
(a) Calculation time
Nextly, we will discuss about eectiveness of proposed protocol in solving MAMI nego-
tiation. The simulation is executed by 1000 times and the results are shown as Table 6.6,
where average and standard derivation of calculation time are presented. We can see the
proposed protocol is eective and stable in solving MAMI negotiation between multi-MA
and multi-MSA.
(b) Comparison of the proposed protocol under dierent weights
In this section, eects caused by weights of attributes are discussed. Nine cases are
provided, where MAs and MSAs prefer to give the biggest concessions of their prices in
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Table 6.6: Calculation time of MAMI negotiation between multi-MA and multi-MSA
Calculation time (sec)
Avg. 1.5767
S.D. 0.0543
Case 1, Case 4, and Case 7, give the biggest concessions of quantities in Case 2, Case 5,
and Case 8, and give the biggest concessions of lead time in Case 3, Case 6, and Case 9,
respectively.
 Case 1: !p =0.5, !q =0.25,!lt =0.25;
 Case 2: !p =0.25,!q =0.5, !lt =0.25;
 Case 3: !p =0.25,!q =0.25,!lt =0.5;
 Case 4: !p =0.6, !q =0.2, !lt =0.2;
 Case 5: !p =0.2, !q =0.6, !lt =0.2;
 Case 6: !p =0.2, !q =0.2, !lt =0.6;
 Case 7: !p =0.8, !q =0.1, !lt =0.1;
 Case 8: !p =0.1, !q =0.8, !lt =0.1;
 Case 9: !p =0.1, !q =0.1, !lt =0.8.
(c) Relationship between the weights and the convergence rates
Equilibriums of the negotiations between MAs and MSAs or coalitions can be obtained
by solving equations (6.47) - (6.50). Total numbers of in ability coalitions for MAs in 9
cases are shown in Table 6.7, where NSi is total number of suppliers (include MAs and
coalitions), with which MA i succeed to nd equilibrium.
Details of all equilibriums are presented in Appendix A4, and after simulation we
have:
 It's faster to nd equilibriums when weight of price is the biggest: in Case 1, Case 4,
and Case 7;
 Prices of items are higher when weight of price is the biggest: in Case 1, Case 4, and
Case 7;
 Quantities of items are higher when weight of quantity is the biggest: in Case 2, Case
5, and Case 8.
Results are shown in Figure 6.9 - Figure 6.11, and we can see that:
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Table 6.7: The number of in ability coalitions in dierent cases.
NSi
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 Case 8 Case 9
MA 1 134 130 141 123 102 110 125 58 62
MA 2 130 130 138 125 109 109 125 94 111
MA 3 130 128 132 113 80 97 124 48 49
MA 4 130 125 134 125 112 112 125 94 114
MA 5 134 130 141 121 95 108 125 60 60
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Figure 6.9: Comparison of TF related to !p.
- TFi decreases as !p increases (see Figure 6.9);
- TFi increases as !q increases (see Figure 6.10);
- TFi increases as !lt increases (see Figure 6.11).
(d) Relationship between weights and iterations of attributes
The negotiation between MA 2 and coalition f612g is taken as an example to illustrate
iteration of three attributes in nine cases. Final equilibriums in nine cases are shown in
Figure 6.12 - Figure 6.14, where TFi is nal iteration to reach equilibriums, and p
F
ijk, q
F
ijk,
and ltFijk is price, quantity, and lead time of item k at TF . We can see from Figure 6.12
that pFijk has the highest values in Case 1, Case 4, and Case 7, and from Figure 6.13 that
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Figure 6.10: Comparison of TF related to !q.
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Figure 6.11: Comparison of TF related to !lt.
ltFijk has the highest values in Case 3, Case 6, and Case 9. Moreover, it's faster to nd
equilibriums in Case 1, Case 4, and Case 7 (see TFi in Figure 6.12), in which weight of
price has the highest value.
Then, we take item 1 as an example to illustrate iteration of attributes in Case 1 - Case
3. Iteration of attributes are shown in Figure 6.15 - Figure 6.17, where PM1, PM2, and
PM3, QM1, QM2, and QM3, and LTM1, LTM2, and LTM3 are prices, quantities,
and lead time of MA 2 in Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3, respectively; PC1, PC2, and PC3,
QC1, QC2, and QC3, and LTC1, LTC2, and LTC3 are prices, quantities, and lead time
of coalition f612g in Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3, respectively. We can get from Figure 6.15
- Figure 6.17 that:
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Figure 6.12: Final prices in nine cases.
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Figure 6.13: Final quantities in nine cases.
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Figure 6.14: Final lead time in nine cases.
 In Case 1: weight of price has the highest value.
- PM1 gives the greatest concessions in Case 1 (e.g. PM1[3] = 0.919 is greater than
PM2[3] = 0.887 and PM3[3] =0.887 in Figure 6.15(a)). That's because concession
rate (the second parts and third parts of equation (6.28)) is the greatest in Case 1.
- PC1 gives the greatest concessions in Case 1 (e.g. PC1[3] = 3.035 is less than PC2[3]
= 3.960 and PC3[3] = 3.60 in Figure 6.15(b)). That's because concession rate (the
second parts and third parts of equation (6.41)) is the greatest in Case 1.
 In Case 2: weight of quantity has the highest value.
- QM2 has the highest value in Case 2 (e.g. QM2[11] = 19095 is greater than QM1[11]
= 18265 and QM3[11] = 19095 in Figure 6.16(a)). That's because concession rates
(the second part of equation (6.29)) is the greatest in Case 2.
- QC2 has the lowest value in Case 2 (e.g. QC2[11] = 19719.09 is less than QC1[11] =
19937.70 and QC3[11] = 19940.41 in Figure 6.16(b)). That's because concession
rate (the second part and third part of equation (6.42)) is the highest in Case 2.
 In Case 3: weight of lead time has the highest value.
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Figure 6.15: Fluctuation of quantity in Case 1 - Case 3.
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Figure 6.16: Fluctuation of quantity in Case 1 - Case 3.
149
- LTM3 has the highest value in Case 3 (e.g. LTM3[11] = 39.881 is greater than
LTM1[11] = 39.875 and LTM2[11] = 39.438 in Figure 6.17(a)). That's because
concession rate (the second part and third part of equation (6.30)) is the greatest
in Case 3.
- LTC3 has the highest value in Case 3 (e.g. LTC3[11] = 39.881 is greater than LTC1[11]
= 39.875 and LTC2[11] = 39.438 in Figure 6.17(b)). That's because concession rate
(the second part of equation (6.30)) is the greatest in Case 3.
Finally, we compare attribute uctuations under the same situations, where price has
the highest weight (Case 1, Case 4, and Case 7), quantity has the highest weight (Case
2, Case 5, and Case 8), and lead time has the highest weight (Case 3, Case 6, and Case
9). Then, we have:
 !p related:
- From Figure 6.18(a), we can see that MA 2 has the highest value of price in Case 7,
and concession of price increases as !p increases;
- From Figure 6.18(b), we can see that coalition f612g has the highest value of price in
Case 7 as well, and concession of price increases as !p increases.
 !q related:
- From Figure 6.19(a), we can see that MA 2 has the lowest value of quantity in Case 8,
and concession of quantity decreases as !q increases;
- From Figure 6.19(b), we can see that coalition f612g has the lowest value of quantity
in Case 8 as well, and concession of quantity increases as !q increases.
 !lt related:
- From Figure 6.20(a), we can see that MA 2 has the lowest value of lead time in Case 9,
and concession of lead time decreases as !lt increases;
- From Figure 6.20(b), we can see that coalition f612g has the lowest value of lead time
in Case 9 as well, and concession of lead time increases as !lt increases.
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Figure 6.17: Fluctuation of lead time in Case 1 - Case 3.
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Figure 6.18: Fluctuation of price in Case 1, Case 4, and Case 7.
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Figure 6.19: Fluctuation of quantity in Case 2, Case 5, and Case 8.
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Figure 6.20: Fluctuation of lead time in Case 3, Case 6, and Case 9.
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Table 6.8: Parameter settings of MAs
k pMUik p
ML
ik q
MI
ik lt
MI
ik k p
MU
ik p
ML
ik q
MI
ik lt
MI
ik
MA 1 1 3.86 0.08 24997 68 MA 3 3 18.42 4.12 4973 29
MA 1 2 36.79 8.38 14836 59 MA 3 4 272.22 60.66 9211 46
MA 1 3 18.34 4.49 4970 29 MA 4 1 3.73 0.79 24974 68
MA 1 4 272.89 60.44 9214 46 MA 4 2 36.84 8.95 14825 59
MA 2 1 3.41 0.85 24972 68 MA 4 3 18.84 4.95 4967 29
MA 2 2 36.90 8.33 14837 59 MA 4 4 272.13 60.79 9209 46
MA 2 3 18.87 4.80 4968 29 MA 5 1 3.54 0.07 24997 68
MA 2 4 272.47 60.34 9215 46 MA 5 2 36.82 8.74 14829 59
MA 3 1 3.12 0.040 24998 68 MA 5 3 18.89 4.37 4971 29
MA 3 2 36.65 8.33 14837 59 MA 5 4 272.20 60.15 9218 46
6.4 Comparison of Four Types of Negotiations
SASI, SAMI, MASI, and MAMI negotiations are compared in this section. Five MAs,
six MSAs, and four items are involved in simulation. Parameters of MAs and MSAs are
shown as Table 6.8 and Table 6.9, respectively. pMUik , p
ML
ik , q
MI
ik , and lt
MI
ik are upper bound
price, lower bound price, initial quantity, and initial lead time of item k of MA i. Cjk,
jk, and CSjk are cost, productivity, and setup cost of item k of MSA j.
Table 6.9: Parameter settings of MSAs
Item Cjk jk CSjk Item Cjk jk CSjk
MSA 1 1 1.5 500 211 MSA 4 4 80 200 552
MSA 1 3 5 200 672 MSA 5 1 1.65 250 202
MSA 2 2 10 350 249 MSA 5 2 10.5 200 210
MSA 3 1 1.7 350 226 MSA 5 3 5.1 100 613
MSA 3 2 12 200 187 MSA 5 4 80 100 621
MSA 3 3 5.5 150 625 MSA 6 4 75 300 635
MSA 4 3 4.9 220 619
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Table 6.10: Results of SASI negotiation
MA Item MSA SFik 
M
ijk 
S
ijk 
T
1 1 5 f51346g 81724.18 54891.66 23812290.55
1 2 2 f21346g 527998.03 368445.72
1 3 3 f3256g 89177.54 36270.69
1 4 4 f41236g 2512728.94 937856.34
2 1 3 f312456g 66585.47 44142.06
2 2 3 f31456g 530726.31 284804.87
2 3 4 f4256g 94477.32 38681.12
2 4 4 f41236g 2509274.46 935565.65
3 1 1 f12456g 58536.76 88758.01
3 2 5 f51346g 526368.23 283385.35
3 3 5 f5236g 90198.49 22719.81
3 4 6 f61234g 2502794.62 1410893.66
4 1 1 f12456g 78834.96 86946.60
4 2 2 f21346g 528167.74 369574.74
4 3 4 f4236g 92403.10 36388.90
4 4 6 f61235g 2500127.44 1767860.86
5 1 3 f32456g 70614.20 79111.96
5 2 3 f312456g 530848.82 156782.29
5 3 1 f126g 95454.76 52905.71
5 4 5 f51234g 2508621.50 760641.71
6.4.1 Results of SASI negotiation
In SASI negotiation, MAs negotiate with MSAs for each item, and only price is con-
sidered. Final allocation of SASI negotiation is shown as Table 6.10, where SFik is nal
determined coalition for item k of MA i, Mijk and 
S
ijk are prots of MA and MSA related
to item k, and T is total prot of supply chain networks.
We can see from Table 6.10 that item 1, item 2, item 3 and item 4 of MA 1 is allocated
to coalition f51346g, f21346g, f3256g, and f41236g, respectively. Item 1, item 2, item
3 and item 4 of MA 2 is allocated to coalition f312456g, f31456g, f4256g, and f41236g,
respectively. Item 1, item 2, item 3 and item 4 of MA 3 is allocated to coalition f12456g,
f51346g, f5236g, and f61234g, respectively. Item 1, item 2, item 3 and item 4 of MA
4 is allocated to coalition f12456g, f21346g, f4236g, and f61235g, respectively. Item 1,
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item 2, item 3 and item 4 of MA 5 is allocated to coalition f32456g, f312456g, f126g,
and f51234g, respectively. Total prot of SCNs under the allocation is 23812290.548.
6.4.2 Results of SAMI negotiation
In SAMI negotiation, MAs negotiate with MSAs for all items (items are combined
together), and only price is considered. Final allocation of SAMI negotiation is shown as
Table 6.11, where SFi is nal determined coalition for MA i, 
M
i , 
S
j , and 
T are prots
of MA i, MSA j, and total prot of SCNs, respectively.
Table 6.11: Results of SAMI negotiation
SFi 
M
i 
S
j 
T
MA 1 MSA 4 f412356g 3446470.98 3490330.50 34860420.35
MA 2 MSA 4 f412356g 3560963.04 3457656.73
MA 3 MSA 1 f123456g 3433494.13 3457523.24
MA 4 MSA 2 f213456g 3634729.86 3447554.22
MA 5 MSA 2 f213456g 3456372.19 3475325.46
We can see from Table 6.11 that MA 1 is allocated to coalition f412356g, MA 2 is
allocated to coalition f412356g, MA 3 is allocated to coalition f123456g, MA 4 is allocated
to coalition f213456g, and MA 5 is allocated to coalition f213456g. Total prot of SCNs
under the allocation is 34860420.35.
6.4.3 Results of MASI negotiation
In MASI negotiation, MAs negotiate with MSAs for each item, and price, quantity and
lead time are considered. Final allocation of MASI negotiation is shown as Table 6.12,
where SFik is nal determined coalition for item k of MA i, 
M
ijk and 
S
ijk are prots of
MA and MSA related to item k, and T is total prot of supply chain networks.
We can see from Table 6.12 that item 1, item 2, item 3 and item 4 of MA 1 is allocated
to coalition f246g, f5146g, f526g, and f6123g, respectively. Item 1, item 2, item 3 and
item 4 of MA 2 is allocated to coalition f5246g, f2146g, f326g, and f6123g, respectively.
Item 1, item 2, item 3 and item 4 of MA 3 is allocated to coalition f246g, f3146g, f526g,
and f5123g, respectively. Item 1, item 2, item 3 and item 4 of MA 4 is allocated to
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Table 6.12: Results of MASI negotiation
MA Item MSA SFik 
M
ijk 
S
ijk QFijk LTFijk 
T
1 1 2 f246g 80128.83 138514.36 24940 68.09 31706212.78
1 2 5 f5146g 540947.76 518295.22 14781 59.13
1 3 5 f526g 85373.27 82095.94 4956 29.05
1 4 6 f6123g 2300438.30 2609116.36 8790 47.27
2 1 5 f5246g 73128.13 124729.79 24950 68.04
2 2 2 f2146g 543718.82 510870.16 14781 59.13
2 3 3 f326g 87057.68 80325.67 4954 29.05
2 4 6 f6123g 2297548.23 2604575.65 8792 47.27
2 1 2 f246g 52620.17 152372.74 24935 68.10
3 2 3 f3146g 527766.65 535777.82 14766 59.17
3 3 5 f526g 87456.34 77579.58 4958 29.05
3 4 5 f5123g 2291617.80 2592365.28 8788 47.27
4 1 3 f3246g 74820.54 146715.10 24940 68.06
4 2 5 f5146g 533813.97 548653.51 14769 59.13
4 3 3 f326g 86247.90 82146.03 4953 29.05
4 4 5 f5123g 2289694.38 2595857.07 8788 47.26
5 1 3 f3246g 68888.38 145658.30 24940 68.09
5 2 5 f5146g 536505.63 537353.70 14772 59.14
5 3 5 f526g 89019.98 81754.49 4957 29.05
5 4 6 f6123g 2296707.03 2597956.26 8794 47.27
coalition f3246g, f5146g, f326g, and f5123g, respectively. Item 1, item 2, item 3 and
item 4 of MA 5 is allocated to coalition f3246g, f5146g, f526g, and f6123g, respectively.
Total prot of SCNs under the allocation is 31706212.777.
6.4.4 Results of MAMI negotiation
In MAMI negotiation, MAs negotiate with MSAs for all items (items are combined
together), and price, quantity, and lead time are considered. Final allocation of MAMI
negotiation is shown as Table 6.13, where QFik is nal determined quantity of item k of
MA i, LTFi is nal lead time of MA i, SFi is nal determined coalition for MA i, 
M
i ,
Sj , and 
T are prots of MA i, MSA j, and total prot of SCNs, respectively.
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Table 6.13: Results of MAMI negotiation
MA Item QFik LTFi MSA SFi 
M
i 
S
j 
T
1 1 10820 70.47 2 f23456g 281059.72 540571.86 4029959.84
1 2 6492
1 3 2164
1 4 4328
2 1 12375 65.07 2 f2456g 286782.79 491698.65
2 2 7425
2 3 2475
2 4 4950
3 1 9255 76.53 1 f12346g 266186.00 562057.18
3 2 5553
3 3 1851
3 4 3702
4 1 12315 65.09 2 f2456g 286694.62 493805.57
4 2 7389
4 3 2463
4 4 4926
5 1 10855 70.32 2 f23456g 281289.41 539814.04
5 2 6513
5 3 2171
5 4 4342
We can see from Table 6.13 that MA 1 is allocated to coalition f23456g, MA 2 is
allocated to coalition f2456g, MA 3 is allocated to coalition f12346g, MA 4 is allocated
to coalition f2456g, and MA 5 is allocated to coalition f23456g. Total prot of SCNs
under the allocation is 4029959.838.
6.4.5 Comparison and analysis
Results of SASI, SAMI, MASI, and MAMI negotiation are compared in this section.
6.4.5.1 Single-attribute negotiation and multi-attribute negotiation
Single-attribute negotiation is compared with multi-attribute negotiation in this sec-
tion. What we should pay attention to is quantities and lead time of items will never be
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changed in single-attribute negotiation, they always equals to initial values of quantities
and lead time. However, quantities and lead time will be changed during multi-attribute
negotiation. We can get:
- Prots for MSAs and total SCNs are higher in MASI negotiation than in SASI ne-
gotiation (see Sj and 
T of MASI and SASI in Figure 6.21). We can say that
multi-attribute negotiation is better for MSAs and SCNs.
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Figure 6.21: Comparison of prots of four negotiations.
- Prots of MAs are lower in MASI negotiation than in SASI (see Mi of MASI and SASI
in Figure 6.21). However, it cannot be said that MAs get higher prots in SASI
negotiation than in MASI negotiation. That's because the nal reached equilibriums
of quantities and lead time are dierent in MASI negotiation and SASI negotiation.
We can see from Figure 6.22 and Figure 6.23 that the nal quantities are lower in
MASI negotiation than in SASI negotiation, and the lead time is higher in MASI
negotiation than in SASI negotiation, which of course will lead to the decrease
of prots of MAs. Furthermore, MAs and MSAs in MASI negotiation can make
concession among attributes according to their own preferences.
- Prots of MAs, MSAs, and SCNs are lower in MAMI negotiation than in SAMI ne-
gotiation. As the same with above analysis, decreases of prots are because of the
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dierences of quantities and lead time in MAMI negotiation and SAMI negotia-
tion. We can see from Figure 6.22 and Figure 6.23 that the quantities of items in
MAMI negotiation are greatly lower than in SAMI negotiation, and the lead time
is almost higher in MAMI negotiation than in SAMI negotiation. Furthermore,
MAs and MSAs in MAMI negotiation can make concession according to their own
preferences.
6.4.5.2 Single-item negotiation and multi-item negotiation
Single-item negotiation is compared with multi-item negotiation in this section, and we
can get the results as:
- Prots of MAs, MSAs, and total SCNs are higher in SAMI negotiation than in SASI
negotiation. We can see multi-item negotiation can improve prots of MAs and
MSAs according to their own preferences.
- Prots of MAs, MSAs, and total SCNs are lower in MAMI negotiation than in MASI
negotiation. However, it cannot be said that MASI negotiation is better than MAMI
negotiations because the nal reached equilibriums of quantities and lead time are
dierent in MAMI and MASI negotiations. We can see from Figure 6.22 and Fig-
ure 6.23 that quantities in MAMI negotiation are greatly lower than in MASI, and
lead time in MAMI negotiation is higher than in MASI. We can see that multi-item
negotiation can give concessions among items according to their own preferences.
6.4.5.3 Analysis
According to analysis of section 6.4.5.1 and 6.4.5.2, we can get conclusion that multi-
attribute negotiation is better than single-attribute negotiation when agents have dierent
preferences on attributes, and multi-item negotiation is better than single-item negotia-
tion when agents have dierent preferences on items. Moreover, it is protable to combine
items and(or) attributes during negotiation. MAs and MSAs can trade o items or at-
tributes during negotiation according to their own preferences.
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Chapter 7 Summary and Conclusion
7.1 Summary
This dissertation addresses the problem of negotiation of supply chain networks. Main
purposes of this research are to nd another way to solve problems when orders of MAs
are out of abilities of MSAs, which can maximally keep integrities of orders of MAs;
nd another way to solve multi-to-multi game by decomposing multi-to-multi game into
two-person Stackelberg game, J-person cooperative game, and two-person game.
The results obtained in this dissertation can be summarized as follows:
Chapter 1 presents background and motivation for this research, denes its purpose and
presents a basic outline of the study problem. Literature reviews on multi-agent based
supply chain networks, multi-agent based negotiation of supply chain networks, and multi-
agent based coalition formation of supply chain networks are described. Finally, structure
of dissertation is presented.
Chapter 2 addresses coalition formation mechanism for MSAs when order of MA is out
of their abilities. Coalition formation protocols are proposed for single-item negotiation
and multi-item negotiation, respectively. Determination of coalition and allocation of
prot among members are discussed as well. Then, a modied coalition formation protocol
which takes change of lead time into account, is presented to get used to dynamic changing
during multi-attribute negotiation.
Chapter 3 is comprised of two main parts. In the rst part, SASI negotiation between
one-MA and multi-MSA is discussed. It is veried that the proposed two-stage negotiation
protocol is eective and feasible in solving SASI negotiation between one-MA and multi-
MSA. Comparisons are provided and veried that the proposed protocol with concession
is faster to reach agreement than the protocol without concession. Furthermore, it is
veried that convergence rate greatly depends on concession rate, and the higher the
concession rate the faster to reach agreement. In the second part, SASI negotiation
between multi-MA and multi-MSA is addressed. A hierarchical-game based negotiation
protocol is proposed. Simulations are provided and veried eciency and feasibility of the
proposed protocol. It is proved that the proposed coalition formation based protocol is
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superior to greedy algorithm which splits the orders into piece. It doesn't only maintain
integrity of the order, but also reduces workload of MA and increases prots of MA,
MSAs, and total SCNs.
Chapter 4 is comprised of two main parts. In the rst part, SAMI negotiation between
one-MA and multi-MSA is discussed. It is testied that the proposed protocol is eective
and stable in solving SAMI negotiation between multi-MA and multi-MSA. In the second
part, SAMI negotiation between multi-MA and multi-MSA is addressed. A coalition for-
mation based negotiation protocol is presented. It is certied that the proposed protocol
have a good performance in solving SAMI negotiation between multi-MA and multi-MSA
as well.
Chapter 5 discusses MASI negotiations between one-MA and multi-MSA, and between
multi-MA and multi-MSA, respectively. A modied two-stage negotiation protocol and
a modied hierarchical-game based negotiation protocol is proposed for two negotiations,
respectively. It is veried that the proposed two protocols are eective and stable in
solving MASI negotiations. They can better o agents by trade o one attribute for
another according to their own preferences. Comparisons are provided and veried the
necessity of using coalition formation mechanism. Moreover, the proposed protocol is
good for increasing the competitiveness of the market.
Chapter 6 presents a modied coalition formation based negotiation protocols for MAMI
negotiations between one-MA and multi-MSA, and between multi-MA and multi-MSA,
respectively. It is veried that the proposed negotiation protocols are eective, stable, and
exible in solving MAMI negotiation problem. They can better o agents not only have
tradeo among attributes but also can have tradeo among items according to their own
preferences. Comparisons of SASI, SAMI, MASI, and MAMI negotiations are provided,
and veried that multi-attribute negotiation is better than single-attribute negotiation
when agents have dierent preferences on attributes, and multi-item negotiation is better
than single-item negotiation when agents have dierent preferences on items.
In this dissertation, negotiation between MA(s) and MSAs of SCNs is discussed step-
by-step. In chapter 3, SASI negotiation is discussed, and then result is extended to
negotiation where multi-item is involved in chapter 4. The results of chapter 3 is general-
ized into MASI negotiation in chapter 5. Based on result of chapter 5, we popularize the
proposed model into the most complex situation in chapter 6, where MAMI are involved.
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7.2 Conclusion
This dissertation focuses on negotiation between MA(s) and MSAs when the order(s) of
manufacture agent(s) is(are) out of abilities of MSAs. It tries to solve this problem using
coalition formation mechanism which allows material supplier agents to nd partners to
establish coalitions when they cannot nish the order(s) independently.
Moreover, game theory is adopted to analyze interactive optimization problems exist in
negotiation between MA(s) and MSAs. The I  J game is decomposed into two-person
game (MA(s) negotiate with MSAs to decide nal trade partnership), J-person coopera-
tive game (all MSAs negotiate to establish coalitions), and two-person Stackelberg game
(MA(s) negotiate(s) with MSAs coalitions to decide nal equilibriums), which greatly
reduces complexity to solve I  J game.
The proposed coalition formation based negotiation protocols are reciprocal protocols
for both MAs and MSAs:
- MAs can reduce cost to divide orders into pieces and allocate to dierent MSAs by
selecting coalitions to keep integrities of orders (e.g. they need to pay for transport
fees for dierent suppliers when they split orders for dierent suppliers), and reduce
cost to buy materials by selecting suppliers which have lower price but once have
been abandoned due to their limited abilities.
- On the other hand, MSAs have more opportunities to win orders which were once out
of their abilities by establishing coalition.
- In addition, the proposed protocol increases the competitiveness of MSAs in SCNs.
Furthermore, the proposed protocols are very exible, because all MAs and MSAs
can dene weights of attributes and concession rates among dierent attributes or items
according to their own preferences:
- They not only can tradeo one attribute to another;
- but also can tradeo one item to another in order to maximize their total prots of
whole order according to their own preferences rather than maximize each attribute
or item.
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The proposed coalition formation based negotiation protocols are veried in dierent
situations where SASI, SAMI, MASI, and MAMI are involved, respectively. It is shown
that the proposed protocols are feasible and eective in solving real problems.
7.3 Future Research Direction
This dissertation focuses on negotiation between MA(s) and MSA(s), and only two ech-
elons of supply chain networks are involved. The results can also be generalized into other
negotiations between MA(s) and retailer agent(s), between retailer agent(s) and consumer
agent(s), or generalized into multi-echelon negotiation. Furthermore, it is assumed that
negotiation environment is static, no MAs or MSAs are allowed entering into negotiation
after negotiation starts. For future work, the proposed protocol can be applied into the
situation where negotiation environment is dynamic changing. In other words, new par-
ticipates are allowed entering negotiation even negotiation has started. Moreover, in this
dissertation it is assumed that MAs have more negotiation powers, and it can be extended
to the situation where MSAs have more negotiation powers or where MAs have the same
negotiation powers as MSAs. Only was concession related to deadline of negotiation con-
sidered in this research. Concession related to trading opportunity (related to the number
of trading partner) and competition (related to the number of competitors) can be taken
into account in future.
In this research only abilities of MSAs are considered. We just focus on nding the
solution which can nish the order and don't consider of nishing the order just in time.
Because the inventory cost of MSAs of nishing the orders before the due time is not
taken into account. Next step of our research will take cost of nishing the order too
early into account.
Another possible direction for this research can be focused on the scales of coalitions.
In this dissertation, the scales of coalitions are not considered, however, it's impossible
or unrealistic to establish huge-scale coalitions in real SCN. Furthermore, one objective
of this dissertation is to keep integrity of the order of MA, while the degree of integrity
is not discussed. It's assumed that the whole order is kept integrity in this dissertation,
which is a hard assumption in real manufacturing system as well. Therefore, for future
work, the degree of integrity should be considered as well.
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Appendix
A1. All equilibriums for MA with all SFj
MSA SFj TF k p
F
j q
F
j lt
F
j 
M S
0 f013g 12 0 1.256 14365 41 406108.244 2703.809
12 1 15.004 8619 29
12 2 7.178 2873 29
12 3 112.535 5746 41
f015g 10 0 1.165 15085 39 397768.095 2568.992
10 1 13.992 9051 29
10 2 6.658 3017 29
10 3 104.943 6034 39
f0245g 9 0 1.118 15460 38 392221.657 2565.025
9 1 13.462 9276 29
9 2 6.386 3092 29
9 3 100.962 6184 38
f04g 20 0 1.558 11990 49 413841.232 9052.287
20 1 18.341 7194 29
20 2 8.901 2398 29
20 3 137.556 4796 49
1 f103g 11 0 1.269 14770 40 401732.645 28698.806
11 1 13.845 8862 29
11 2 7.253 2954 29
11 3 108.801 5908 40
f105g 9 0 1.178 15515 38 391413.339 23492.118
9 1 12.772 9309 29
9 2 6.731 3103 29
9 3 100.962 6206 38
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MSA SFj TF k p
F
jk q
F
jk lt
F
jk 
M S
f14g 20 0 1.605 12035 49 414066.675 26115.827
20 1 17.803 7221 29
20 2 9.170 2407 29
20 3 137.556 4814 49
2 f213g 13 0 1.299 14095 42 408520.375 6125.880
13 1 14.851 8457 29
13 2 7.425 2819 29
13 3 116.140 5638 42
f23g 14 0 1.341 13765 43 410978.854 19525.681
14 1 15.328 8259 29
14 2 7.664 2753 29
14 3 119.615 5506 43
f234g 10 0 1.165 15160 39 396676.880 4454.742
10 1 13.317 9096 29
10 2 6.658 3032 29
10 3 104.943 6064 39
f24g 53 0 1.056 16375 82 371112.879 2801.925
53 1 12.073 9825 60
53 2 6.036 3275 38
53 3 91.167 6550 82
f245g 9 0 1.118 15540 38 391040.749 2526.7516
9 1 12.772 9324 29
9 2 6.386 3108 29
9 3 100.962 6216 38
3 f301g 11 0 1.269 15080 40 397707.494 150093.048
11 1 14.507 9048 29
11 2 6.922 3016 29
11 3 103.836 6032 40
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MSA SFj TF k p
F
jk q
F
jk lt
F
jk 
M S
f32g 14 0 1.396 14030 43 408848.914 203606.661
14 1 15.949 8418 29
14 2 7.664 2806 29
14 3 114.960 5612 43
f324g 8 0 1.130 16235 37 378566.145 55290.133
8 1 12.915 9741 29
8 2 6.106 3247 29
8 3 91.586 6494 37
f34g 53 0 1.064 16415 82 370461.615 55548.139
53 1 12.156 9849 60
53 2 6.036 3283 38
53 3 90.546 6566 82
4 21 0 1.588 12110 50 414055.294 292723.887
21 1 18.146 7266 29
21 2 9.073 2422 29
21 3 136.097 4844 50
f403g 14 0 1.341 14110 43 408177.642 78299.735
14 1 15.328 8466 29
14 2 7.664 2822 29
14 3 114.960 5644 43
f423g 10 0 1.165 15540 39 390890.690 31747.103
10 1 13.317 9324 29
10 2 6.658 3108 29
10 3 99.874 6216 39
f425g 9 0 1.118 15925 38 384276.855 19015.908
9 1 12.772 9555 29
9 2 6.386 3185 29
9 3 95.790 6370 38
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MSA SFj TF k p
F
jk q
F
jk lt
F
jk 
M S
5 f501g 9 0 1.178 15825 38 386155.468 135399.564
9 1 13.462 9495 29
9 2 6.731 3165 29
9 3 95.790 6330 38
f52g 14 0 1.396 14020 43 408991.609 228397.298
14 1 15.949 8412 29
14 2 7.974 2804 29
14 3 114.960 5608 43
f524g 8 0 1.130 16220 37 378786.134 84405.612
8 1 12.915 9732 29
8 2 6.457 3244 29
8 3 91.586 6488 37
A2. Fluctuation of  related to I and J
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A3. Fluctuation of AT related to I and J
A4. Statistic results of the equilibriums of MAs in nine cases
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J=3
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0
0.05
0.1
0 10 20 30 40
pMijk[TFi] q
M
ijk[TFi]
MA TFi k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4
Case 1
1 29.43 1.198 16.793 8.594 123.360 14867.7 8920.6 2973.5 5947.1
2 24.09 1.459 15.102 8.133 110.625 15833.0 9499.8 3166.6 6333.2
3 30.58 0.992 17.094 8.545 126.143 14693.3 8816.0 2938.7 5877.3
4 23.52 1.470 15.399 8.160 109.646 15865.3 9519.2 3173.1 6346.1
5 29.10 1.080 16.953 8.612 122.161 14948.8 8969.3 2989.8 5979.5
Case 2
1 41.66 1.114 16.165 8.288 118.662 15257.8 9154.7 3051.6 6103.1
2 35.17 1.427 14.743 7.956 107.954 16052.5 9631.5 3210.5 6421.0
3 44.05 0.970 16.896 8.445 124.662 14814.8 8888.9 2963.0 5925.9
4 33.27 1.392 14.655 7.789 104.011 16328.6 9797.2 3266.7 6531.4
5 41.81 1.023 16.490 8.372 118.663 15238.0 9142.8 3047.6 6095.2
Case 3
1 42.11 1.143 16.378 8.392 120.259 15125.0 9075.0 3025.0 6050.0
continued on next page
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MA TFi k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4
2 35.17 1.421 14.676 7.923 107.464 16093.0 9655.8 3218.6 6437.2
3 43.77 0.961 16.809 8.401 124.012 14868.6 8921.2 2973.7 5947.4
4 33.59 1.397 14.702 7.812 104.366 16299.4 9779.6 3259.9 6519.7
5 42.21 1.047 16.688 8.475 120.161 15114.1 9068.4 3022.8 6045.6
Case 4
1 26.12 1.206 12.764 6.823 91.750 14828.2 10434.8 3478.3 6956.5
2 20.96 1.453 14.526 7.533 105.225 15872.2 9797.1 3265.7 6531.4
3 27.00 0.991 16.045 8.219 116.947 14697.3 9231.0 3077.0 6454.0
4 20.69 1.472 18.077 9.270 132.035 15856.8 8475.9 2825.3 65650.6
5 26.25 1.106 20.193 10.318 147.962 14814.4 7688.9 2563.0 5126.0
Case 5
1 45.58 1.095 16.024 8.219 117.613 15345.4 9207.2 3069.1 6138.2
2 37.92 1.391 14.337 7.756 104.942 16300.5 9780.3 3260.1 6520.2
3 47.53 0.937 16.589 8.290 122.370 15003.8 9002.3 3000.8 6001.5
4 36.86 1.388 14.614 7.769 103.699 16354.7 9812.8 3270.9 6541.9
5 45.69 1.005 16.349 8.299 117.600 15326.4 9195.9 3065.3 6130.6
Case 6
1 45.68 1.099 16.049 8.231 117.793 15330.5 9198.3 3066.1 6132.2
2 38.30 1.385 14.275 7.725 104.487 16337.8 9802.7 3267.6 6535.1
3 46.92 0.914 16.373 8.180 120.758 15137.1 9082.3 3027.4 6054.8
4 37.27 1.379 14.534 7.729 103.092 16404.6 9842.7 3280.9 6561.8
5 45.63 1.001 16.318 8.284 117.370 15345.5 9207.3 3069.1 6138.2
Case 7
1 22.34 1.279 17.403 8.891 127.926 14488.6 8693.2 2897.7 5795.4
2 18.25 1.512 15.691 8.423 114.996 15473.4 9284.0 3094.7 6189.3
3 23.41 1.066 17.777 8.890 131.244 14270.6 8562.3 2854.1 5708.2
4 18.13 1.543 16.089 8.504 114.878 15434.8 9260.9 3087.0 6173.9
5 22.51 1.176 17.732 9.015 128.045 14461.4 8676.8 2892.3 5784.5
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MA TFi k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4
Case 8
1 54.66 0.987 15.207 7.821 111.500 15852.4 9511.4 3170.5 6341.0
2 47.67 1.277 13.065 7.129 95.497 17077.8 10246.7 3415.6 6831.1
3 55.38 0.818 15.492 7.735 114.172 15682.1 9409.3 3136.4 6272.8
4 46.35 1.246 13.267 7.097 93.487 17194.8 10316.9 3439.0 6877.9
5 54.43 0.889 15.406 7.812 110.481 15916.0 9549.6 3183.2 6366.4
Case 9
1 54.16 0.955 14.967 7.703 109.702 16001.9 9601.1 3200.4 6400.7
2 48.29 1.297 13.292 7.241 97.183 16939.1 10163.5 3387.8 6775.7
3 55.20 0.803 15.357 7.667 113.166 15765.2 9459.1 3153.0 6306.1
4 47.41 1.286 13.646 7.286 96.361 16958.3 10175.0 3391.6 6783.3
5 54.27 0.876 15.304 7.759 109.709 15979.9 9588.0 3196.0 6392.0
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